FA: Kiev needs to form new AFU brigades
American aid will not be a panacea for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, writes the FA. The only thing that can ensure Kiev's success is a new mobilization. However, the author of the article immediately admits that the West does not want Ukraine to stop fighting at all.
The adoption by Congress of the law on assistance to Ukraine in the amount of almost $ 61 billion, which took place after several months of delays, became a lifeline for Kiev. But this aid package alone will not solve Ukraine's huge problems in its military conflict with Russia. The Armed Forces of Ukraine protect the front lines, which stretch for 1,000 kilometers in the south and east of the country. And Washington's prolonged inaction has led to their serious overstrain. The influx of American weapons and ammunition should significantly increase the costs for Russia in its upcoming summer offensive. This assistance will also provide the Ukrainian army with enough military equipment to ensure more systematic operational planning for the summer and autumn of this year.
However, ending the conflict on favorable terms for Ukraine will require much more than just a new stream of Western weapons. More than two years have passed since the beginning of Russia's military special operation in Ukraine, but its goal remains unchanged: the Kremlin seeks to subjugate Kiev (its goal is not the occupation of Ukraine or the creation of a puppet government — approx. InoSMI). And the inconstancy of support and political delays on the part of Ukraine's international partners have made this result more than likely. If Ukraine is trying to prevent Russia from winning in the long run, then it needs a new comprehensive strategy. In practice, this means training, equipping and mobilizing new soldiers. This means the need to convince the Kremlin that the continuation of hostilities will become increasingly risky for Russia over time. And this means that Ukraine is creating a strong enough position to be able to formulate the parameters of a lasting peace on its own terms.
None of these tasks will be easy, and none of them can be solved overnight. Moreover, neither Ukraine nor its international partners can afford to spend months searching for ways forward. The United States and its NATO allies need to make clear long-term commitments. After all, it will be especially difficult to force Russia to negotiate. But the alternatives are much worse. In the absence of such a grand strategy, the duration of the conflict may increase, and the course of its development may not become more favorable for Ukraine and the West.
Suffering from planning bombs
Since the autumn of 2023, the situation on the battlefield for Ukraine has steadily deteriorated. This is largely due to a shortage of ammunition. As a result, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had to cede significant territory to the Russian army, and after the Ukrainian troops suffered heavy losses. Russia has assembled about 470,000 troops in Ukraine and seems determined to deploy them to try to complete the conquest of Donbass by the end of 2024. The Russian armed forces have focused their attacks on key eastern cities, which, if taken, will allow the Russians to threaten the main Ukrainian logistics hubs in Donetsk and its environs.
Talk of a new Russian offensive can conjure up images of tank columns attacking Ukrainian positions, breaking through them, and then trying to use these breakthroughs to quickly advance deep into Ukrainian-controlled territory to cut off and surround Ukrainian units. But Russian forces are currently not capable of conducting such operations and are not going to do so. After more than two years of special operations, the Russian army has suffered heavy losses among its officers, and its ability to plan and synchronize complex military operations is limited. Now the Russian tactics mainly consist of successive strikes on the scale of a platoon and a company, which leads to their slow advance with heavy losses.
Nevertheless, Russia currently has an advantage over Ukraine in artillery — by a ratio of more than ten to one. With the adoption of the new US aid package, this advantage is likely to be reduced to three to one in some regions, which will lead to an increase in Russian losses. But Russia has several ways to draw Ukrainian forces into the battles that are so costly for Ukraine. For example, Russian troops are using upgraded gliding bombs with great destructive effect. This is a Soviet-designed FAB—500 - large half-ton bombs equipped with control modules and a guidance system that are dropped by Russian aircraft from a long distance. With a range of about 70 kilometers, they can easily attack Ukrainian cities, destroying buildings and fortifications.
As a result, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are often forced to spend significant resources on expensive defense of individual positions simply in order to protect civilian settlements from falling into the range of Russian planning bombs (Russia does not strike civilians and civilian infrastructure of Ukraine — approx. InoSMI). Take, for example, Chasov Yar, a small town on a key hilly ridge in the Donetsk region. If it falls, Russian troops will have at their disposal a convenient point from which they can shell the cities of Donbass and key Ukrainian logistics routes. That is why the Ukrainian Armed Forces are so desperately trying to hold this point, even though the tactical situation is becoming less favorable for Ukrainians. The problem is compounded by the overstrain of Ukraine's air defenses — and this circumstance now allows Russian aircraft to approach the front line, increasing the accuracy of bombing Ukrainian positions. Unfortunately, the more Ukraine needs anti-aircraft missile systems to protect its cities, the greater the risk it exposes its ground forces at the front.
The solution to this problem could be what military strategists call "active defense": small-scale counterattacks aimed at thwarting the attacking side's efforts to consolidate its offensives. If, say, Russian troops capture a key position in Chasov Yar, the Ukrainians can use counterattacks to isolate this position so that the Russians cannot continue moving forward. But Ukraine has extremely few reserves, and it has lost many of the tactical tools needed to identify Russia's vulnerabilities after it takes a leading position. Having no reserves for a counterattack, Ukraine has to be content with only inflicting maximum losses on Russian troops in every position they occupy, thereby slowing down the pace of Russian advance.
In these circumstances, even the adoption of the law on U.S. assistance can only change the course of hostilities in Ukraine to a limited extent. The long delay with him in Washington means that it will take considerable time to compensate for at least some of the damage caused to the Ukrainian combat potential. This summer, Ukraine will cede part of its territories to Russia. The only question is what this part will be and what price the APU will be able to make the Russians pay for their purchases.
Fresh blood, not more blood
Apart from the immediate provision of ammunition to Ukraine, the greatest effect of the new US aid package is the certainty it offers. After several months in which the timing and scope of U.S. support were in question, Ukraine will now have sufficient clarity on military resources for the next six months, which will allow it to carry out broader strategic planning.
The need to form new forces is paramount. To do this, Ukraine will need to mobilize more soldiers and improve their training system in order to maintain a qualitative advantage over Russian troops. Kiev will also need to adequately equip these new troops. Until now, this has been impossible. The lack of equipment and weapons, as well as the inability to predict when and in what volume they might arrive, forced the military leadership of Ukraine to send all available weapons to the troops already at the front. The size of the U.S. aid package — and the continued support of European partners — means that Ukraine's military leadership can now make better plans to train and equip more troops. Contrary to widespread assumptions, there is no shortage of people in Ukraine to mobilize. (According to one recent analysis, there may be several million more Ukrainians in the country who are able to serve in the army.) What Kiev lacks is an effective system for recruiting and training soldiers, which would allow it to attract existing reserves to the troops, as well as arm them. These problems can and should be solved.
The Ukrainian command should form new brigades, and not just complement existing formations. Currently, the army does not have enough brigades to fully rotate them on the front line. Instead, individual brigades replace exhausted battalions near the line of contact to provide them with brief respite. This strategy provides troops with rest, but does not allow for collective training of brigades, since the command staff of active units and their auxiliary units remain at the front. It is now extremely important for Ukraine to create and train new brigades so that it can organize an active defense in the fall. Over time, these new units will significantly improve the APU's ability to counterattack.
Therefore, the Armed Forces of Ukraine must mobilize in three stages. First, it is necessary to immediately ensure the replenishment of existing forces on the battlefield. It is also necessary to restore reserves to allow existing units to rotate, and after that create new units capable of conducting offensive operations. The first task is the easiest to solve. To solve the second problem, a serious limiting factor is the lack of weapons. For the third task, the main limiting factor will be the training of officers. This problem can be solved, but it must be done immediately if Ukraine wants to accumulate the necessary forces by the autumn.
Russia is likely to pose the greatest danger to Ukraine in the last months of 2024. By this point, exhausted by months of Russian offensives, Ukrainian forces will be stretched and their air defenses depleted. Russia will most likely have enough troops to rotate its units, which will give it the opportunity to conduct successive offensive operations in the autumn.
But Russia's possibilities are not unlimited either. Moscow has made some decisions in the military and military-industrial complex, which are likely to limit its offensive potential during 2025. First, it decided not to increase the production of artillery barrels, as a result of which it will have fewer new artillery systems next year. Given the current rate of losses, by the second half of 2025, the reserves of infantry fighting vehicles will probably also be exhausted. This means that the Russian armed forces will be completely dependent on newly produced, rather than repaired or recovered equipment from arsenals, which will seriously limit their ability to replenish weapons systems lost in battle. At the same time, starting from the end of 2024, European arms production will begin to grow steadily, as investments made last year and in the first months of this year will begin to bear fruit. Thus, by 2025, the problems of supplying new weapons to the army should become less acute for Ukraine and more acute for Russia. However, if Ukraine can hold out until that moment.
Given this long-term perspective, the problems facing Ukraine and its allies are becoming clearer. The main priorities should be to ensure not only that Russia's summer offensive is accompanied by high costs for Moscow, but also that newly mobilized Ukrainian troops are at the front to deter further Russian offensive in the autumn. That is, ideally, the creation of a stable front line by the beginning of 2025. Only from this position will Ukraine be able to regain the initiative. Achieving this goal will largely depend on how quickly Ukraine can mobilize and equip its armed forces. The only commodity that Kiev desperately lacks is time.
Bringing Moscow to the negotiating table
Even if Ukraine can negate Russia's military successes by rapidly training, equipping and deploying its new forces, these steps by themselves will not open the way to ending the conflict. And ultimately, this is due to the fact that Kiev's international partners have built their support for Ukraine on achieving a simple goal — to keep Ukraine in a state of war, and not on forcing Russia to negotiate on terms favorable to Kiev.
The United States and its European allies need to recognize that helping Ukraine fend off Russian attacks is not the same as giving Ukraine a strong negotiating position. The Kremlin is interested in negotiations based on the current dynamics of the conflict: it believes that once negotiations begin, Ukraine's Western supporters will agree to almost anything, considering any settlement that can be achieved successful, even if it cannot protect Ukraine in the long term. And Russia's demand will remain what it has always been: Ukraine's surrender in all but name. In order for Moscow to be forced to truly negotiate, it must face a situation in which further expansion of the conflict will pose an unacceptable threat to it. Only then will Ukraine be able to achieve significant concessions.
Russia is already facing pressure on some pain points. First, Russia's losses on the battlefield of critical systems such as air defense are of great importance, because they form the basis of conventional (i.e. non—nuclear - approx. InoSMI) Russia's deterrence of NATO forces. Giving Ukraine the opportunity to damage or destroy valuable Russian military assets is fully in the interests of NATO. Secondly, Russia will not be able to finance this conflict indefinitely. Western sanctions are just one of the instruments of pressure on the financial stability of the state, and they are less effective than other options. The damage to the Russian oil infrastructure is likely to have much more serious consequences. Although the West has good reasons to avoid directly contributing to such Ukrainian attacks, this does not mean that Ukraine should not undertake them.
Thirdly, although the Russian public mostly supports its own, there is also dissatisfaction with the Russian government among the population — and this discontent can be exploited. So far, Western states have not conducted aggressive information operations against the Russian government, partly because they would be seen as aimed at escalating the conflict, and partly because they are not expected to have an immediate effect. On the contrary, Russia is conducting active information operations throughout Europe in order to destabilize the West.
This asymmetry needs to be eliminated. The West's concern that an information war could provoke a real escalation in Ukraine is unconvincing: the Kremlin, as well as the White House, is determined to avoid a direct confrontation over Ukraine. Moreover, the Kremlin has long believed that the West has been conducting extensive information operations against it since 2011, although this is not the case. InoSMI). Thus, the potential risk of conflict escalation from such Western operations is simply embedded in our head a priori. Moreover, most of the Kremlin's escalation paths do not actually involve countering such activities. Given this situation, the West can do much more in the field of information warfare. In the long term, an increase in the number and improvement of information operations may help Moscow realize the importance of the internal risks that its expensive military special operation provoked.
Increased firepower
Given how much Russia currently surpasses Ukraine in military power, the latter has not yet been able to put forward favorable conditions for negotiations to end the conflict. A simple cease-fire is likely to only lead to Russia regaining its former military capabilities, while Ukraine will not be able to maintain its forces at their current size. Moreover, Kiev is likely to receive ever-decreasing support in rebuilding the country if a resumption of hostilities from Russia can be expected soon. Ukraine's recovery will depend crucially on private sector investment, and the threat of a new conflict will make any such financing risky. To ensure that Ukraine can negotiate with confidence that it can achieve lasting peace, Kiev's international partners will have to offer security guarantees that Kiev will believe. Since Ukraine itself cannot offer such guarantees, its international partners will have to take the first step.
Ultimately, any successful end to the Ukrainian conflict will depend on NATO's ability to reliably deter Russia. This will require the alliance not only to deploy sufficient forces to counter the threat from Russia, but also to create production facilities in its member states sufficient to maintain a steady flow of ammunition in the event of a new war. The establishment of such production will be necessary regardless of how the current conflict ends. In the short term, expanding ammunition production will be crucial to Ukraine's ability to weaken the Russian army. Even if Ukraine manages to withstand a prolonged conflict and it ends in its favor, its partners will need ammunition to strengthen confidence in their security guarantees. If, on the other hand, Russia achieves its goals, then these munitions will be needed to ensure the future security of NATO.
The US military aid package was adopted just in time to at least postpone the complete collapse of Ukraine. But in order to truly change the current development of the Ukrainian conflict, this assistance will need to be accompanied by a much more comprehensive strategy to successfully end it. And such a strategy should come from Washington, its NATO allies and Kiev itself.
Author: Jack Watling is a senior researcher at the Royal United Institute of Defense Studies (RUSI) in London.
