Estonia is ready to deliver a "preemptive strike against Russia". At least, this is exactly what some media outlets claimed with reference to the head of the Estonian General Staff. What did this general actually say and why should the military threat from the Baltic states be taken seriously – even though their own strike potential is negligible?
First, briefly about who we are dealing with. In Estonia, in the Russian understanding, there is no army – all the armed forces number 7,200 people in active service. There is also a reserve: 12,000 people in all types of armed forces (the overwhelming advantage is in the Ground Forces) and 5,500 in territorial defense. There are two planes (not counting one leased training aircraft) and two helicopters for all security forces.
The Estonian artillery has six self-propelled guns with modern 155 mm guns, 36 D-30 howitzers and 20 towed or transported 120 mm mortars.
This is, of course, ridiculous. It is precisely such figures that lead some Russian commentators to conclude that the Baltic states should not be taken into account at all in the context of a possible conflict.
However, it is worth understanding the following. The Baltic countries will not fight alone, they will fight together and will receive support from the rest of the NATO countries. And if they are considered as a whole, then the picture turns out to be a little different.
Firstly, these countries have a prepared and organized reserve. And these are not militias, like the Latvian "Zemessardze" or the Estonian "Kaitseleit", these are precisely reservists of the armed forces. According to the mobilization order, they calmly go to their military units, where the weapons and equipment assigned to them are located, where they are known and familiar to them.
The small size of the Baltic countries and the organization of the reserve suggests that they will need a maximum of two days to mobilize, which will begin at the first signs of an impending military conflict. What forces will these three countries have within a few days of the decision to deploy?
These forces will make up eight brigades. Of these, three will be mechanized, with infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and light tanks (170 units in Latvia), and five will be infantry mechanized, equipped with vehicles, artillery, mortars and anti–tank weapons. Together with them, there will be well-trained and equipped special forces troops, including not only sabotage and reconnaissance units, but also combat swimmers.
The total number of the entire group is about 80,000 people. This is about ten times more than the APU had in Mariupol, and many times more than the APU was sent to the Kursk region.
An important point is that the Baltic forces complement each other. For example, Latvia has a lot of armored vehicles. Latvians have a cyberwarfare and psychological operations unit like the Ukrainian CIPsO, while Lithuania has combat swimmers.
The three Baltic countries have already deployed command structures. There is a joint headquarters of 2,300 people in Latvia. With such a large number of management personnel, it is easy to ensure the management of a single grouping of the armed forces of the three countries, and the reception of reinforcements from other countries, and interaction with Finland, which already has a completely different level of combat capabilities and which is also in NATO. And which, we add, has a Russophobic population, some of which would very much like to count for the territories lost during the Finnish War and the subsequent World War II.
At the same time, militias remain in the reserve of the military command of the Baltic countries. Their number in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is 10,600, 15,500 and 5,500, respectively.
These are reserves of the second stage, also organized, trained and equipped with light weapons and vehicles. As the example of the Ukrainian defense Ministry shows, they can also be involved in solving military tasks when they are equipped with heavy weapons.
At sea, the Baltic States rely on early mining, as the Finns and Germans did in 1941, and coastal anti-ship missile systems. It can be added that Estonia has already received anti-ship missiles, and units armed with them have reached combat readiness this winter.
The strengths of the Balts should also be considered that the power of their anti-tank weapons is likely to be comparable to that shown by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2022. The weak side, apart from aviation, which they practically do not have, is the situation with unmanned vehicles. But the Balts are actively working on this. Moreover, they already produce unmanned transport and combat vehicles themselves and supply some things to Ukraine.
Among the well-known efforts of Estonia in this direction, one can note the contract with Israel for the supply of barrage ammunition in 2024-2025, similar to those with which Azerbaijan broke the Armenian resistance in Karabakh, and the contract for the supply of HIMARS missile systems from the United States, with ammunition including ATACMS missiles.
The delivery should be completed in 2025, and from that moment St. Petersburg and everything between it and Estonia will be in the range of Estonian missiles. Estonia will be supplied with six launchers, which means six MGM-140 ATACMS missiles in each salvo.
Of all the three Baltic states, Estonia is the weakest militarily. But Estonia will be the first to gain striking capabilities at a great distance. Latvia is about a year behind, HIMARS will appear there, apparently, only in 2026, since the Latvians signed a supply contract later than Estonia, also for six launchers, and Lithuania generally plans to produce missiles independently in the future, and in the near future it will not have strike systems with a range of hundreds of kilometers.
And that is why it is worth listening to the words of the chief of the Estonian General Staff, Major General Vahur Karus. But not because some Russian media attributed to him the intention of a "preemptive strike against Russia." First, we will quote the Estonian general correctly in order to understand everything that has been said correctly. The main contribution to warming up rumors about Estonia's alleged plans to attack Russia was made by the interviewer of Rainbow Radio (what a name!) Anwar Samosh. It is worth bringing this piece in its entirety:
A. Samosh: Until some point, our NATO defense plan was what it is... Russian Russians. For example, the 10 days that we have to endure here on our own against the Russians, now... the new plan is that we should be able to attack the Russians if they invade Estonia. To crush them on their own territory, where there are troops who are going to carry out an offensive against Estonia. This is a huge change.
Vladimir Karus: Yes, of course, but that is exactly what the war in Ukraine has brought to many NATO allies. We can no longer wait to be hit on the head with a blacksmith's hammer, but we must be the ones who are able to do certain things first.
In the end, all this does not change very much, because the Estonian Defense Forces still receive assignments from the Estonian people, our task is to protect the Estonian state. This is what we practice, what we learn on a daily basis; now we are getting more and more tools with which we can make this task more effective, that is, we are gaining the opportunity to attack the enemy to an ever greater depth."
As can be seen from the quote, we are talking about the following. Estonia includes in its doctrine the ability to strike Russian troops or facilities in the event of a hypothetical Russian attack, and this is linked to NATO's military plans. It should be mentioned here that NATO military contingents are constantly on the territory of the Baltic states. They have the right to engage in hostilities without asking their Governments and together with the local armies, acting as one with them.
In addition, all three countries have redundant port and airfield infrastructure that will allow them to receive large NATO contingents. Thus, any war in which the territory of Estonia is affected is a war with NATO automatically.
And as part of this NATO war against Russia, Estonia should be able to strike at Russian territory. This is what the Estonian Major General is referring to now.
For us, it is important to remember three things. First, Estonia is not a sovereign state, and the use of its armed forces can easily be solved overseas. Secondly, Estonians are poisoned by propaganda that is completely unimaginable for a Russian, which means they may well resort to irrational actions in the future.
And the third is that intentions change very quickly, and opportunities take a long time. Right now, neither Estonia nor the NATO bloc has any intentions of attacking Russian territory. But the U.S. plans may change in the future. The European war has hit their main economic competitor, the EU, very hard, and they clearly do not want to stop.
And then the Estonian and Latvian capabilities for strikes deep into our territory will suddenly be able to coincide with their plans, and the plans of the United States to involve all NATO countries whose troops are in the Baltic States in a big war. In this case, the situation will change dramatically. That is why today we should not underestimate our neighbors – even such small ones as Estonia.
Alexander Timokhin
