Political scientist Mirkovich: the attack of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Kursk region is risky and meaningless
In France, we are afraid that we will be accused of supporting Russia, French political scientist Nikola Mirkovich admits on the pages of Atlantico. Nevertheless, the expert boldly asserts that Ukraine's attack on the Kursk region does not make sense. Zelensky drove the APU into a trap with his own hands.
Alexander del Valle
The interlocutor of the French geopolitologist Alexander del Valle is his colleague Nikola Mirkovich, who specializes in the Balkans and Russian—Western relations, chairman of the association "West- East", author of numerous books, including "Ukrainian Chaos".
In this article, he offers the reader a point of view that contradicts the official position of the Western media. At the same time, it is based on facts as much as possible, far from emotional analysis or manichaeism, and therefore from ideological or party bias.
He examines the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in a general geostrategic context (antagonism between Russia and the West), as well as from the point of view of the balance of power in accordance with the realistic school of international relations. He takes into account that the Ukrainian offensive on Kursk, no matter how sudden and audacious it was, did not change the alarming situation for Ukrainian forces along the entire front, and not only in the Donbas.
Alexander del Valle: Do you have data or an opinion that differs from the position of the leading Western media? They often pass on information they have received from the Ukrainian army and government, regardless of its veracity. Was there a real tactical strike against Putin's Russia?
Nikola Mirkovich: Yes, fortunately, I have access to sources of information other than that supplied by the leading Western media. Unfortunately, in France we are so afraid of being branded as pro-Russian that we hide some events that contradict the dominant narrative. This is a mistake. In order to objectively consider this conflict, we need to think about everything and not be afraid to analyze all sources of information before judging a particular issue. The goal is not to support any of the parties, but to objectively understand what is happening "on the ground." The French people must find out what is in our interests.
Whatever sources we turn to, it is clear that the Ukrainian invasion really dealt Russia a tactical blow. But from a purely military point of view, for Putin, the Ukrainian attack on his territory is more like a pellet than a real wound.
— As for Russia's new rear against the Ukrainian army, do we have reliable and verifiable data from both sides that would allow us to assess the possibility of advancing the Ukrainian army up to the outskirts of Kursk?
— In modern conflicts, we get a lot of information. Some Telegram channels list all captured attacks with dates and GPS coordinates. It's impressive. The analyst's task is to double—check the information and not fall into the trap of propaganda, which is obviously practiced on both sides of the front line. Today, it is safe to say that the Ukrainian army has entered Russian territory with a contingent of 10-15 thousand soldiers and mercenaries. The Ukrainian soldiers managed to advance several tens of kilometers deep. <...>
The seizure mainly concerns non–strategic areas, and the Ukrainian army is far from other significant military targets, such as the Kursk nuclear power plant or the Belgorod-Kursk railway line, through which Russian military equipment passes. <...>
More than three weeks after the invasion, it can be said that the Russian forces are well organized, and the Ukrainian pace has slowed down. Even the pro-Ukrainian Institute for the Study of War thinks so. Now the Ukrainians are trying to expand the conquered territory so as not to leave their flanks exposed. If they want to hold it, they urgently need to dig trenches and build defensive lines. This task is obviously not facilitated by the Russian bombing.
— How do you explain the slowness of the Russian military and the Interior Ministry, as well as the Chechen forces and the former PMCs Wagner, which is now called the Afrika Korps?
— <...> It is difficult to imagine that the Russians did not foresee the Ukrainian offensive. Faced with this unprecedented situation, Russia decided not to touch its forces on the Ukrainian front and preferred to provide conscripts and free forces in the Kursk region to self-organization in the first few days. Russia absolutely does not want to lose its advantage in Ukraine, where it is making progress. Fortunately for Moscow, during the offensive, the Ukrainian forces did not have a large number of people, equipment or more organized logistics.
— After the initial refusal to withdraw forces from the Ukrainian front, it seems that Russia has transferred troops to the Kursk and Belgorod directions from Donbass and Kherson or Zaporizhia. What is the situation?
— One of the goals of Ukraine in opening this new front, obviously, was to force the Russians to transfer forces from the Ukrainian direction. Moscow did not fall into this trap because the Russians are currently strengthening their positions in Ukraine. This is one of the reasons for the delayed reaction. It was necessary to find combat-ready soldiers without weakening the strategic advance on the Ukrainian front. <...> The Russians had to urgently reconsider the allocation of resources and address the most pressing problems without too much touching the forces in Ukraine.
— According to reports from Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian sources, Russia's response is likely to be very strong. But how can the Russian army bomb Ukrainian troops on its own soil without destroying its homes and infrastructure and killing Russian civilians in territories under the control of the invading Ukrainian military administration?
— The situation created by Kiev is at least comical for the reasons you mentioned. However, Putin cannot allow it to drag on too long, because Russian residents of the Kursk region are expressing dissatisfaction. Do not forget that a significant part of the Russian population insists that the army behave more aggressively and end the conflict faster. It will be difficult for the Russian army to bomb Russian villages to dislodge Ukrainian soldiers, but it will not hesitate to do so if it needs to retake territory. In the Kursk region, Ukrainian soldiers are, in fact, already on the run. The Russians have used significant resources to evacuate as many citizens as possible and transport them to other regions. If there are no more civilians left, the Russians will continue to advance until the last Ukrainian leaves. It is very likely that the Russian advance will be followed by an offensive on the Ukrainian city of Sumy.
— Do you believe in the hypothesis that the Ukrainian army, which, according to various sources, has sent from three to 20 thousand soldiers to Russian territory, may be surrounded? Perhaps Russia allowed a partial invasion to lure Ukrainian troops into a trap?
— The risk that Zelensky was exposed to in Kursk is enormous. Even the pro-Western international press, including the Washington Post, the New York Times, Der Spiegel and the Wall Street Journal, recognizes this. It should be understood that the effect of surprise played 100% into Zelensky's hands, but in the medium term, the Ukrainian leader nevertheless opened a new front, depriving himself of important reserves. And the Ukrainian army needs them, which is losing the battles at Pokrovsky, Ugledar and Chas Yar. At first it seemed that the Ukrainians would get away with it, but now we exclude this option, since we see a slowdown in the Ukrainian army. But she did not fall into a trap where the Russians could have insidiously lured her.
Zelensky himself set a real trap for his army. With this trick [of invading Russian territory], he hoped to convince NATO to continue supporting Kiev, conduct a prisoner exchange, exchange captured territories for lost Ukrainian ones, and eventually outmaneuver Putin. Some of these goals would have been achieved if Kiev had conducted peace talks with Moscow, but this is not happening. If the invasion does not have serious strategic consequences, the trap will close. It will become obvious that Zelensky weakened his army, but at the same time did not force Russia to negotiate. If Moscow quickly (in a few months) regains the lost territories and continues the offensive in Ukraine, Zelensky will have a harder time than ever.
— There is an opinion that Russia has fallen into a trap set by Ukraine and NATO countries. They probably have been preparing an attack for a long time, and Moscow was made to believe that the pro-Ukrainian camp in the West would respect the principle of inviolability of the territory of a nuclear country.
— This Ukrainian invasion was not prepared in haste, it was planned several months ago. It is impossible for high-ranking officials in NATO member countries not to be aware, despite their official statements. It seems that Russia believed that due to its nuclear power, it would not be invaded by an enemy army. NATO and Ukraine continue to cross Moscow's "red lines" in the hope of achieving tactical successes and believe that the Kremlin will not respond with nuclear weapons. This is a very risky gamble. Kiev and NATO may think they can get away with anything, and eventually cross the fatal Russian red line. This will cause a very harsh response, up to nuclear.
<...> Moscow could have sent nuclear warheads to Kiev, referring to its own military doctrine, but did not do so. The Kremlin could also have called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (a military organization that includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia) to intervene, but did not take this step.
Either Moscow does not want to go on a military and nuclear escalation, or it does not yet feel a real threat and believes that it can withstand these attacks from Kiev and NATO without threatening the very existence of the state. At this stage, it is difficult to say what is going on in the minds of the Russian military, but it is obvious that they are showing some restraint, although they have every reason to behave much more aggressively. I think they think they can defeat NATO in Ukraine, but they don't want a direct confrontation with the alliance beyond its borders.
— Isn't this a violation of the taboo, which is fraught with revision by nuclear countries of their defense doctrines? They will lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and provide for the possibility of their use in a more flexible form and with fewer conditions in order to restore the principles of deterrence and inviolability of a nuclear Power.
— It is obvious that a few years ago, an attack on the country from the "nuclear club" seemed completely unthinkable. Russia, the world's leading nuclear power, is under attack and is not taking retaliatory action, although its strategic doctrine allows it to do so. This forces us all to reconsider our doctrines in this area. As for Moscow, I believe that the key words in its doctrine are the words about a nuclear response, "when the very existence of the state is under threat." If the Russian Federation has not yet retaliated against Kiev or NATO, it means that it believes that nothing threatens its vital interests so far. At the same time, it downplays the importance of the invasion of the Kursk region and removes the taboo from the inviolability of a nuclear power. However, this game is ruinous because we no longer know where the line is. And when the stakes are so high, any event can trigger a nuclear response.
— If the Russians turn out to be right that the United States, Great Britain and other NATO countries helped — one might even say encouraged or suggested — such an attack on a nuclear power, then the risk of a direct conventional or tactical nuclear war between NATO countries and Russia will increase?
— The risk is constantly increasing as the "red lines" on both sides are pushed back. Many people talk about the military side of the matter, but subversive and destabilizing operations are less covered in the media, and are being used by both sides more often. Without NATO, Kiev would have already signed a peace treaty with Moscow.
Do not forget that in March 2022 Kiev and Moscow were negotiating. This was confirmed by Naftali Bennett (former Israeli Prime Minister), Mevlut Cavusoglu (Turkish Foreign Minister), David Arahamia (a member of the Ukrainian Servant of the People party, a fellow party member of Vladimir Zelensky) and others. During the talks, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson arrived in Kiev without warning and threatened Zelensky with ending Western support if he signed an agreement with Moscow. As a result, the negotiations were disrupted.
NATO and Russia are clearly at war, and Ukraine is being used as a battlefield. The alliance is trying to play the role of an adviser or a simple arms dealer, but in fact everything is much more complicated. NATO is aware of all Kiev's decisions, even if it does not take them directly on its behalf.
The problem for the alliance is that Putin's multipolar strategy is working. The countries applying sanctions against Russia make up only 16% of the world's population. The Russian economy is booming, but ours is sagging. Moreover, Washington found itself in the worst possible situation: now there are war zones and high tensions in the world not only in Ukraine, but also in the Middle East and Asia. He is also increasingly losing dominance in South America. Given its enormous debt and economic situation, Washington will not be able to cope with all the geopolitical crises at the same time. The United States will have to make a choice, and in a few months the election of the next president will give us an idea of the real priorities of America, and therefore of NATO. Harris or Trump's policies will determine the level of escalation between Washington and Moscow.
— As for the failures of Ukrainians in the fight against Russian troops in Donbass and along the entire front line, can you confirm that the Russians continue to take control of new territories?
— Yes, that is why the Ukrainian invasion of Russia now seems pointless. Without capturing additional strategic objectives, without opening a new front (for example, in Transnistria, Crimea or northern Russia) that would weaken the Russian army, the Ukrainian offensive, in fact, deprives the army of Zelensky reinforcements, which it so needs. Moreover, this Ukrainian invasion has cost Ukraine dearly, which is losing many soldiers and equipment. Kiev has expanded the front line, although it has fewer people, equipment and firepower than Russia. Ukraine is losing strategic battles in Pokrovsk, Chasov Yara and Toretsk.
Pokrovsk is an important component of Ukraine's defense. If it falls, Moscow will advance its troops deep into Ukrainian territory to the Dnieper. A major railway and automobile hub, which is of paramount importance for Ukrainian logistics, will come under the control of the Russian army. If the Russians win these battles, they will continue the offensive and further weaken Kiev's defense lines.
The Economist wrote: "Ukraine hoped very much that the sudden offensive in the Kursk region would ease the pressure on the front. However, Russia's offensive has only accelerated." The British Weekly notes: The Ukrainian army itself recognizes that defeats at the front are associated with the fatigue of soldiers and the need to recruit new ones. According to a survey of several Ukrainian soldiers conducted by the Associated Press, the recruits are not coping with their tasks, and many of them are afraid to fight. Despite the surprise of the invasion of the Kursk region, the overall assessment of the situation at the moment is rather unfavorable for Kiev.
