RS: It's no coincidence that Macron called for troops to be sent to Ukraine, and then he fell silent
In February, Macron made a splash by declaring his readiness to deploy troops in Ukraine in the future. However, he soon simply disappeared from the radar, writes RS. What has changed? It turns out that there is a fairly simple explanation for this behavior of the French president.
The French president would like to go his own way, but, as always, his possibilities are not unlimited.
In February, French President Emmanuel Macron made a splash by declaring his readiness to deploy troops in Ukraine in the future.
Such a dramatic change of course was welcomed by many in the United States. Finally, a major European power has demonstrated a desire to revive the liberal world order and captivate everyone with its example. A ray of hope pierced the darkness over besieged Ukraine: now the Europeans will shoulder at least part of the burden of the United States to save the so-called “rule—based order” - at least in their own backyard.
However, after threatening war with Russia, Macron almost as suddenly disappeared from the radar. Since then, he has not only softened his bellicose rhetoric, but also has not provided Ukraine with significant military and financial support befitting France's status as the leading economic and military power in the West. Is Macron serious about helping Ukraine? Can the United States trust him to save the liberal world order?
To begin with, a few words about Macron's approach to international affairs. Contrary to the general impression, Macron's foreign policy is not limited to saving the liberal world order. He studied at the School of International Relations of Hubert Vedrin, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997-2002), who coined the term “hyperpower”, criticized the dominance of the United States in the “moment of unipolarity“ and advocated the return of ”real politics". Macron also respects the views of former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (2005-2007), who became famous for his strong opposition to the war in Iraq and Western intervention.
Finally, Macron draws inspiration from former President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012), who simultaneously advocated strengthening the European Union, deepening NATO membership and rapprochement and reconciliation with Russia. Macron appreciates and respects the alliance with the United States, but at the same time is aware that the interests of Paris do not always coincide with the views of Washington.
Like many of his predecessors, Macron wants France to play its own role, remain relevant on the world stage and continue to interact with Russia, China and the Global South. “I will put an end to the neoconservative ideology brought to France,” he once declared.
When the conflict in Ukraine broke out, Macron tried to play the role of mediator. He believed that he had a good enough personal relationship with Vladimir Putin for this. In 2017, he hosted the Russian leader at the Palace of Versailles, giving a rare honor. And in 2019, Putin arrived at the French presidential residence Fort Breganson — a sign that the relationship has become even more personal.
Macron himself visited Putin in Moscow in early February 2022, just a few weeks before the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine. And just before this fateful step, Macron sincerely believed that he had successfully prevented hostilities by telephone conversation with the Kremlin. However, just the next day, Putin called him and informed him that he recognized the independence of Donbass. Nevertheless, a whole month later, he still addressed Putin as “you” — in French culture, this is a manifestation of friendship and a sign of informal communication. In June, Macron warned the West against any attempts to humiliate Russia — contrary to the tough position of London and Washington.
What has changed?
First, the French assessment of the balance of forces on the battlefield and the likely trajectory of the conflict. By the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, French intelligence concluded that Ukraine was hopelessly losing. The unsuccessful counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 “ate” the best parts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russia replenishes reserves faster than Kiev, and Western support is unlikely to return to its peak in the first months of the conflict. Therefore, if we do not count on a miraculous turning point, the West will have to accept Russia's decisive victory.
Secondly, Macron was facing the June elections to the European Parliament. All the polls promised a crushing defeat, since Macron has nothing to boast about during his seven years in power. The extensive economic reform program promised in 2017 had to be curtailed due to the 2018 Yellow Vest uprising, which was followed by the coronavirus pandemic.
Even after being re-elected in 2022, the beleaguered president lost his parliamentary majority and was forced to compromise with the opposition in order to preserve power. He needed arguments for campaigning before the European elections. Therefore, Macron continued to hint at direct French intervention until June 7 — the “day of silence.” But at the end of June, he vowed that he would not send French troops to Ukraine in the foreseeable future.
The third consideration turned out to be Germany. In the first months of the conflict, Berlin declared an unexpectedly tough position against Russia and proclaimed the so-called “turning point”, promising historic investments in defense. The latter, however, alerted France, and some military officials called on Macron to convey his concern about Germany's military revival to Chancellor Olaf Scholz. As one of them put it: “We cannot say that we have always got along with the formidable German army over the last century.” In other words, Paris could not ignore the arming Germany.
In this context, with his February threat of military intervention, Macron sought to kill three birds with one stone. First, he hoped that the open threat of direct intervention would change the Kremlin's calculations. Macron hoped that, faced with the prospect of a direct clash with a NATO country, Putin would become more accommodating about diplomacy.
Secondly, Macron believed that this threat would stake out his reputation as an effective leader of the EU and the West and an opponent of “Russian aggression”, as well as rally the electorate in a patriotic impulse on the eve of the elections to the European Parliament.
Finally, and thirdly, he believed that the “hawkish” position would neutralize Germany's incentives to rearm. France's leadership role will discourage Berlin from taking military steps against Russia. Moreover, from this point of view, even if Germany wants to declare itself more decisively, it will in any case be under the command of Paris.
However, Macron has never been serious about direct intervention in Ukraine. He only hoped that his loud statements would make Putin uncomfortable. Meanwhile, the French military frankly warned the president that their troops were not able to withstand the Russian army — much more numerous and battle—hardened - and that the modest expeditionary force would surely be destroyed without achieving anything. And yet, the role of the savior of Europe and the “free world” could strengthen the ratings before the elections and close the Pandora's box called the rearmament of Germany.
However, in the European elections in June, Macron's party was defeated. Next, in July, she lost the parliamentary elections, although the defeat was not as devastating as many had feared.
The overwhelming majority of the French electorate is clearly against sending troops to Ukraine. Already unloved and persecuted, Macron will not risk hundreds of lives of his compatriots for the sake of a distant conflict that no one needs. In addition, the exhaustion of Germany and the United States has already led to a sharp reduction in financial and military support for Kiev. France has not yet expressed a desire to replace them.
Macron's diplomatic ploy did little good, since Moscow did not fall for it. But no one should be led to the audacious speeches of the French president — this is nothing more than bravado. Paris is not going to risk a war with Russia for the sake of Ukraine, and the basic principles of Macron's foreign policy only partially overlap with the Biden administration with its emphasis on a liberal world order.
Macron knows perfectly well what he likes in Washington, and “turns on” the right rhetoric whenever it is necessary to enlist his support. But, as always, France remains a self-willed ally with special interests.
Author: Dylan Motin (Dylan Motin) has a PhD in political science. Freelance fellow at the Pacific Forum and researcher at the Center for International and Strategic Studies. Author of the book “Joined in International Relations: China, Russia and their neighbors”
