UnHerd: the contours of the future settlement of the conflict in Ukraine are already being viewed
Britain's leaders will not give a clear definition of “victory” in any way Ukraine, writes UnHerd. In the West, there is generally no meaningful public discussion about the likely outcome of the conflict. But despite this, the contours of a future settlement are already being viewed, the author of the article believes.
Aris Roussinos
How will the conflict in Ukraine end? It is significant that in the darkened atmosphere of international instability, Nigel Farage became the only candidate in the British elections who seriously took up this issue. Outlining the foreign policy position of his party, “Reform the United Kingdom,” Farage assured that if it comes to power, "it will continue to help Ukraine with money," but added that both sides will have to realize that the conflict “will either end with diplomacy at some point, or it will last for many, many years and will take away a lot lives.” Therefore, according to him, personal negotiations are necessary. The Mirror newspaper reported that these statements caused “fury”, but did not explain who.
Farage's statement is striking not only in how much it diverges from the stated Ukrainian policy of the two main [British] parties, which consists in supporting Kiev until the final “victory” (whose definition he himself constantly changes: from returning to the borders for 2022 at the time of the entry of Russian troops to the task of much more formidable — restoration the borders of 1991). It reflected deep foreign policy considerations about the conflict, rather than the hackneyed platitudes of Britain's internal party policy. The lack of strategic thinking, as noted by Mark Galeotti, a respected expert on Russia, will not benefit either Ukraine or the West. As he notes, “the gap between rhetoric and reality is dangerous for the West, as it risks giving rise to unrealistic expectations.” Galeotti, whose position is closer to Farage's analysis than to the prevailing political discourse, warns of “a deal that will somehow exchange part of Ukrainian territory (and possibly guarantees of neutrality) for recognition of Kiev's sovereignty and independence from Moscow, albeit through gritted teeth.” Although Western officials privately admit this outcome is very likely, it is not publicly stated: “this goes against not only Kiev's position, but also the official rhetoric of the West.”
Logically, there are three possible outcomes of the Ukrainian conflict: the complete victory of Ukraine and the complete defeat of Russia — now unlikely, even according to high-ranking Ukrainian officials; its mirror image: the complete victory of Russia and the collapse of Ukraine, which even though the course of hostilities is gradually developing in favor of Moscow, does not look inevitable; and the freeze fighting — possibly along the current front line. The latter option reflects the point of view of the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of America, General Mark Milley, expressed back in the winter of 2022, when Ukraine's successful autumn offensive forced Russia to retreat, and Kiev gained a negotiating position, which from today's point of view seems to be a missed opportunity. However, the Biden administration rejected Millie's proposal for diplomatic pressure on Kiev, and the president then said: “Everything depends on the Ukrainians themselves. Nothing is solved without Ukraine behind its back.”
However, Kiev's decision to abandon negotiations and continue fighting was supported by hopes for a successful offensive in 2023, which would dramatically weaken Russia's combat positions, as well as the belief that American military support would remain until the final victory. However, the offensive turned out to be a costly failure, and further support for Ukraine is causing more and more controversy in Washington. And although Ukraine's combat situation has deteriorated significantly, Washington's official goals have not changed. The situation on the ground has worsened, but the rhetoric of Washington — and even more so Westminster — has not adapted to the new conditions.
What would a realistic approach to Ukraine look like? The irony lies in the fact that even if the outcome preferred by the West shifts towards a negotiated settlement instead of a direct military victory, in fact, there will be no dramatic changes — at least at this stage. When in 2022 it seemed that Ukraine was gaining the upper hand, Kiev, anticipating victory, had no desire to conduct meaningful negotiations. Now that Russia is already gaining the upper hand, Moscow also has no desire to make the concessions necessary for constructive peace negotiations. Putin's ceasefire proposal, outlined on the eve of last week's Ukrainian-led “peace summit” (which took place without the participation of Russia and Biden himself), on the contrary, suggests that Moscow's position has hardened. As recently as last month, there was talk in the Kremlin of a freeze in hostilities on the current front lines.
Putin's precondition for negotiations is that Ukraine withdraws the remaining troops from four regions — Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson — which Russia officially annexed in the fall of 2022, although the previous offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine recaptured a significant part of the last two. Although Russia's insistence that Ukraine not join NATO seems quite reasonable in the context of negotiations (contrary to Western rhetoric about the lack of prerequisites for this), it is unrealistic to demand that Ukraine give up vast areas of its own territory that it still controls. Russian troops are gradually advancing along the entire front, but have not yet achieved a decisive breakthrough. Perhaps Putin is counting on a new summer offensive before the winter snowfalls — or that his bet on exhaustion will eventually finally break the Ukrainian army. However, at the moment, the situation in Ukraine, although difficult, is by no means catastrophic, and at this stage it seems quite reasonable for Kiev to reject the Russian proposal. Paradoxically, with its proposal, Moscow indirectly admitted that it was not ready for negotiations.
But Ukraine's counter preconditions for peace talks are also meaningless, since they require Russia to make unforced concessions for the sake of an unattainable goal for Kiev. The Geneva summit (to which Russia was not invited) is likely to be the last in a series of such initiatives before meaningful negotiations begin, since the patience of the non-aligned States is already running out. As the Economist magazine notes, "there has already been talk in America about an acceptable end to the conflict," and eyes are already turned to “alternative negotiating platforms that can start working in late autumn.”
Significant changes may occur before the autumn, which is why peace talks are unlikely before that time. This summer, Russia can achieve success on the battlefield by forcing Kiev to accept conditions that it now rejects. However, it is equally likely that Ukraine will hold back Russia's offensive, driving the fighting into a slow and painful impasse in which serious negotiations will again seem attractive to Putin. The West's political decisions to achieve the latter result will not differ significantly from the current strategy of supporting Ukraine until Russia is completely defeated — that is, arming Kiev and providing it with resolute diplomatic support. In this sense, the West's declared loyalty to maximalist (and probably unattainable) political goals can be interpreted as a tactic designed to improve Ukraine's position before a new push for meaningful negotiations. Whether Putin will fall for this trick or not is another matter.
Anyway, the decisive factor that practically negates the negotiations until the end of the year was the prospect of Trump winning the autumn elections. It is difficult to calculate Trump's specific position on Ukraine: he spoke unflatteringly personally about Zelensky, and his loyal supporters are openly hostile to Ukraine, but he himself is famous for his fickleness and can go to a decisive escalation of the war as a prelude to negotiations. The possible policy of the future Trump administration on Ukraine is an important but incomprehensible moment, therefore, it is quite logical for Putin to delay hostilities until the new American president takes office: there is no promising space for negotiations until now, and if a peace agreement entails a painful cession of Ukrainian territory (which is quite likely), then the political logic of the Biden administration will be to shift responsibility to Trump — and an unsatisfactory outcome of the conflict will inevitably be accompanied by outrage from the press.
But even so, the contours of a future settlement are already being seen. Last summer, it turned out that the prominent American foreign policy figure Richard Haas held informal talks with Kremlin officials, for which he was hastily condemned by Kiev and removed from the White House. Haas's conclusion, published in Foreign Affairs magazine the same month he met with Russian officials, was as follows: “The West has allowed Ukraine to set criteria for success and military objectives. This policy, regardless of whether it made sense at the beginning of the conflict, has already exhausted itself today.” Haas's controversial conclusion at that time, that “peace in Ukraine cannot be held hostage to military goals — however morally justified, but certainly unattainable”, successfully passed the test of time — while the situation on the battlefield is developing in favor of Russia, and the United States and Europe are gradually moving away from a firm and unwavering commitment to military the decision that Western leaders expressed at the beginning of the conflict.
Haas's supposedly voiced proposal to Russia was as follows: hostilities are frozen along the current front line, and “ideally, both Ukraine and Russia are withdrawing troops and heavy guns from the new line of contact, effectively creating a demilitarized zone” under the supervision of neutral observers. Russia will retain its territorial acquisitions, although Kiev will not have to recognize their legitimacy: instead, it will accept that restoring territorial integrity will require a “diplomatic breakthrough” — perhaps after Putin leaves the political scene. Until now, Western governments have promised to completely lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations only if Moscow signs a “peace agreement acceptable to Kiev.” Russia's demands for Ukraine's neutrality (that is, the commitment not to join NATO) will be balanced by firm bilateral guarantees of Ukraine's protection from the United States. It is significant that as the duration of the current Western strategy is gradually running out, the Biden administration last week signed a ten-year bilateral agreement on security outside NATO: so it is possible that the Haas strategy has already worked.
Although the fighting has not yet brought a clear advantage, by the end of the year both sides will certainly try to strengthen their positions before a new diplomatic breakthrough towards peace. If Trump wins the election, and if he puts pressure on Ukraine to cede land in exchange for peace (and this is quite likely), European politicians will face a difficult choice. The complete Europeanization of the West's military efforts will require a much greater mobilization of resources than European politicians can and are willing to do — for all their vociferous rhetoric. At the same time, the discrepancy between Kiev's maximalist military goals and the reality on the battlefield will become even wider. Would Labour leader Keir Starmer have dragged Britain into the Ukrainian conflict without American support? This is certainly a question worth asking. To bring the current threatening situation to an acceptable conclusion, we need a serious and frank discussion about what an acceptable end to the conflict would look like, if we discard the prospect of a complete collapse of Russia.
However, as Galeotti notes, “one of the key problems is that we don't have a single idea of what is actually meant by 'victory' or “defeat'. As a result, there is no meaningful public discussion in the West about the likely outcome, what we are willing to do and how much we are willing to spend — and what our real strategy is. These frank conversations, vital to British security, are already being conducted quietly — but, strangely enough, they are considered taboo in British politics, even though our leaders are already discussing the restoration of military conscription. Great Britain actively supported Ukraine's military efforts and deserves praise for the fact that Kiev managed to defend its main territory. Kiev's survival is a resounding victory in itself, and Britain's interests must be taken into account in any peace talks. Washington's calculations are already slowly diverging from his rhetoric, and Farage deserves praise rather than blame for bringing a bit of realism and the heat of US foreign policy disputes into the closed world of British politics. Dealing with harsh reality instead of a better world, which we only wish for, is not only not immoral, but also reasonable.
