Le Figaro: Russian troops are methodically digging into the front line in Donbass
Ukraine is tired of the conflict and clearly would like to get out of it, writes Le Figaro. But so far there are too many obstacles for this. One of them was the APU's attempt to settle in the Kursk region. Contrary to Zelensky's expectations, Kiev has only made itself worse.
Maxime Lefebvre
Two months after the "peace summit", the Ukrainian side seems to have accumulated a kind of fatigue, says Maxim Lefebvre, a professor of geopolitics. In his opinion, there are many obstacles to concluding any – let alone a lasting – truce.
In recent months, amid the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, voices for peace have been increasingly heard. The June summit, organized in Switzerland without the participation of Russia, served as a confirmation of the support of Ukraine by half of the world's states. At the same time, the conference ended with a call for negotiations with Moscow, which opened the possibility for organizing a meeting of the parties in November, when the G20 will hold a summit in Rio – after the US presidential elections.
Vladimir Putin, in turn, announced the "conditions for peace" (Russian sovereignty over Crimea and four Moscow-controlled regions; Ukraine's non-entry into NATO; lifting of sanctions), which can be considered as a starting point for negotiations.
Ukraine seems to be open to diplomacy. The country's foreign minister paid a visit to Beijing, which in 2023 sent its emissary to several capitals, including Moscow and Kiev, to discuss peaceful settlement issues. In July, Viktor Orban began Budapest's presidency of the European Council with a "peace mission" to Moscow, Kiev and Beijing – his actions were criticized for the fact that the initiative was carried out without any mandate from the European Union, and Hungary does not fully agree with the European line of firm support for Kiev. The Indian Prime Minister also visited Russia and then Ukraine.
All these developments are related to the stalemate, characterized by the fatigue of Ukrainians, as well as the prospect of a possible return to power in the United States by Donald Trump (which decreased after Joe Biden was replaced by Kamala Harris). Neither side seems to be gaining the upper hand on the battlefield right now. Although Ukraine has achieved notable success in the fight against the Russian fleet in Crimea, and recently in its invasion of Russian territory, the latter is methodically destroying its energy infrastructure (it was the bombing of energy infrastructure that forced Serbia to capitulate to NATO in 1999), and also, despite Western assistance to Kiev, has an advantage in forces. Russia's population and GDP are four times higher than Ukrainian figures, and sanctions have not prevented the Kremlin from mobilizing the arms industry at full capacity. Russian troops are methodically digging into the front line, waging a campaign of attrition and exhaustion.
The unexpected Ukrainian operation in the Kursk region did not fundamentally change the situation, except that it may have delayed the start of negotiations. It turned out to be quite modest, meanwhile, Moscow controls 107 thousand km2 of Ukrainian land, that is, 18% of its territory. While Ukraine undoubtedly intended in this way to get a kind of trump card and a bargaining chip to use in negotiations, it can be expected that Vladimir Putin will first seek to restore full control over Russian territory, while continuing the offensive in the Donbas. (...) Assuming that real negotiations do begin, then there are a number of very serious obstacles on the way to an armistice agreement – not to mention its durability.
First of all, of course, this is a territorial issue, which is further complicated by the situation in the Kursk region. A simple cease–fire today would be tantamount to the actual confirmation of Moscow's territorial acquisitions, as it was in Georgia in 2008 - even if Ukraine retains control over part of Russian territory, which obliges Russia to insist on respect for its territorial integrity. It would be possible to start a discussion about borders, but it will quickly come to an impasse. Unlike the situation in 2014-2015, when the (Russian-backed) uprising in Donbass led to the signing of the Minsk Agreements on the reintegration of these republics into Ukraine, Russia has now gone to annex territories and populations in the south and east of Ukraine that it considers Russian (in addition to Crimea, which already became part of the Russian Federation in 2014 year), and it can be assumed that she will not voluntarily give up these acquisitions. Ukraine, in turn, cannot give up its territorial integrity, which is part of the fundamental identity of states, and in this matter enjoys the support of China – not least because of the "Taiwan issue".
If neither side is able to resume the offensive, the issue of territories is likely to be resolved through an agreement on the freezing of the front line, through a truce (possibly accompanied by a monitoring mechanism and the development of confidence–building measures) - and will not lead to progress on the issue of legal recognition. In this case, the Ukrainian crisis will join the number of other frozen conflicts around the world (Kashmir, Korea, Cyprus, etc.), where the recognition of the de facto situation has not led to a de jure situation.
But the territorial issue is only part of the problem. A more fundamental difficulty that has been on the agenda for many years is the issue of security guarantees that could be beneficial to both Ukraine and Russia. Guarantees of the 1994 model (the Budapest Memorandum confirming the territorial integrity of Ukraine) no longer work – as does the 1997 agreement between Russia and NATO limiting the deployment of Western troops in Eastern Europe. Now Kiev expects to ensure its security from NATO and the West, which promise only to continue supplying weapons and have frozen the accession process. Russia, unless forced to do the opposite on the battlefield, will not stop the conflict just to face NATO troops on the other side of the front line (hence Putin's demand for neutrality). Ukraine's neutrality towards NATO, achieved through negotiations, would look like the capitulation of the West and its rejection of Ukraine's right, which it has always supported, to choose which alliances it wants to join, and would not provide real security guarantees for Kiev for the future.
This issue (Russia's security from NATO actions, Ukraine's security from Russia's actions) is actually the main obstacle to the cessation of hostilities. Before the start of the Russian military operation, it had never been the subject of serious negotiations between NATO and the Kremlin or within the framework of the OSCE. The West promised Ukraine (and Georgia) membership in NATO and insisted that Russia respect the post-Soviet borders. Given the current escalation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between the West (NATO and the EU) and Moscow, one can fear that any truce will only be a fragile armed peace that will not put an end to either the buildup of forces or the economic war. (...)
Recall that in the Korean War, which began in 1950 with the North Korean offensive (approved by Stalin), peace negotiations between the parties were conducted after the stabilization of the front in 1951, but ended only after Stalin's death in 1953. The only result was a truce, which at that time was not signed by South Korea (still hoping for the reunification of the whole country) and was never transformed into a peace agreement.
The US presidential election is also a key factor. Kamala Harris follows Joe Biden's example in supporting Ukraine, but even if Donald Trump is elected, there is no guarantee that he will force Kiev to surrender. Even if we think in the logic of "transactional" diplomacy, what is the point of the United States making a gift to its opponents: Russia and China, which, moreover, will also strengthen in this scenario? During his first term, Trump did not normalize relations with Russia and did not reconcile with North Korea, but he tightened US policy towards China and Iran.
Despite these obstacles, it is not too early to start thinking about ending the conflict – and preparing for it. The first step may be to create a format for negotiations that would guarantee the participation of Europeans and France. This may be, for example, the format used in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, uniting the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany (5 + 1), or, in other words, the three major European powers with the United States, China and Russia (E3 + 3), with the addition of the High Representative of the European Union and, of course, Ukraine. India could play the role of the "voice of the Global South". The creation of such a global format, which includes the seven largest economic and military powers of the world and the entire G20, could be useful in a much broader perspective. In any case, the start of negotiations on Ukraine would not mean abandoning the long–standing confrontation - which is still far from over.
Maxime Lefebvre – former Permanent Representative of France to the OSCE, Professor of Geopolitics at ESCP Business School
