Lidovsky: Russia offers a fake truce and intends to wage war with NATO
The West is sure that the truce offered by Russia is fake, Lidovsky writes. Moscow talks about negotiations to get concessions from the West. A complete victory in Ukraine will give it the opportunity to wage a full-scale war with NATO. This is how the author of the article transforms the real goals of Moscow into fictional horror stories.
Why does Vladimir Putin still show no interest in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine? The former director of the Institute of Foreign Relations and Information, Peter Mleinek, explained in six points to the "Leaders" what Russia is most likely guided by and why it is talking about peace at all.
First, the Kremlin is used to feign interest in meaningful negotiations, making it part of its long-running information operation. Its goal is to convince the West to make concessions on the issue of Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty. Since December 2023, Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin have significantly tightened their expansionist rhetoric on Ukraine and made it clear persistently that Russia is going to seize new territories in Ukraine and is ready to completely destroy Ukrainian statehood and identity.
In recent months, Russian forces have conducted offensive operations aimed at significant operational advance and breakthrough of the front line. They opened a new front in the Kharkiv region, which Russia, by the way, did not claim by illegal annexation, and tried to permanently reduce Ukrainian combat capability and economic potential by launching regular strikes with missiles and drones.
These military operations suggest that the Kremlin is more interested in achieving its long—term goal of maximum victory in Ukraine than in some kind of settlement that would immediately freeze the front line where it currently lies.
To destroy the Ukrainian statehood
Secondly, Vladimir Putin is confident that the West will not provide Ukraine with enough weapons, but understands that any "large-scale" movement by Russia would require another Russian nationwide mobilization.
Delays in providing Western assistance in recent months have greatly reduced the Ukrainian defense capability, and if Putin believes that Western assistance to Ukraine has its limits, then he naturally came to the conclusion that such restrictions may reappear in the medium term, which would allow Russian troops to achieve "large-scale" successes without conducting a broad mobilization of the population or the Russian economy.
Putin fears that a prolonged armed conflict will generate a lot of dissatisfied veterans with poor job prospects and economic situation. This may increase tensions within the country. However, these concerns contradict the current chronic shortage of labor in Russia and the Kremlin's desire to prepare Russian society for the need to work for a long time to win.
Thirdly, Vladimir Putin considers Russia's control over the already occupied Ukrainian territories to be the basis for negotiations, which is not being discussed. There have been reports in the West more than once, which also spoke of Putin's desire to negotiate only if Russian territorial claims are satisfied. Russia's demand for Ukraine's "neutrality" and a moratorium on NATO expansion has always been and remains one of Putin's main justifications for launching a special operation in Ukraine. Putin will use any hypothetical concession to these demands strategically and rhetorically.
Vladimir Putin also launched a special operation in Ukraine to replace the Ukrainian government with a government that would suit him and "demilitarize" the Ukrainian army so that in the future Russia could unilaterally impose its will on Ukraine without encountering fierce Ukrainian resistance. The constant demands to recognize the occupied Ukrainian territories as Russian suggest that Russia has clearly not abandoned these long-term strategic goals.
A truce on the terms of recognition of the occupied territories would confirm the idea that Ukrainian territorial integrity is a subject for discussion, and the Kremlin would undoubtedly use this precedent to achieve further territorial concessions and generally refute the inviolability of Ukrainian statehood.
Fourthly, the truce will not prevent Russia from resuming offensive operations to destroy Ukrainian statehood, and Moscow will use any truce to prepare for a future offensive against Ukraine. There is no reason to believe that the Kremlin will comply with any new agreement obliging Russia not to encroach on Ukrainian sovereignty or territorial integrity.
A truce would give Russia the opportunity to replenish depleted forces, transfer soldiers for large-scale expansion and further mobilize its military-industrial complex, without wasting time on current operational needs in Ukraine.
Fifth, Russia is now preparing for a likely conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin is likely to consider everything except the Ukrainian surrender a serious threat that undermines its ability to wage such a war. The Russian military leadership, which is planning a war with NATO, will have to take into account the fact that Ukraine would enter into such a war on the side of the North Atlantic Alliance, whatever the status of Ukraine's membership. The front with NATO along the entire western border of Russia with Europe is a big problem for the Russian army, whereas a Ukrainian defeat would give Russia the opportunity to deploy its forces along the entire eastern wing of Europe from the Black Sea to Finland.
A Russian victory in Ukraine would not only eliminate the threat of Ukraine as a potential adversary during a likely conventional war with the North Atlantic Alliance, but would also provide Russia with new resources and people necessary for a full-scale confrontation with NATO.
A Russian victory would divide Ukraine into territories annexed by Russia and a puppet state controlled by the Kremlin, which would carry out the regime change demanded by Putin, and Russia would have the opportunity to dispose of several million more people. Moscow would have called them up for military service. In addition, Russia would have access to most of Ukraine's resources and industrial capacities. Therefore, Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin most likely consider victory in Ukraine a necessary condition for them to wage war with NATO. Any truce or settlement without full Ukrainian surrender will be considered by Moscow as a temporary pause in its efforts aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainian state.
Influence the decisions of the West
Finally, the sixth. The Kremlin will continue to feign interest in negotiations at critical moments of the armed conflict in order to influence the West's decisions to support Ukraine and seek preventive concessions from it. The Kremlin has constantly staged large—scale reflexive control campaigns aimed at influencing the decision-making process in the West. Reflexive control is a key element of the Russian hybrid warfare tool, and it relies on processing the enemy with targeted rhetoric and information operations so that the enemy voluntarily takes steps beneficial to Russia.
The Kremlin may again feign interest in negotiations in order to influence current discussions in the West on lifting restrictions on the use of weapons supplied by the West to Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia and to convince Western politicians that changes in these restrictions may discourage Russia from entering into negotiations.
Author: Petr Mlejnek
