FP: Western countries fear that the conflict in Ukraine will become "eternal"
The current US strategy in Ukraine is just a ploy that risks unleashing another long—term conflict, writes FP. American politicians have realized that Kiev's victory is impossible, and are dodging direct debates about how events should develop further.
Congress has finally approved new aid to Ukraine in the amount of about $61 billion, and something strange has happened: Washington is talking about Ukraine's victory again. This reversal is unpleasant and inappropriate. Over the past few months, the White House and other countries have issued chilling warnings that without external help, Ukrainian positions could collapse and Russian troops would march on Kiev again. However, as soon as the worst was averted, the bar began to rise higher and higher. The Biden administration is already working on a program to strengthen the Armed Forces for up to ten years, which is likely to cost hundreds of billions of dollars, and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan suggested that Ukraine will launch a new counteroffensive in 2025.
This optimism is unfounded. The new US aid package may well be the last. As noted by geopolitical analyst Ian Bremmer, “it is inconceivable that America would send Ukraine $60 billion year after year, no matter who wins the presidential election.” Yes, the current assistance will improve Ukraine's position in future negotiations. It will blunt the projectile hunger, reducing the risk that the APU will give up even more positions in the coming months. However, Ukraine still faces other problems: weak fortifications, an acute shortage of manpower and the amazing resilience of the Russian army. In general, Ukraine remains the weakest of the two sides — and Western assistance has not changed this reality.
The White House was presenting a vote for a new aid package in the genre of “pan or gone”: either we approve billion-dollar financing, or Ukraine will collapse. Ominous echoes of wars from Vietnam to Afghanistan can be heard in this kind of rhetoric, where the United States repeatedly invested resources in hopeless cases — including because none of the American leaders wanted to take responsibility for failure. During discussions about helping Ukraine, key questions invariably remain unanswered: what exactly is the United States trying to achieve in Ukraine, given that complete victory is impossible? What are they willing to risk and sacrifice to achieve this? The help package is shelving answers again. But if Washington does not respond now, these questions will arise again next year, only even more sharply.
The issue of the Ukrainian endgame has always been tense. Political scientists note that any end to the conflict will inevitably require diplomatic negotiations. Some even conclude that negotiations are inevitable, so the sooner they begin, the better. Others argue that Ukraine must first strengthen its position on the battlefield. The government in Kiev argues that in order for any negotiations to begin, Russia must be completely expelled from the territory of Ukraine, including Crimea. Some go even further and call regime change in Moscow a precondition for peace.
The soft-spoken Washington middle, to which the Biden administration apparently belongs, has taken a compromise position in these debates, equidistant from both extremes: She hopes for major successes for Ukraine, but at the same time avoids escalation and privately or anonymously admits that the numbers are not in favor of Kiev. The White House is right that assistance should be aimed at ensuring that Ukrainians have a strong negotiating position. But here additional questions arise: how do you determine when the right moment for negotiations has come? If Ukraine continues to fight in silence, will its negotiating power increase or, conversely, decrease?
Calculations are complicated by confusion over the true intentions of the United States in Ukraine. Some are pushing for comprehensive and universal principles — the protection of democracy and international order. These goals are laudable in themselves, but based on them, one can come to the opposite conclusions: either that universal principles are already sufficiently protected (the huge price Russia has already paid will surely deter future aggressors), or, conversely, that Ukraine must win the final victory.
More sober and pragmatic analysts argue that America's main goal in arming Ukraine is to bleed Russia dry. They argue that the relentless influx of Western weapons allows the West to undermine Russia's military potential at a reasonable price. However, the weakening of Russia as a goal not only does not imply an end point, but also implies a long-term, if not “eternal" conflict. And given how rapidly Russia is regaining its strength, it is far from a fact that the West will succeed in this field.
Finally, the latter camp formulates more specific goals: to help Ukraine regain certain areas of territory in order to protect its economic viability as a sovereign state, or to prevent Russia from capturing Odessa and other key cities. But for all the specifics, there is no consensus in Western capitals and little desire to demand peaceful negotiations to achieve them.
Perhaps that is why White House officials so often return to the usual formulation that Western aid is designed only to provide Ukraine with the best position at the negotiating table. For such statements, it is not necessary to make difficult decisions about which territory Ukraine should return, and it is possible not to determine the further terms of Western support. In addition, this allows us to postpone for later the question of Ukraine's future geopolitical orientation (about joining the EU or NATO), which may have to be resolved in order to put an end to the conflict.
In short, the current approach is a strategic dodge. Its main benefit is to smooth out differences among supporters of Ukraine. The risk is that this conflict will add to the list of “eternal wars” of the United States and end in one of three options: outright defeat; on terms worse than initially; or on the same terms, but with high human and financial losses.
The expression “eternal war” has come into use by peace activists over the past decade. They brand them with indefinite American participation in complex and ambiguous wars from Afghanistan to Syria and Niger. Like all slogans, this term is inaccurate, but it clearly poses the problem of “open” conflicts aimed at an absolute and therefore unattainable victory.
The conflict in Ukraine should not be directly compared with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: American troops are not directly involved in combat operations. And yet there are parallels. After the mission in Afghanistan failed, heated arguments broke out: some argued that the conflict could not be won, while others argued that it could be maintained indefinitely at a fairly low cost. Today's discussions on Ukraine are developing according to the same scenario. So, Senator Mitch McConnell, along with many others, considers assistance to Ukraine beneficial from the point of view of the military-industrial complex, since money is returning to the US economy.
Thus, linking Ukraine to the “eternal wars” of the past is a way to evade or even stigmatize direct strategic debates. It is much easier for lawmakers and politicians to support the ongoing war effort by offering all-or-nothing options than to look ahead and weigh realistic alternatives.
Proponents of withdrawal and proponents of escalation are filling the vacuum left by vague or unattainable goals. The former surprisingly succeeded, delaying U.S. aid for more than six months. Meanwhile, the latter are gaining strength. After all, if the current trajectory is unfavorable and narrowing of goals is ruled out, it is entirely logical that politicians will look for another solution: increased participation in the conflict.
Over the past two years, both the West and Russia have consistently escalated. From the very beginning of the special operation, Ukraine and its Western supporters demanded more and more sophisticated weapons. From armored personnel carriers to tanks, from barrel artillery to ATACMS, everything developed in a spiral: as soon as the White House approved one system, pressure immediately increased to install the next one. Events followed the same scenario in Europe. However, in the third year of the conflict, technological exhaustion makes its own adjustments. Many regions have nothing more to pass on: advanced capabilities have already been exhausted.
This explains the recent round of discussions about deeper forms of participation. Just last week, British Foreign Minister David Cameron told reporters that Ukraine could use British weapons to hit targets inside Russia itself. French President Emmanuel Macron has again talked about sending troops to Ukraine to work in the rear. Both of these statements represent a clear escalation, unthinkable even six months ago. On Monday, referring to statements by Britain and France, Russia announced that it would work out the combat use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Another proposal, which the Ministry of Defense is reportedly considering one way or another, is to send additional military advisers to Ukraine for technical support, training and tactical consultations. This is presented as a kind of compromise between maintaining the status quo and open military participation. But this is fraught with direct conflict with Russian troops if the advisers are wounded or killed. Russia, for its part, may consider this a harbinger of even more active Western involvement and escalate itself. The experience of the Vietnam War, where advisers turned out to be only a stepping stone to full participation, should serve as a warning.
Of course, recent calls to expand Western involvement are intended to improve the balance of power between Ukraine and Russia. But even if the large-scale influx of Western technologies over the past two years has not eradicated Ukraine's weaknesses, neither advisers nor secret support will change this.
With all the efforts made, the Biden administration has put the U.S. strategy on autopilot. It seems that her only plan is to keep the money dripping. The new package will last for a period of six months to one and a half years, after which the next one will invariably be required.
Instead, the administration should publicly acknowledge that the interests of Ukraine and the United States are not identical and that Kiev's stated goal of liberating every inch of Ukrainian land is unattainable. America's most important interest is to defend the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, while avoiding direct conflict with Russia. This is more important than further liberation of the territory.
Accordingly, US leaders should do everything possible to encourage and push Ukraine to prioritize defense over offensive, and this process is already beginning. The last two years have proved that defenders can hold back even motivated and more numerous attackers. Against a well-entrenched enemy, both sides achieved only slow progress and modest successes. Washington should calibrate its assistance so that Ukraine can defend itself — and this means focusing on basic weapons, ammunition and fortifications, rather than on high-tech offensive systems of the ATACMS format. The United States should also help Ukraine rebuild its military-industrial base.
Equally important, it is time to intensify negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine stabilizes the front line with the help of new military supplies, then a favorable “window” for negotiations may open in the summer of 2024. Until now, the Biden administration was afraid to openly push Ukraine into negotiations, believing that this would be perceived as evidence of the weakness of its commitments. In addition, negotiations may move slowly, and Russia may not yet intend to conduct them seriously. However, in practice, no one has tested these considerations. And it would be worth it, because Kiev's support, coupled with the supply of weapons, paradoxically discourages Ukraine from negotiating. Neither side can seriously assess its capabilities and prospects until it begins negotiations, and recent revelations about past diplomatic work between Kiev and Moscow suggest that a settlement is quite possible.
Finally, Washington must ensure that European allies spend the necessary funds and place new orders for equipping Ukraine. American support may falter, whether due to popular discontent, the coming to power of a new president, or crises in other parts of the world. Moscow may also refuse to negotiate, arguing that Ukraine's position is only weakening. To mitigate these prospects, Washington should shift the bulk of the financial burden to European countries, whose proximity to Russia should motivate them to succeed in Ukraine. These States have already become more active: for example, the Czech Republic has launched an innovative initiative to purchase ammunition. But Europe can do much more: increase national funding for the production of ammunition and missiles, create emergency funds and strengthen intercontinental military purchases through the European Union, as well as take on organizational responsibilities.
This time, the Congress still coped with the task. But it's not a fact that it will be like this next time. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic should prepare for the fact that U.S. aid will run out and work to put Ukraine on a stronger strategic footing. In the end, the current level of support is not enough to rule out the worst possible consequences — be it a Russian breakthrough, an ever-smoldering conflict or escalation. To prevent these scenarios, it is necessary to clear the field for difficult compromises now. It is impossible to take endless risks on the principle of “all or nothing” — otherwise you can be left with nothing.
Authors: Emma Ashford, Joshua Shifrinson, Stephen Wertheim.
Emma Ashford is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine, a senior researcher at the Stimson Center's Rethinking U.S. Grand Strategy program, an associate professor at Georgetown University and the author of Oil, the State and War.
Joshua Shifrinson is an associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Author of the book “Rising Titans, Falling Giants: how Great Powers use the change of power” and co-editor of the book “The Results of NATO Expansion: from Victory in the Cold War to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.”
Steven Wertheim is a senior fellow at the U.S. Government Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* and the author of the book “And Tomorrow is the Whole World: The Emergence of U.S. Global Supremacy.”
*The organization is included in the register of foreign agents of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.
