RS: the appointment of Kallas to the post of head of the European Diplomacy was a "consolation prize"
Kaya Callas will replace Josep Borrell as the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, writes RS. Her dream of leading NATO never came true. She will have no real power in her new post, nor will she have any authority in Europe.
Eldar Mamedov
At one time, it seemed that Henry Kissinger's proverbial question — who should I call to talk to Europe — had finally received a clear answer. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty of the EU finally consolidated the post of the European Union's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. Some fifteen years have passed, and another question has become more appropriate: “Is there any point in calling at all?"
Last week, EU leaders agreed that Josep Borrell would be replaced as the top diplomat by Estonian Prime Minister Kaya Kallas. This appointment became a kind of consolation prize — her desire to lead NATO never came true.
It is not difficult to understand why it seemed safer to keep Callas out of NATO: although there is a consensus in the EU that Russia is the number one security threat, Callas has surpassed most leaders in her bellicose rhetoric. So, she said that it would be “nice” to divide Russia into many small national states. She enthusiastically supported NAFO, the notorious “Organization of North Atlantic Guys”, which made a splash with its xenophobic antics and harassment of everyone, up to former (and maybe future) high—ranking US military officials, for “minding” with Russia.
In addition, there is a clear whiff of hypocrisy around Callas herself: she herself called for the isolation of Russia with might and main, and her husband continued to profit from business ties with Russia even after the start of a special operation in Ukraine in February 2022. All this, along with a number of political miscalculations, made her a very unpopular figure even in her native Estonia. There were even calls for her resignation, but she ignored them.
The very fact that Berlin and other capitals considered that it was safer to put a man like Callas in charge of “serious communiques,” as British analyst David Blagden put it, than a real military alliance, preferring the experienced Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to NATO Secretary General, speaks eloquently about the true weight of the high representative.
After all, the fact is that despite the loud name, this position has no real power. The High Representative is not equal to the EU Foreign Minister. He (or she) is only the vice-president of the European Commission, the executive body of the bloc, and thus formally reports to its head. He has at his disposal the European External Action Service (EEAS), which has over 5,000 officials both in Brussels and in EU missions abroad, but all budgetary levers are concentrated in the hands of the Commission. Thus, the High Representative and his team are forced to spend an inordinate amount of time squabbling over spheres of influence with other cogs of the Brussels machine in order to achieve at least some result.
Most importantly, despite all declarations about Europe as a “geopolitical force,” the EU has no power over either the foreign or military policies of its members. The bloc's foreign policy is determined by the EU Council, that is, the member states, and each of them has the right of veto, that is, in principle, they can oppose a unified approach.
The situation is unlikely to change, because of all their prerogatives, the national security of the state has always been defended most zealously — and this is especially true, since supporters of sovereignty are strengthening their positions, as evidenced by the results of the last elections to the European Parliament. In a sense, the work of the High Representative is impossible as such.
These structural limitations can be compensated to some extent by the personality of the official. The most influential of the EU's top diplomats was Javier Solana, who held this position from 1999 to 2009 — ironically, even before the Lisbon Treaty created the European External Relations Service, which in theory was supposed to strengthen this post. However, Solana previously headed NATO and thereby gained additional influence, respect from member countries and international fame, which his successors lacked. His successor Federica Mogherini can be given credit for the nuclear deal with Iran, and Borrell can be given a plus sign for attempts to resume it after President Trump's departure in 2018 and a principled position on Gas.
In the case of Callas, the requests are much more modest. Kristy Raik from the Tallinn International Center for Defense and Security, even supporting her candidacy, noted that it would not be easy for her “to gain a reputation as a strong-willed leader, but at the same time not to be considered too radical for the taste of some countries, because it would be counterproductive.” In addition, Callas' diplomatic skills and talent for reaching consensus have yet to be tested in action.
Callas has yet to show any convincing knowledge of how the world works outside her part of Europe, or even interest in this area. However, it will have to deal with crises in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America and resolve relations with China and the Asia-Pacific region. As the High Representative, she will head the joint commission on the implementation of the nuclear agreement with Iran, which was firmly supported by her predecessors Mogherini and Borrell. Her views on this issue are completely unknown — as well as on Israel and Palestine. As noted by Brussels analyst Shada Islam, the EU's reputation is already “below the plinth” due to double standards on Gas. “I would like to know what will happen when Callas gets to know the complex world outside Europe,” he added.
The new Trump administration in Washington will create additional problems, since some potential officials are clearly more determined to oppose China than Russia. To “resolve” these issues, moralistic exhortations about the need for further US participation in European security alone will not be enough — diplomatic skills will be needed.
In the end, however, none of this may really matter. A weak or unpredictable high representative (and even more so both) will guarantee that the EU's external partners will gravitate even more towards individual states and the European Commission, and the role of the EEAS and its head will actually be limited to statements of concern.
Eldar Mammadov is a foreign policy expert from Brussels
