Military expert Gennady Alekhine — on how to ensure the secret movement of troops and protect them from enemy ambushes
In modern warfare, despite the massive use of drones, aerial and space reconnaissance, units and subunits of the warring parties are constantly moving, covertly changing firing positions and concentration areas. A special military operation is no exception. The OOD — movement support units can save from losses on the march. Moreover, their role, as it has shown, is only growing.
Both science and art
In one way or another, troops regularly perform maneuver actions, marches along roads and rough terrain, and overcome water obstacles. In these cases, a proven tactical scheme of warfare plays a huge role. Do not forget that the Russian army is fighting according to the classical scheme of military science and art.
In it, the OOD is an obligatory element of the pre—combat order of units and divisions. As a rule, this is a group of specially trained military personnel. Often reinforced with tanks with trawls, bulldozers and sappers. It must be able to operate under the cover of armored vehicles and small arms, smoke screens and air defense systems.
Movement support units have been used before in military conflicts when conducting large and medium-sized marching columns.
The experience of the Great War
There are examples from the distant and recent past. During the Great Patriotic War, a reinforced battalion was sent from the regiment as advanced detachments, a reinforced regiment from the division, and several reinforced battalions when moving in a wide band.
From the front, these advanced detachments were guarded by vanguards consisting of battalions, head marching outposts, patrols and patrol units.
The traffic support detachment was necessarily sent as part of the engineering troops units. After all, the main forces always followed one or more columns. And the technical support and rear units moved directly behind the combat units or independent columns. They were several kilometers away. They need protection too.
During the fighting in Afghanistan, escorting convoys in mountainous terrain and foothills required a kind of military cunning from our command. There, too, the transportation and movement of forces and means took place as part of columns.
Terrain features
As a rule, the advance to the combat area is carried out at night in compliance with camouflage measures.
Many people say that everything is visible from space. Of course, the means of intelligence are developing, but personnel and military equipment are still moving on the ground. They do it by car or by rail.
At the same time, tank and motorized rifle units march, as a rule, in one column with their own means of reinforcement.
For example, a battalion is marching, and a patrol from a reconnaissance or motorized rifle platoon is sent forward along the route, at a distance of one to three kilometers. It necessarily includes two or three sappers with a mine detector, sometimes with specially trained dogs. They are accompanied by guides from among the local residents.
Following the reconnaissance, a head marching outpost is put forward. And from the flanks, the battalion is covered by side marching outposts — consisting of up to a motorized rifle squad. The rear outposts are closed from the rear of the column.
It should be borne in mind that in the south-east of Ukraine — in the Donbas, in the Kharkiv direction — the fighting mainly takes place in crowded agglomerations. And, of course, the commanders take into account how these settlements, bridges and the green zone are best overcome. As a rule, this happens at maximum speed, which helps to avoid hitting combat vehicles and other equipment from hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers.
The automobile columns are accompanied by regular motorized rifle units, forces and means, which are distributed along the column at the rate of one armored personnel carrier per ten vehicles. Skilful commanders send units to the dominant heights or important lines in advance to protect the columns.
It is mandatory that sappers, aircraft manufacturers and artillery spotters are included in this column. In addition, they are accompanied by combat helicopters of fire support.
A sad experience
We have the sad experience of Yarysh-Marda in Chechnya, when our column did not have fire support from the air. There were also no reconnaissance units and a head marching outpost. The enemy took advantage of this and broke it. It's a bitter experience. This is a statement of fact.
Combat reality shows that invaluable experience, paid for with blood, remains, unfortunately, not always in demand. It is often poorly studied and even ignored.
I would like to emphasize once again that over the years of participation in local conflicts in Afghanistan and the North Caucasus, a wealth of combat experience has been gained in conducting and escorting convoys in difficult terrain conditions. In the Caucasus and Afghanistan, it was a mountainous desert area in conditions of guerrilla warfare on the part of the enemy.
In the current conditions of ITS implementation, these are hilly areas, forests, rivers, lakes, reservoirs. All this creates additional complexity in the organization of columns, as well as its advantages for enemy ambushes.
Do not forget about mistakes
Conclusions were drawn in the course of the CBO. The convoy escort and escort required a number of serious tactical changes in actions and improved the quality of training for commanders, headquarters and troops.
High-level commanders who skillfully use OOD, thereby eliminating unjustified losses.
These points were taken into account during our successful military operations in the area of Artemovsk, Avdiivka, during the consolidation on the Volchansk and Liptsevsky bridgeheads in the Kharkiv region. There was a gray area between Volchansk and Liptsy from where the enemy could operate. But the commanders took these conditions into account when transferring reserves, avoiding unnecessary losses. The same thing is happening now at the Kupyansk site.
In the course of offensive actions, not only the tactical, but also the operational level of combat missions are clearly outlined. OOD has by no means lost its significance, but, on the contrary, is currently gaining special importance. It is important for our commanders to remember the mistakes of the past and plan their actions taking into account the realities of conducting a special operation.
The author is a military expert, a combatant
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion
