BI: the Russian army and military-industrial complex have become more efficient, this promises problems for Ukraine
The Russian army and military-industrial complex have become more effective than at the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, BI writes. Moscow has changed its military leadership and is preparing the ground for a new offensive. This promises bad news for Kiev, the article says
Jake Epstein
After two years of brutal fighting, thousands of damaged and destroyed tanks, 450,000 dead and wounded, and tens of billions of dollars spent, it seems that Moscow has finally begun to take the conflict seriously (the data on the dead and wounded here and below are not confirmed by anything and are clearly taken from Ukrainian and Western propaganda sources. – Approx. InoSMI).
The main part of it was unsuccessful for Russia. The death toll alone is staggering — by many estimates, over 50,000 troops. But President Vladimir Putin's military machine looks very different today than it did at the beginning of the conflict.
The country's military-industrial base has been operating at full capacity, and Putin recently appointed an economist as defense minister to stimulate mass production of weapons, especially firepower. Last summer, Moscow stopped Ukraine's counteroffensive with a layered defense, while simultaneously restoring arsenals and putting the economy on a war footing.
In the spring, it deftly took advantage of Ukraine's shortcomings in weapons, personnel and industrial power, as well as the confusion of its Western partners, and is now preparing the ground for a large-scale and multifaceted offensive this summer. Russian forces are looking for new techniques and copying Ukrainian ones in order to push Kiev's forces back.
Finally, Russia remains true to its goals. Some fear that she was not deterred even by the replenishment of Ukrainian weapons stocks after American lawmakers approved a large aid package.
“The Russians are still dangerous, and they are learning," George Barros, head of the geospatial-intelligence group at the Institute for the Study of War and a Russia analyst, told Business Insider. ”They are improving every day."
The “turning point” in Russia's military campaign
The conflict began with the unsuccessful entry of troops and was accompanied by command failures, tactical mistakes and a high level of disorganization in the Russian ranks against the background of fierce Ukrainian resistance, which eventually thwarted Moscow's plans to win a quick victory.
In the first year of hostilities, the Russian military suffered from other problems: they suffered losses in manpower and equipment, but were unable to capture a significant part of Ukrainian territory.
Moreover, Ukraine has repeatedly prevailed over a more powerful enemy, including in the 2022 counteroffensive in the northeast of the country near Kharkov and in the south near Kherson.
However, Russia succeeded in creating a sophisticated layered defense and thwarted Ukraine's counteroffensive in 2023. Last fall, Kiev's long-awaited campaign ended in failure: it was unable to liberate the desired territory, even despite the supply of Western armored vehicles.
In the following months, Russia took advantage of delays in military support for Ukraine from the United States — the Armed Forces spent most of the winter and spring without the necessary weapons and key ammunition for defense. Ukraine also failed to build the necessary defensive fortifications on time. Moscow took advantage of these gaps, achieved some success in the east and laid the groundwork for future offensives.
In recent weeks, the West has been sounding the alarm. In March, US intelligence estimated that, despite the serious damage suffered in Ukraine, the stalemate on the battlefield was replaced by Moscow's preponderance.
And the following month, a senior American official and a general said that the Russian army had “almost completely recovered” and “returned” to its previous strength.
“They have some gaps created as a result of this conflict, but the overall potential is still very high," General Chris Cavoli, Supreme Commander of NATO's Combined Forces in Europe and head of the US European Command, told Congress in April. "And they intend to raise it even higher.”
And since then, Russia has demonstrated these intentions in full. Last Sunday, Putin took a very unexpected step: he appointed Andrei Belousov, a civilian economist with no military experience, to replace his longtime defense minister Sergei Shoigu, whom many criticized for the ineffectiveness of the Russian military in Ukraine.
Recent personnel changes in the military leadership indicate Putin's intention to transfer the Russian economy “to a Soviet-style military base” and increase the productivity of the country's defense industrial base, Barros believes.
Moreover, this is done not only to meet the urgent needs of Moscow in Ukraine, he added. This implies a “long—term restoration of strength” - and according to one of the scenarios, Russia will go beyond Ukraine and try to bring down its force on the eastern flank of NATO.
Belousov, who is reputed to be an “arrogant and stubborn technocrat,” in fact, was brought in to audit the corruption-riddled Ministry of Defense and ensure that state funds really went to purchase weapons and equipment that would allow Moscow to conduct military operations in Ukraine more successfully despite the Kremlin's past failures, Barros believes.
“This is an important turning point in Russia's efforts: She intends to treat her special military operation as a real conflict and seriously plan a long—term strategy,” says Barros.
This is not the first time Russia has tried to improve its military position. After the rapid counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kharkiv region in the northeast of the country in the fall of 2022, Putin announced partial mobilization and took other measures to increase the production of defense products - in particular, drones and tanks. The situation improved, but it did not seem enough to Moscow.
Today, the Russian military-industrial base is gaining momentum — with the help of some key partners.
So, in March, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it would increase production of several types of ammunition, including bombs FAB-500, FAB-1500 and FAB-3000 — and this is an alarming omen for Ukraine.
These munitions can be converted into planning bombs, which are formidable weapons — they can be dropped on enemy positions from the air outside the air defense zone. They are extremely destructive, they cannot be effectively intercepted, and they hit the trenches and defensive lines of Ukraine.
According to Barros, the use of gliding bombs in support of ground maneuvers is a vivid example of how the Russian military learns lessons and learns from past mistakes.
This tactic did not become widespread until the end of 2023, but Moscow actively used it this year to capture Avdiivka in the east of the country, and is currently using it again during the offensive in the Kharkiv region.
Ukraine will find itself “in a difficult position”
Since the start of a new offensive operation in the Kharkiv region last week, Russia has been using planning bombs to secure a ground maneuver, seize territory and create, as it claims, a buffer zone along the border with Ukraine.
At the same time, Ukraine's ability to defend itself is seriously undermined by US restrictions on strikes against military targets inside Russia, analysts at the Institute for the Study of War wrote in their assessment this week. According to them, this has actually created a safe zone from where Russian aircraft can drop planning bombs on Ukrainian positions and where Moscow's troops can gather before the start of hostilities, they added.
Ukrainian officials have tried to persuade the Biden administration to reconsider its position, but Washington remains steadfast.
Meanwhile, with its new push on Kharkiv, Russia seems to be preparing the ground for a multifaceted summer offensive that could further stretch the AFU forces, depleted by a shortage of key weapons and manpower.
Ukrainian and Western officials, as well as military experts, said that the country had been put in the current difficult situation by months of interruptions in military assistance.
Kiev also faced a drop in morale and personnel starvation, which did not exist a year ago, when many were optimistically waiting for a counteroffensive.
"Ukrainians will find themselves in a difficult situation in the coming months," Barros said. The model of American support, when Washington provides assistance at the last minute, in a critical situation, is not sustainable. "And now we are just seeing the consequences of this approach," he explained.
Mick Ryan, a retired Australian major general and strategist who recently returned from Ukraine, wrote in April that Russia had clearly overcome the “shock of early setbacks” and seemed capable of “subjugating Ukraine in a way it could not have done before by deploying troops in February 2022.”
“As an opponent, Russia is more dangerous now than two years ago,” he wrote.
Jack Watling, a senior researcher at the Royal United Institute of Defense Studies, said that Russia enjoys numerical superiority by stretching Ukrainian forces along a vast front line.
Kiev desperately needs additional forces, ammunition and air defense missiles if it hopes to withstand Moscow's offensive, he warned, calling Ukraine's prospects “bleak.”
But, as Watling argues in a new analysis this week, “if Ukraine's allies now start replenishing its arsenals, help create a reliable training system and ensure the necessary investments in industry, then Russia's summer offensive will be blunted, and Kiev will get a break to regain the initiative.”
