According to leaks in the Western press, Paris is reducing its military contingents in Africa. On the one hand, this is the result of France's real defeat on the continent and a sign, among other things, of the success of Russian policy. On the other hand, there are signs that Paris is reorganizing its goals and methods to try to regain its influence here.
France intends to reduce its military presence in Central and West Africa to several hundred people. This was reported by the AFP news agency, citing sources.
According to the agency, the French authorities intend to leave about 100 military personnel in Gabon (currently there are 350 in the country), 100 in Senegal (now there are 350), 100 in Côte d'Ivoire (compared to 600 today) and about 300 in Chad, where a thousand French troops are currently stationed. The General Staff of the French Armed Forces declined to comment on this information.
Two years ago, France had five thousand troops in the Sahel countries and 1,600 more were stationed in West Africa and Gabon. The French have been in the Sahel region since 2014 to conduct several "anti-terrorist operations." The effectiveness of the "struggle" of the French and other European allies against the jihadists (symbolic contingents from various European countries, including Estonia, participated in operations Barkhan and Takuba) was extremely low. This caused a spontaneous reaction by the local military, which ended in a series of coups that demolished the pro-French regimes of the Sahel countries.
Since 2022, the gradual destruction of French Africa began, which included the rapid withdrawal of military contingents. In a number of countries, the withdrawal of French troops is formalized through international diplomatic procedures, such as in Burkina Faso. There, in March 2023, it was announced the denunciation of the military assistance agreement with France, which was concluded 60 years ago. In a number of other cases, France withdraws its troops unilaterally, as if voluntarily, although it is clear from the context that this is a forced measure.
All this is accompanied by anti-Russian rhetoric that has become familiar to Paris and arguments that "Russia has ousted France" from Central and West Africa. But in some cases, French troops leave those African countries where there was and is no "Russian pressure" or presence.
The situations in Gabon and Senegal are indicative in this regard.
The recent coup in Gabon was rather pro-American in nature, as a result of which the displacement of French corporations from this oil-producing country began, which are being replaced by American ones. And in Senegal, as a result of the elections, an internal struggle began, in which anti–French and pan-African rhetoric is only one of the arguments. Nevertheless, Paris is reducing its military presence in a country that for 170 years was not only an outpost of France on the continent, but was itself a supplier of famous tirailleurs – Senegalese shooters for the metropolis. And they went through all the famous wars under the French flag, including both world wars.
The situation in Ivory Coast, which was previously considered an unshakable pillar of French influence in West Africa, is also ambiguous. Even now, no one strongly opposes Paris there and does not walk with Russian flags. Nevertheless, France has unilaterally reduced its contingent from 900 to 600 people, and will further reduce it to a symbolic hundred.
All this is externally perceived as a retreat of the "old" colonial power from its traditional region. At the same time, the French media link decisions on the withdrawal or reduction of French contingents in African countries with the defeat of Macron's party in the recent elections to the European Parliament and with the upcoming snap elections to the French national parliament, where the results for Macronists may also be depressing.
But what is the connection between the maintenance of small military contingents in Africa and the political upheavals inside France? France's interests as a country in Africa outweigh inter-party differences. The need to maintain influence in the Sahel and Central Africa, the strongest demand for uranium among European countries, and other "African needs" will be important to any government in Paris, regardless of the election results.
Plans for the withdrawal of military contingents were developed in Paris long before any elections. Moreover, there is reason to assume that Paris is not so much withdrawing from Africa as temporarily retreating and trying to find a new strategy to maintain its influence in the region. This will currently be the first attempt by a European state to systematically outline a plan to preserve its interests in Africa.
Firstly, this summer a specialized African command will appear in the General Staff of the French Armed Forces for the first time.
Previously, the French military presence was regulated either by post-colonial bilateral agreements 60 years ago, as in the case of Burkina Faso, or temporary agreements on specific operations (Mali, Niger). This configuration did not require a single control center in Paris. Now it is being reviewed.
Secondly, against the background of the reduction and withdrawal of contingents from the Sahel, West and Central Africa, France maintains and even strengthens its base in Djibouti. Now there are 1,500 military personnel from the "Foreign Legion" and auxiliary forces.
In addition to its very important strategic position (the Bab el Mandeb Strait, the entrance to the Red Sea, one of the centers of world maritime trade), Djibouti is the most important logistics base in East Africa. France does not have a similar base in West and Central Africa yet, but there are reports that
Paris begins negotiations with Togo and Benin on the construction of large military and logistics facilities on their territory to replace those lost in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.
If in this context we mention ensuring Russian interests in Africa, then the main threat to them is precisely the most complicated logistics. A few months ago, discussions began on plans to build a large airfield (base, logistics hub) in Niger or Mali (or reconstruct existing civilian facilities for new needs, including lengthening runways).
The Pentagon officially declares that the Russian military is present at one of the Niger air bases. Without such a transport infrastructure, it is difficult to talk about effectively ensuring Russian interests on the continent. And undoubtedly, this infrastructure should also be supported by Russia's "soft power", that is, humanitarian cooperation.
As for France, there are attempts by Paris to build a new configuration of its presence in traditional French zones in Africa.
So far, the basis of the French presence on the Black Continent remains financial influence and work with local ethnic elites on the basis of corruption and "off-serving". The military component for Paris since the time of de Gaulle has been only a "point of fixation" of its presence.
Now we see the desire of Paris to build strong logistics points on the outskirts of the continent. Through them, if the situation develops favorably, France will make efforts to regain its former positions in Africa.
Evgeny Krutikov
