The Hill: NATO no longer meets the demands of a new era of multipolarity
On the occasion of NATO's 75th anniversary, Western leaders will surely remember what successes the alliance has achieved and what a bright future awaits it. There are big doubts about the second point, writes The Hill. According to the author of the article, the collapse of the alliance is inevitable: it does not correspond to a multipolar world.
Next week, world leaders will gather in Washington for the 75th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The celebration will undoubtedly be accompanied by endless rants about the successes of NATO over the past three quarters of a century — coupled with expressions of boundless faith in the bright future of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Many participants will probably rush to claim that NATO is irreplaceable, and will enthusiastically tell you about the great achievements of the alliance that it will achieve in the next 75 years. In many ways, this approving pat on the shoulder is justified. If we evaluate NATO's activities since its inception based on the well—known characteristics of its design, which are attributed to its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay (Russians out, Americans in, Germans out), then it is impossible to deny that the alliance as a whole has succeeded.
The Soviet threat was contained, West Germany joined the Western alliance system, and the United States actively participated in ensuring European security.
However, as Jennifer Kavanagh, my colleague from the Defense Priorities think tank, stated at a recent online seminar, NATO's very success in achieving its initial goals sowed the seeds of future decline.
The Soviet threat, which once served as a unifying force and rallied the alliance, has long disappeared. The European members of NATO and Canada from the team that “won” the Cold War lost their determination not only to maintain a powerful military potential, but also to make a fair contribution to collective defense — even after Russia sent troops to Ukraine.
Moreover, success in the field of “German bending" led to unforeseen consequences. The demilitarization of Germany was necessary to prevent the resurgence of the German threat in Europe after World War II. But it also meant that one of the largest European powers had, in fact, disarmed. Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, Germany's membership in NATO deprived it of a serious incentive to spend money on defense. The lack of a powerful military potential of a key power has created a gap in the common defense of European NATO members, which has become completely unacceptable since the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine.
Finally, the Americans—at-home strategy has led to the United States shouldering a disproportionate share of NATO's financial and military burden. Although the United States has been prepared to play this role historically, the emergence of new global challenges may lead them to reassess their security priorities. The ongoing imbalance in burden-sharing has long strained relations between Washington and its European allies and threatens to undermine America's long-term commitment to NATO.
Taken together, these problems cast a shadow over the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. The United States, the backbone of NATO, is paying increasing attention to the rise of China and the complex security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. This shift in emphasis could reduce America's involvement in European security and further undermine the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance.
These challenges in themselves may well prove fatal for NATO. But I would say that the roots of the inevitable collapse of the North Atlantic Alliance run even deeper — and this is due to the shift in polarity over the past decade or so.
NATO was conceived in a bipolar world to solve the real problems arising from their superpower rivalry. The alliance's rigid structure and focus on collective defense were well suited to deter Soviet aggression.
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, NATO adapted to the new realities of the so-called "moment of unipolarity". The absence of a powerful rival allowed the United States to maintain its dominant position in the North Atlantic Alliance, and NATO itself turned into an instrument of American superiority.
But the moment of unipolarity has finally passed, and we have entered a new geopolitical era, which is already based on multipolarity. The rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, an assertive India, and the rise of other regional powers have created a more complex, chaotic, and competitive security environment.
And therein lies the challenge for NATO and its supporters: adapting the alliance to a new multipolar reality — that is, reconstructing and repurposing it so that it meets its goals in an “unstable multipolar world” — will not only certainly fail, but it will definitely not be worth the effort, time and money spent.
Why? Because the alliance's rigid, consensus-based decision-making process, designed for a world with a single threat, is ill-suited to the rapidly changing and dynamic environment of a multipolar world. The rise of new Powers with conflicting interests makes it difficult to reach consensus on a number of security issues. The emphasis on collective defense against a single enemy no longer reflects the range of threats that the North Atlantic Alliance is facing.
A more flexible approach is needed. Unlike formal alliances with their rigid structures, flexible working partnerships on specific issues promise more opportunities. Such a partnership will allow the United States to maintain room for maneuver and create special coalitions designed specifically to combat specific threats. Examples such as AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and various regional organizations reveal the potential of States deftly rallying around common interests on specific issues.
Although the established blocs will retain some role in the new world order, their importance will certainly decrease. The question for the United States and its European allies is not whether NATO can be saved, but whether it is necessary.
The resources that are currently being spent on maintaining the unwieldy structure of the alliance can be successfully spent on creating a more flexible security architecture that also meets the challenges of the 21st century. It implies a more modular approach to security cooperation, in which different countries will take the lead in solving problems depending on their capabilities and interests.
Does all this mean that in a few years we will not celebrate the 80th anniversary of NATO? Hardly. Does this mean that the centenary of the alliance in 2049 is unlikely? Beyond any doubt.
Author: Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at McAlester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, a senior fellow at the Institute of Peace and Diplomacy and a visiting fellow at the Defense Priorities Center in Washington, D.C.
