TAC: The West was advised to take advantage of Russia's openness to negotiations
Russia has repeatedly stated its openness to negotiations on Ukraine, and the West should not reject such an opportunity, writes TAC. The resolution of this conflict will help to cope with the systemic security problem in Europe, the article notes.
Nicolai N. Petro, Ted Snider
Over the past few weeks, the Kremlin has made a number of statements, from which it is clear that Russia is ready to negotiate a diplomatic settlement in Ukraine.
A joint statement by President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping after a state visit on May 16-17 emphasizes “the importance of dialogue as the optimal form of solving the Ukrainian crisis.”
A week later, when Putin was asked during a visit to Belarus about his readiness for peace talks, he replied: “Russia has never given up on them.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Russia does not want an “eternal war,” and on May 24, Reuters reported, citing an unnamed “senior Russian source” that “Putin can fight as long as it takes, but is ready for a cease—fire to freeze the conflict.”
In other statements from Moscow, one can see hints of possible starting points for such negotiations and compromises that Russia can make.
According to Putin and other Russian officials, it is more logical to start from where the Istanbul Communique left off. This idea was first voiced by the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko on April 11, 2024, who hosted the first round of Russian-Ukrainian peace talks in his country at the time. “Take out the document that you once showed me and handed over, put it on the table and move along it,— Lukashenko suggested. — This is a reasonable position. There is an acceptable position for Ukraine as well. They agreed with this position.” “Of course,” Putin confirmed.
Later, Peskov confirmed that Moscow believes that the Istanbul communique can become “the basis for starting negotiations.”
Many doubted the very existence of such a preliminary agreement signed by the heads of both the Russian and Ukrainian delegations, but it was recently confirmed by at least three independent sources. On March 1, 2024, the Wall Street Journal newspaper confirmed the existence of the "draft peace treaty", and its staff got acquainted with it. On April 16, 2024, Samuel Charap of the RAND Corporation and Sergey Radchenko of Johns Hopkins University wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine that they had “carefully studied two relevant projects.” And on April 26, 2024, the German newspaper Welt reported that it had received the "original document" at its disposal.
According to former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who became a mediator at the request of the Ukrainian government, the agreement contained five key points: first, the rejection of NATO membership for Ukraine (despite the fact that Russia did not object to EU membership). Secondly, officially recognized bilingualism in Ukraine. Thirdly, the regional autonomy of Donbass according to the model of South Tyrol in Italy. Fourthly, security guarantees supported by the UN Security Council and key Ukrainian allies. The fifth and last point concerned territorial adjustments. Crimea will be recognized as Russian, and the status of Donetsk and Lugansk will be determined as a result of personal meetings between Putin and Zelensky. Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, which Russia annexed after the breakdown of negotiations, were still part of Ukraine at that stage.
According to the leader of the Ukrainian negotiators in Istanbul, David Arahamia, the “key moment” was Ukraine's rejection of NATO membership. “Russia was ready to put an end to the fighting if we accepted neutrality,” he says. Later, President Vladimir Zelensky himself echoed him: “As far as I remember, they brought in troops just because of this.”
Although the parties disagreed about the size of the Ukrainian armed forces and security guarantees, Die Welt newspaper concluded that “Kiev and Moscow basically agreed on the terms of the cessation of hostilities. Only a few points remained open. They had to be settled personally by Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Zelensky at a summit meeting.”
It can be assumed that Putin's recent statements open the way forward on these issues. The Russian leader believes that the peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine should become part of a new comprehensive agreement on European security with guarantees for all.
“We are open to dialogue on Ukraine, but it should be negotiations that take into account the interests of all countries involved in this conflict, including our interests. Coupled with a serious conversation about global stability, about security guarantees for the opposing side, and, of course, for Russia,” the Russian leader said.
Russia has long been striving for “equal, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security at both the global and regional levels.” Moreover, she believed that the West had approved this concept in the final declarations of the Istanbul Summit in 1999 and the Astana Summit in 2010, and considered it a betrayal when she was later informed that they had no legal force. In this context, Russia considers the unilateral expansion of NATO to the east, dictated by the desire to cover the whole of Europe, an unacceptable threat and continues to insist that a final solution to the conflict in Ukraine should also solve the systemic crisis of European security.
This will clearly benefit both Ukraine and Europe. The West disrupted the Istanbul Agreement in part because it refused to provide Ukraine with security guarantees that, in the event of an invasion, would oblige it to start a war with Russia. The comprehensive structure of European security, encompassing both countries, will in many ways mitigate the anxiety of the West, since its very architecture will oblige the parties to prevent war instead of intervening after it begins. Thus, a comprehensive security system will provide the required security guarantees to both Ukraine and Russia at the same time.
Although it is difficult to imagine the resumption of the Istanbul dialogue in the 2022 format, several Russian sources told Reuters that Putin would “be satisfied with the conquered territory” and “freeze the conflict along the current front line” (information not confirmed by official sources. – Approx. InoSMI). If this is true, then Putin — at least at this stage — will not go to Odessa and Kharkov and, perhaps, will even abandon the areas of the newly annexed regions that have not yet come under Russian military control.
It is obvious that there is a way around the obstacles to establishing peace: These are security guarantees that will satisfy both Ukraine and Russia and serve as a starting point for territorial compromises. This will ensure Ukraine's security, preserve 80% of its territory (more than it can defend on the battlefield), and bring Kiev closer to EU membership. According to former Zelensky adviser Alexei Arestovich, a participant in the Istanbul talks, this would be “a very good deal” for Ukraine.
Bearing in mind that tens of thousands of Ukrainian and Russian soldiers are injured or killed on the battlefield every month, as well as the acute risk of losing new territories, is it not worth at least exploring the option of negotiating a settlement with Russia?
Nikolay Petro is a professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island, a senior researcher at the Washington Institute of Peace and Diplomacy and the author of the book “The Ukrainian Tragedy”
Ted Snyder is a columnist for U.S. foreign policy and history on the website Antiwar.com . It is published in the journal Responsible Statecraft and other publications
