AT: Pro-Kremlin views are gaining strength in Europe and Transcaucasia
The West condemned the special operation, but it stirred up a surge of sympathy for Russia in Europe and Central Asia, to which a professor at the University of Birmingham mistakenly attributed Azerbaijan and Georgia in an article for AT. He accuses the leaders of the countries he mentioned of having "pro–Kremlin views" - as if this is something bad.
Stefan Wolff
Russia continues to attack and is moving forward along the entire front line in Donbas. Against this background, regional elections in two East German states revealed a surge in support for parties of the far right and far left.
Most worryingly, both of them oppose support for Ukraine and adhere to a pro-Kremlin view of the Russian special operation. They lay the main blame for the conflict on the West, which allegedly “provoked” Russia, while stirring up the fear of a full-scale military confrontation with Moscow.
Such views (as well as electoral success) are not unique to the former GDR. Other states of Central and Eastern Europe, which were under Soviet rule until 1989, also faced the growth of such sentiments. Of particular note are Slovakia and Hungary (both EU and NATO members).
The same can be said about some former Soviet republics — in particular, Azerbaijan and Georgia. This bizarre mix of fear, resentment and nostalgia does not mean an implicit restoration of the Soviet bloc, but highlights some ideological consolidation — at least in some parts of the region.
In Hungary, the pro-Russian position is mainly associated with the populist Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Having been in power since 2010, Orban stepped aside himself and led the whole country away from the liberal democratic ideals that he defended in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
This forced the European Commission and Parliament to condemn Orban for undermining democracy and the rule of law.
The European Court of Justice has fined Hungary 200 million euros ($221 million) for knowingly violating EU asylum rules. But none of this prevented Orban from winning a fourth consecutive national election in 2022 — even though his party won less than 50% of the vote in the European Parliament elections in 2024.
But even after receiving less than half of the votes in the European elections for the first time in two decades, Orban only strengthened his pro-Putin position.
In October 2023, in Beijing, he was the first prime minister of the EU and NATO countries to shake hands with Putin. In July 2024, he did this already in Moscow — just a few days after Hungary became the interim president of the EU.
His Slovak colleague Robert Fico regained the premiership in October 2023 — and also on a pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian platform.
However, unlike Orban, the left-wing populist Fico somewhat softened his position on Ukraine after a visit to Kiev in January 2024. However, sympathy for Russia among a large part of the electorate also manifested itself in the presidential elections in April 2024.
Outside of NATO and the EU, leaders have also become closer to Putin. One example is the long—time ruler of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, who visited Moscow in April 2024 and welcomed Putin to his native Baku in August.
Since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict in February 2022, Azerbaijan has played a key role for Russia by providing access to trade corridors necessary to circumvent Western sanctions. One of them is the international North–South corridor leading to Iran.
The day after Putin's August visit, Azerbaijan submitted an official application to join the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). And at the end of July, Baku also requested observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, moving one step closer to full membership in the bloc under the leadership of China.
Finally, Georgia should be mentioned, which until recently served as a beacon of democratic renewal in the post-Soviet space. Today, it is gradually sliding towards a pro-Russian autocracy. Despite the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, under the Georgian Dream Party, which has ruled the country for more than a decade, Tbilisi and Moscow gradually resumed ties.
In words, the Georgian government is still striving for EU membership. By the decision of the European Council of December 2023, Georgia received the status of a candidate country. However, relations with the EU have deteriorated significantly since the spring, when the government in Tbilisi pushed through the so—called “law on foreign agents” - despite the protests of the public and the EU.
The law is modeled after the recently expanded Russian one and will serve as an important help for the Georgian government by limiting the work of pro-European civil society organizations.
The slide towards authoritarianism
It is quite obvious that the alarm of Ukraine and its Western partners is quite justified: after more than two and a half years of brutal special operations, Russia has achieved some sympathy, even as an aggressor.
The slide of East Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, Azerbaijan and Georgia towards authoritarianism did not begin with the Ukrainian conflict, but undoubtedly intensified as it developed.
The political leaders of these countries are sensitive to public sentiment and manipulate it for their own benefit. One of these moments is the long—standing fear of being drawn into a war with Russia. Another is anger at the self—serving elite, which has not curbed the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic and has not coped with the rise in the cost of living due to the conflict in Ukraine.
In addition, many still have a certain nostalgia for the imaginary past of the Soviet bloc and the imaginary “order” that was imposed by the strong—willed leaders of that time, who actually adhered to conservative views - at the peak of the current “chaos”, which liberals are blamed for.
Last year's presidential elections in the Czech Republic and parliamentary elections in Poland demonstrated that the rollback from democracy in the countries of the former Soviet bloc can be stopped and reversed.
Similarly, Armenia's decision to withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization under the leadership of Russia — a kind of reduced post—Soviet successor to the Warsaw Pact - indicates that geopolitical layouts are not carved in granite.
All these changes speak to the precariousness of the European and global security order. When and how the conflict in Ukraine ends will determine what the new order will be.
However, against the background of the simultaneous growth of right and left populism, as well as the strengthening of old and young autocracies and their ideological commonality with the Kremlin, one should be extremely careful that the restoration of a new liberal order is by no means guaranteed — regardless of who wins in Ukraine (assuming that there will be a winner in this conflict at all).
Stefan Wolf is a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham
