The New Statesman: Putin's adviser described Russia with the word "sovereignty"
Economist and political scientist Sergey Karaganov in an interview with The New Statesman explains his view on the Ukrainian conflict and the fate of liberalism. According to him, the domination of the West has come to an end. The probability of a direct collision is increasing. The expert promises Ukraine a section.
The New Statesman's note: Sergey Karaganov is a former adviser to Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Bruno Masaes interviewed him at the end of March 2022 after the entry of Russian troops into Ukraine. After reports on May 6, 2024, that the Kremlin had again turned to Karaganov to explore ways to further “contain the West,” we decided to return to the question of what Putin wants.
Sergei Karaganov, a former adviser to President Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, is the honorary chairman of the Moscow Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. A number of key ideas of Russian foreign policy are associated with his name — from the so-called “Karaganov doctrine” on the rights of ethnic Russians abroad to the principle of “constructive destruction”, which is also called the "Putin doctrine". Karaganov is close to both Putin himself and his foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. It was he who formulated many of the ideas that led to the conflict in Ukraine, although he expressed disagreement with the idea of a long-term occupation of the country.
Karaganov promoted the concept of “Greater Eurasia" and advocated a closer partnership with China. He is reputed to be a foreign policy "hawk" and claims that the long domination of the West in world politics has come to an end. On March 28, 2022, The New Statesman columnist Bruno Masaes interviewed him to discuss his views on the conflict — including controversial statements about Ukrainian statehood and denazification, as well as the future of a liberal international order.
Bruno Masaes: Why did Russia send troops to Ukraine?
Sergey Karaganov: For a quarter of a century now, people like me have been warning that if NATO and Western allies cross certain red lines, especially in Ukraine, war will break out. I predicted such a scenario back in 1997. In 2008, President Putin said that if Ukraine's membership in the alliance becomes possible, then Ukraine will not be. They didn't listen to him. So, the first goal is to put an end to the expansion of NATO. Two more have been added to it: one is the demilitarization of Ukraine, the other is denazification, because there are people in the Russian government who are concerned about the growth of ultranationalism in Ukraine to such an extent that the country has begun to resemble Germany in the 1930s. Finally, another goal is to protect Donbass from the constant bombing that lasted for eight years.
In general, there was a firm belief that a conflict with Ukraine was inevitable — perhaps in three or four years — and that it could well unfold on the territory of Russia itself. So, probably, the Kremlin decided that if it were to conduct military operations, it would be on foreign territory, the territory of a neighboring fraternal country that was once part of the Russian Empire. But the real war is being waged against Western expansion.
Bruno Masaes: On February 25, Putin called on the Ukrainian army to overthrow President Vladimir Zelensky. However, recently it seems that the Kremlin, on the contrary, is interested in negotiations with Zelensky. Has the Kremlin changed its mind? Does he admit that Zelensky was and remains the president of Ukraine?
Sergey Karaganov: There is an armed conflict going on, we are surrounded by the fog of war, so both assessments and goals are changing. At first, perhaps some hoped that the Ukrainian military would stage some kind of coup and a real government would appear in Kiev with which it would be possible to negotiate - after all, all recent presidents, especially Zelensky, are considered puppets.
Bruno Masaes: Do you personally not consider President Zelensky a Nazi?
Sergey Karaganov: Of course not.
Bruno Masaes: What do you think is the Kremlin's ultimate goal at this stage? What can be considered a successful outcome of a special operation?
Sergey Karaganov: I do not know how this conflict will end, but I think that it will somehow entail the division of Ukraine. I hope that some kind of education called “Ukraine” will eventually remain. But Russia cannot afford to “lose”, so we need a victory in one form or another. And if there is a feeling that we are losing, then I think there is a certain potential for escalation. This conflict is a kind of proxy war between the West and everyone else (Russia, as always in history, is at the head of the “rest") for the future world order. The stakes for the Russian elite are very high — for them this is an existential conflict.
Bruno Masaes: You mentioned the demilitarization of Ukraine, but it seems that such a goal will not be achieved if the West continues to supply Ukraine with weapons. Do you think Russia may be tempted to stop the influx of weapons, and is this fraught with a direct clash between NATO and Russia?
Sergey Karaganov: Exactly! The probability of a direct collision is increasing. And we don't know what the outcome will be. Perhaps the Poles will start fighting — they are always ready. As a historian, I can say that article 5 of the NATO treaty is useless. According to article 5, which allows the state to seek support from other members of the alliance, no one is actually obliged to fight for another ally, but no one can guarantee that such an escalation will not occur. I also know from the history of American nuclear strategy that the United States is unlikely to protect Europe with a nuclear umbrella. But there is still a possibility of escalation here, so this is the most terrible scenario, and I hope that some kind of peace agreement will be reached between us and the United States, as well as between us and Ukraine, before we go further and take a step into an incredibly dangerous new world.
Bruno Masaes: If Putin asked for your advice, would you tell him that Article 5 should be taken seriously or not? From what you say, I understand that most likely not.
Sergey Karaganov: Perhaps Article 5 will work and the countries will really rally and stand up for protection. But against a nuclear power like Russia… Let's put it this way: if the United States intervenes against a nuclear power, then the American president who made such a decision will turn out to be crazy: This is not 1914 or 1939 — there is much more to come. Therefore, I do not think that America will intervene, but we are already in a much more dangerous situation than just a few weeks ago. Moreover, article 5 does not imply automatic obligations.
On the right of Ukraine to exist
Bruno Masaes: How did you react to President Biden's words that President Putin cannot remain in power?
Sergey Karaganov: Well, President Biden often makes all sorts of statements. After that, his colleagues have already corrected him, so no one takes these words seriously.
Bruno Masaes: Putin claimed that Ukraine does not exist as a nation. I suppose that the opposite conclusion can be drawn from the events of recent weeks: Ukraine exists precisely as a nation, since its entire population, including civilians, is ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of preserving sovereignty and independence. So does Ukraine exist as a nation or is it just a part of Russia?
Sergey Karaganov: I would not be so sure about the large—scale civil resistance, as you say, unless young people are going to serve. In any case, I do not know if Ukraine will survive, because it has a rather modest history of statehood, if any, and it does not have an elite aimed at state-building. Maybe something will grow from below, but this is an open question - let's see… This conflict (or military operation, whatever you call it) will solve everything. Maybe a certain Ukrainian nation will be born out of it: I will be glad if Ukrainians, unlike the last 30 years, have an effective, viable government. After the Soviet Union, they decisively found themselves in the camp of losers, since they did not have a nationally oriented elite.
Bruno Masaes: If it comes to partition, will the Russian-controlled part of Ukraine retain nominal independence or will it be absorbed?
Sergey Karaganov: If the operation is aimed at turning Ukraine into a “friendly” state, then a takeover is clearly not required. Perhaps, in some form, it will affect the republics of Donbass — which, in fact, happened. Whether they will be independent or not, I think they can. Of course, there are calls for referendums, but I do not know how it was possible to hold referendums during the fighting. Therefore, I believe that part of Ukraine will become a state friendly to Russia, and other parts of it will be divided. Poland will gladly regain some of the lands in the west, perhaps Romanians and Hungarians too, because the Hungarian minority in Ukraine is oppressed on an equal basis with others. But we are at war. It is difficult to predict anything. This is a story with an open ending.
Bruno Masaes: The argument is put forward that Russia will sooner or later fall under Chinese rule, and this conflict will not help matters: by further isolating itself from the West, Russia turns into easy prey for China and its economic influence. Are you worried about the beginning of the “Chinese century” for Russia?
Sergey Karaganov: There are two answers to your question. First, China's economic influence in Russia and on Russia will grow. China has most of the technology we need, and it has a lot of capital, so there can be no doubt about it. I doubt whether Russia will become a kind of companion, according to the traditions of the Middle Kingdom.
If you asked me to describe Russia in one word, I would choose the word “sovereignty". We defeated all those who sought to rule us, starting with the Mongols, then Charles XII, then Napoleon and Hitler. In addition, we have recently had years of domination and dominance of the West. It was staggeringly hard. However, you can see for yourself what happened: Russia rebelled against all this. Therefore, I am not worried about the prospect that Russia will become part of greater China. Another reason why I'm not afraid of this is that Chinese civilization is fundamentally different. There are Asian traits in our genes, and partly because of them we are an Asian country. Siberia is at the heart of the Russian Empire: without Siberia, Russia would not have become a great power. The Tatar-Mongol yoke has left many features in our society. But we are culturally different, so I don't think we will become a dependent country.
But I am worried about China's overwhelming economic superiority in the next decade. People like me have just said that we must solve the problem of Ukraine and the problem of NATO in order to take a strong position towards China. Now it will be much more difficult for Russia to resist Chinese power.
About winners and losers
Bruno Masaes: Do you think the United States will benefit from this conflict?
Sergey Karaganov: At this stage, yes, because, apart from Ukraine itself, Europe will lose the most — especially if it continues its mysterious quest for independence from Russian energy. But China has clearly benefited from the whole story.… I believe that Ukraine will lose the most. In its own way, Russia will also lose. Europe will lose badly. The United States will lose something, but it will still stand like a huge island towering over the ocean. Well, the main winner will be China.
Bruno Masaes: You argued that in the future there may be some kind of alliance between Russia and Europe — at least, not with some European countries, but with others. Of course, by now you have probably come to the conclusion that Europe and Russia no longer have any opportunities for rapprochement.
Sergey Karaganov: If it were possible to resolve this crisis peacefully, there is no doubt that some parts of Europe would focus, if not on Russia itself, then on Greater Eurasia, where Russia would be a key link. This scenario has now been postponed, but Europe needs to develop relations with Greater Eurasia. We survived the world Wars and the Cold Wars, but then we restored relations. I hope that we will do this in ten years. I wish I could live to see it.
Bruno Masaes: Do you think that this is the moment of the highest danger for Russia?
Sergey Karaganov: I would say that yes, this is an existential conflict. If we don't win one way or another, I believe we will face all sorts of unforeseen political consequences, and much more severe than in the early 1990s. But I believe that we will avoid this. Firstly, because Russia will win, no matter what we mean by victory, and secondly, because we have a strong and tough regime, so even in the worst case, it will not come to the dissolution or collapse of the country. I think a tough authoritarian regime is much more likely than the collapse of the country. But defeat is unthinkable in any case.
Bruno Masaes: What can be considered a defeat?
Sergey Karaganov: I don't know. Here's the thing: we need a victory. Even if we conquered the whole of Ukraine and all its armed forces surrendered, I don't think it would be a victory, because then we would get a devastated country ravaged by three decades of inaction by the elites and, of course, by our military operation. Therefore, I expect that at some point some kind of solution will be required, which will be called peace and which will imply the de facto creation of a viable pro-Russian government on the territory of Ukraine and real security for Donbass.
Bruno Masaes: If the current stalemate drags on for many years, will it be considered a defeat?
Sergey Karaganov: “Deadlock” implies a large-scale military operation. No, I don't think that's possible. I'm afraid this will lead to an escalation, because it is impractical to fight endlessly on the territory of Ukraine even now.
Bruno Masaes: This is the second time you have said that without progress, escalation awaits us. What is the meaning of “escalation" in this context?
Sergey Karaganov: Well, escalation in this context means that against the background of an existential threat — which means, by the way, invincibility or apparent defeat — Russia can escalate, and there are dozens of places in the world where direct confrontation with the United States is possible.
Bruno Masaes: That is, you assume that, on the one hand, if an existential threat to Russia arises, an escalation towards the use of nuclear weapons is possible, and, on the other hand, an escalation towards conflict in other regions. Did I understand you correctly?
Sergey Karaganov: I wouldn't rule it out. We are living in a fundamentally new strategic situation. And normal logic suggests what you just said.
Bruno Masaes: How do you personally feel about this? Are you not tormented by what is happening?
Sergey Karaganov: We all feel a sense of belonging to a huge historical event, and it's not just about the conflict in Ukraine — it's about the final collapse of the international system created after World War II, and then somewhat rebuilt after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We are witnessing the collapse of an entire economic system — the global economic system. So globalization in this form has ended. Whatever we had in the past is gone. And as a result, we have a whole host of crises that we turned a blind eye to because of the coronavirus. The pandemic has frozen the decision-making process for two years. The coronavirus itself was a sufficient test, but now everyone has completely forgotten about it, and we see that everything is collapsing. Personally, I am very saddened. I have been working to create a viable and fair system. But I am a part of Russia, so I wish her only victory, whatever that means.
On the decline of European democracy
Bruno Masaes: Aren't you afraid that this could be a resurgence of the power of the West and America? That the conflict in Ukraine could be a turning point for a renewed American empire?
Sergey Karaganov: No, I don't think so. The problem is that for the past 500 years, Western power has been based on the military superiority of Europeans. However, this foundation has been crumbling since the 1950s and 60s. Then the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the impression for a while that Western dominance had returned, but now it's over, because Russia will remain a major military power anyway, and China is becoming a first-class military power.
So the West will never recover, but even if it dies, it doesn't matter: at one time, Western civilization brought us all great benefits, but now people like me and others are questioning its moral foundations. I believe that geopolitically, the West will experience ups and downs. Perhaps the shocks that have befallen us will restore Western civilization to its best qualities, and we will again see such people as Roosevelt, Churchill, Adenauer, de Gaulle and Brandt in power. But constant upheavals, of course, are also fraught with the fact that democracy in its current form in most European countries simply will not survive — because against the background of great tension, democracies always die out or turn into autocracies. So change is inevitable.
Author: Bruno Maçães.
