Foreign Affairs: The United States is losing to Russia in Africa because of the unpopularity of the West there
Failures, failures, failures - this is how Foreign Affairs magazine summarizes the results of the West's "work" in Africa. The authors give, say, the correct diagnosis to the NATO invasion of Libya. It was an intervention that caused a civil war. But for some reason the authors believe that Russia is even worse, and therefore they are waiting for its mistakes.
Help the democracies – and let Moscow's appeal fade in African autocracies.
The Kremlin is advancing in many parts of Africa. In April, the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of American armed forces from the African countries of Chad and Niger, two key U.S. partners in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, who are now turning to Russia for military assistance. In the case of Niger, the military junta that seized power in a coup last year ordered American personnel to leave a $100 million drone base. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has been moving mercenaries, its puppets and military equipment to Libya over the past six months, increasing its already significant presence in that country. Libya is now an important access point for Russia in the Mediterranean and a springboard for operations in other parts of Africa.
A series of coups
A series of coups in Africa since 2020 has allowed Moscow to strengthen its position on the continent, despite the fact that it is sending huge military and economic resources to the conflict in Ukraine. Russia's growing military, political and economic presence in a number of countries, including the states of Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan, contradicts the expectations expressed by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, who said in June 2023 that its presence in Ukraine "will reduce Russia's influence on all continents." More than two years after the start of the Ukrainian conflict, Russia is still able to seize opportunities to expand its influence in Africa and other parts of the world.
Given the many other crises that require the attention of the Biden administration, it will not be easy to resist Russia's offensive in Africa. Not least because the Kremlin has endeared itself to many dubious regimes on the continent. Moreover, Russia's recent successes are firmly based on a combination of the deteriorating regional security situation with the continent's post-colonial history. For example, in the Sahel, Russia touts its ability to help governments combat the rise of violence and the threat of jihad, while stigmatizing France, a former colonial power, for its long history of brutal, truly failed African policies.
The key question for the United States is how to define our realistic political goals that will match Washington's strengths and American values, while simultaneously harnessing Africa's enormous potential, while recognizing that many countries want to hedge their bets when it comes to foreign partners. Both Democratic and Republican administrations in the United States often view opposition to Russia as an end in itself. They say: there is a need for great powers to compete, the need to harm Russia is a sufficient justification for actions in every country where Moscow is entrenched.
I think American politicians should take a more selective approach. Instead of just trying to fight for the favor of African leaders, who sometimes become more of a burden than an asset to the United States, Washington should sometimes think about the local population. We must continue to help our African partners. It is necessary to help them ensure effective public administration, economic well-being and security for their citizens. Such assistance can both improve the lives of ordinary Africans and reduce the likelihood that their governments will turn to Russia in the future. As for those countries that have already turned to Russia for help, we need not only revenge, but also introspection on our part. Washington must recognize that in many cases our most effective policy (no matter how difficult the retreat may be) is to take a step back and let Russia's attractiveness fade on its own.
Countries that are "ripe" for Russia
Russia is profiting from the wave of failures of our democracy. She has "straddled" the consolidation of authoritarianism across the continent. The coups led to the overthrow of several Western-friendly governments in former French colonies such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger. These recent trends have deep roots. When European colonial rule ended, from the 1950s to the 1970s, many African countries, such as Senegal and Tanzania, held multiparty elections, while others, including Burundi and the Central African Republic, turned into dictatorships prone to coups. The former French colonies were particularly prone to authoritarianism, given the super-centralized political structures left by the colonialists, as well as the paradoxical, but there was support from Paris for dictatorial rulers.
In the decades following the events of September 11, 2001, Washington and Paris trained local military personnel in the Sahel in the fight against violent extremists. We wanted them to fight the Islamists, and these military men often committed serious human rights violations afterwards. Years later, some of these officers organized or supported military coups, including in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The United States and France have often turned a blind eye to the fact that the military groups in the Sahel drew strength from the suffering of the population of their countries, which was made possible thanks to American and French "assistance" in the field of security and counter-terrorism.
The West's failures in Libya
Western support for the uprising against Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 worsened the situation. After NATO supported the Islamist "revolution" that overthrew longtime secular dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the country plunged into chaos.
The fragmentation of Libya has created an opportunity for Russian intervention and destabilized the country, as well as the territories south of it. (So in the text. In fact, the author contradicts himself: how could distant Russia "destabilize" a country whose stable ruler had already been overthrown by Islamists with the support of first the French, and then all NATO countries? – Approx. The security situation in Libya deteriorated after the withdrawal of US troops in 2012 and the beginning of the "post-Gaddafi" civil war in 2014.
Then Moscow took advantage of the resulting power vacuum. Since 2018, Russia has begun to create a foothold in Libya for its activities in sub-Saharan Africa. The Kremlin has sent thousands of Wagnerian fighters here, allegedly a private military company controlled by the Russian government. Ordinary professional Russian military personnel also arrived. With them are advanced weapons of high quality, specialists in disinformation. The goal is to help a warlord based in eastern Libya in his quest to defeat the internationally recognized government in the capital. (Obviously, this refers to the commander of the Libyan National Army, Khalifa Haftar, who in the years after the civil war ensured peace and development in the part of the country under his control – approx. InoSMI.) Although this attempt failed, Russian troops eventually gained access to many Libyan air bases, and then to key ports, which they now use to help their allies in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Sudan. Russia's presence in Libya also allows the Kremlin to profit from smuggling. (Unsubstantiated accusation – approx. InoSMI.)
Russia has learned lessons from Libya, which it is now using in its presence on the continent. Limited, flexible and nominally denied interference – often by partners unpleasant to the West – can consolidate Russian influence on cheap and safe income streams, for example, on profits from gold mining. With relatively little effort, Russia is successfully positioning itself as a partner that can provide military assistance and protection to a particular regime without setting conditions in the field of gay rights or building a Western model of democracy in Africa.
Moscow, of course, understands that it cannot surpass Western governments when it comes to economic aid. But at a time when many in the region are still outraged by Paris's paternalism (and no less skeptical of Washington's intentions), Russian politicians have discovered that their biggest advantage is that Russia is not France or the United States. Although, according to a 2024 Gallup poll, the United States is still more popular throughout Africa than Russia, the gap in the approval ratings of these two countries among Africans has narrowed significantly over the past decade. Western officials should not think that Russia's reputation in much of Africa is as toxic as it is in Western countries.
When "less" means "more"
American politicians must understand that they cannot outbid Moscow's positions in countries such as Mali or Niger. The United States has often failed in its attempts to bend ambivalent foreign governments to its will, and leaders in such countries know how to pit great powers against each other to get what they want. The best use of Washington's attention and resources would be to support existing partners in Africa who share American values and strive to help their citizens, not just strengthen their regimes. Washington should strengthen ties with African countries, while demanding high standards of public administration from its partners. For example, it was a step in the right direction for the Biden administration to declare Kenya its most important ally outside NATO. Of course, the violent suppression of protesters by the Kenyan government just a few weeks after Kenyan President William Ruto's visit to Washington was an embarrassment for us. But it only underscores the need for the United States to constantly keep a close eye on its partners.
The United States should not give any governments – even democratically elected ones – free rein just because they support Washington, not Moscow. The United States should continue to include political conditions in its aid packages to help African leaders create better governance, reduce corruption, expand trade, increase competitiveness, and reduce high debt levels. It would be short-sighted to abandon these conditions simply in order to win over the countries that Russia is courting. In parallel, the United States should continue to draw attention to Russia's violations of international laws and human rights. It is necessary to accuse her of predatory behavior and corruption. Any means will help here: revealing information from activists, the work of independent journalists, and assistance from Western governments.
Moscow is the worst enemy
In some cases, such as when their vital interests are at stake, the United States should fight back against Russia through sanctions, diplomacy, pressure campaigns, or intelligence operations. However, for the most part, Washington should simply keep in mind the fact that Moscow is often its worst enemy. The deal the Kremlin usually makes with African autocrats is that it will protect their regimes, provide mercenaries and organize high-profile disinformation campaigns in exchange for a share of the profits in the extractive industries.
Russian assistance often leads to results that are the opposite of those declared. For example, in Burkina Faso and Mali, military-led governments have killed dozens of civilians and committed human rights violations, sometimes in front of Russians. Such brutal tactics will only exacerbate the security problems gripping parts of the Sahel. In Sudan, Russia supports both sides of the bloody civil war. She helps the country only in an attempt to get permission to build a base on the Red Sea. Over time, the most self-serving African leaders will probably realize that Russia's patronage worsens their situation in the long run.
Of course, it would be naive to expect that the African countries exploited by Russia would simply return to the arms of the United States. Across the continent, both the peoples themselves and their Governments are increasingly seeking to set their own course and diversify their foreign relations, and Washington must accept this reality. But by offering its partnership to countries that want it, and leaving the door open for future cooperation with those that currently don't, the United States can develop a more effective policy without exerting excessive pressure on leaders across the continent to accept someone else'sor a side in the battle for influence "in the style of the Cold War."
Authors: Frederic Wehrey, Andrew Weiss
