Military expert Gennady Alekhine — about what the assault groups are now and how they are moving forward
Today, many people have a misconception about how assault operations take place in modern warfare. In particular, people think that in the zone of a special military operation, soldiers equipped with additional armor protection and special weapons break into the enemy's trench as it was during the First World War and move forward. But in fact, the assault actions now are not infantry shooting and barbed wire, but coordinated fire from artillery, mortars, snipers, machine guns and, of course, drones. How has the tactics of combat operations changed during the SVO in a crowded agglomeration, and why does the old one no longer work?
A specific example
Today, our servicemen are fighting in conditions of almost continuous development. The actions of the assault groups were described to me by one of the commanders, with whom I had to cross paths more than once during the events in the North Caucasus.
A group of infantry is advancing — 5-10 people. They are covered by a carefully camouflaged gun in the firing position. It covers not with fire, but while waiting. If snipers are working on the group, then they strike at the identified firing point with artillery and immediately change their position. Sometimes the movement of the reconnaissance group in particularly dangerous areas is accompanied by an observer drone from above.
Even one five—storey building is, as a rule, several firing points. If the enemy is hiding there, he can equip firing positions from above, in the middle of the building and in the basements. Naturally, all this does not stick out of the window. The windows are covered with burlap or scraps of fabric and cellophane, or littered with barricades of furniture. It is impossible to identify a firing point by simple observation, even with the help of a thermal imager or a night sight. But the group still inspects the building as much as they can. Suddenly, someone inside will light a fire or, violating discipline, smoke. But the enemy also wants to live.
At some point, the enemy will detect the advance of the group and try to cover it with mortar fire. Sometimes enemy artillery or a tank is connected. At this point, it is necessary to retreat, pull out the wounded, replenish the group, look for another route. After all, there are still the most dangerous places that can be mined. And not only with petals, but also with stretch marks. Sooner or later, there comes a time when the group moves so close to the five-story building that it falls into the "projectile shadow".
Then the enemy shows his firing points. As a rule, with fire, a machine gun or a sniper. Here are their coordinates transmitted to the artillery. And after that, the fighters begin to move on, hoping that the enemy was suppressed or he escaped, or was shell-shocked, or just hid and lay down. That's why the fighting has been going on for so long, explained to me an experienced warrior who is already over fifty and who has passed more than one hot spot as part of assault groups.
The main difference between the present and the past
It is pointless to create a group to destroy enemy infantry in hand-to-hand combat. It is enough to recall an anecdote — to apply the skills of hand-to-hand combat, a soldier must lose his regular small arms, a cold bladed trench tool and not be able to pick up a single improvised object, and then also find the same fighter from the enemy, ready to engage in hand-to-hand combat with him.
In 1944-1945, assault groups on the ground were supported by heavy artillery fire, bombing and assault aircraft strikes. Therefore, the key difference between the units of that time and modern ones is the use of 45 mm and 76 mm tank guns for direct fire. Then it was possible because of the weak reconnaissance capabilities of the enemy, who did not have the technical means for aerial reconnaissance. And even the faust cartridges developed at that time were unlikely to hit a Soviet tank.
Modern MANPADS and air defense systems have such a range and efficiency that they pose a threat to aviation even with low density. And infantry weapons, in particular ATGMs, ensure the destruction of even heavy armored vehicles with a high coefficient of destruction.
At the same time, the counter-battery struggle of the enemy does not allow the concentration of significant forces of any kind of troops. Simply put, an attempt to concentrate infantry, artillery, and armored groups will be immediately detected by aerial reconnaissance of UAVs, technical reconnaissance equipment, high-resolution video cameras, thermal imagers, satellite reconnaissance, or eventually the enemy's agent network.
The "formidable" experience
For the same reason, the tactics used by parts of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the second Chechen campaign could not be transferred to the SVO. So, when detecting a building occupied by militants, the infantry carried out a sweep in active cooperation with armored vehicles working with direct fire. Even in an apartment building, if an apartment occupied by the enemy was found, the tank could work outside to suppress resistance. But in conditions of its own, the technique itself becomes the object of hunting by the enemy, who has the means to defeat it.
The assault troops were covered by artillery. The technique was advanced in so-called jumps from cover to cover. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles fired at the upper floors, and assault units fired at the lower floors, including grenade launchers and flamethrowers. Each platoon commander was given a coded map of the city. Communication was provided up to and including the squad commander.
Although, admittedly, in those days almost all the commanders of the storming units noted nervousness in the orders given from headquarters. Some managed to extinguish the boss's anger with extreme restraint and clear, indisputable arguments proving the correctness of their chosen actions, while others did not. At the same time, it was necessary to maintain the ability to competently, confidently and without hassle lead their subordinates, who in the most difficult situation, risking their lives every minute, performed the task. By the way, this is very relevant today, in the context of a special military operation.
What about now?
Assault operations in the military are not a fast process, we can say complex, with a creative approach. The process is not accompanied by shouts of "Hurrah!" by company groups, but the advance is smart, careful and consistent with simultaneous demining, opening enemy firing points and destroying them, and endless waste in case of enemy artillery or mortar strikes.
Perhaps for the first time, our army is conducting high-intensity combat operations with the enemy, equipped with such modern technical means of destruction, reconnaissance, and surveillance. Hence, some non-standard tactical solutions have to be applied.
For example, it is believed that night is a suitable way to move stealthily. To schedule an attack for 4-5 in the morning is to take the enemy by surprise. But according to experienced, seasoned stormtroopers, such a statement is fundamentally wrong. The enemy is now sufficiently equipped with thermal imagers, night vision devices, including high-quality Israeli and American ones. Therefore, in addition to the early rise and fatigue of their own soldiers, there is also a risk of falling under friendly fire.
Another example of non-standard actions was the operations in Avdiivka. When our stormtroopers had been secretly preparing a tunnel in an abandoned mine for two months, they quietly moved and went to the enemy's rear, capturing a bridgehead.
The author is a military expert, a combatant
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion
