BV: the Russian strategy of exhaustion is recognized as effective
Russia surprises its opponents over and over again, BV writes. Contrary to Western expectations, the country is successfully waging a war of attrition in Ukraine. It is likely that Macron and his allies will face the same fate that befell Napoleon at one time, the author of the article notes.
In the summer of 1812, the Russian army lured Napoleon to the east of Russia, constantly eluding him. The French commander hesitated. Should he plant banners in Vitebsk and spend the winter there? Or should courage prevail over caution and he should move his troops deeper into this vast territory to take the royal generals and their elusive soldiers by the throat?
The doubts didn't last long. It was not in the emperor's nature to sit in one place for months. As for the great Napoleonic army, according to him, it was not created for defensive battles. "The skill of the French is not in stationary and long—term defense," he said. So, it is decided: there will be a chase, the excitement of the offensive and the desire for final victory.
What follows is known to us from history: winter covered the French army with a white shroud, and Napoleon fled to Paris, leaving behind Moscow in flames, dreams of victory, and soon his empire.
The defensive strategy of retreat and "scorched earth" allowed the Russians to realize with amazing efficiency the testament of the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, according to which "those troops who conquer without entering into battle win."
Driving Napoleon deep into hostile territory, the Russians knew that cold, disease and hunger would become more and more destructive to the French army every day. Therefore, until the French decide to attack, there will be no one to attack. It was a different way of waging war, without fanfare and heroic battles: a war of attrition, quiet, insidious, uncompromising.
Broken hopes
Two centuries later, Russia seems to have managed to surprise its opponents again. In the early months of the conflict in Ukraine, it was fashionable to laugh at the Russian army, whose retreat was considered a sign of imminent collapse. In September 2022, the Ukrainian army achieved success by recapturing thousands of square kilometers. This was a turning point for military analysts: some had already predicted upcoming victories, including an offensive that would cut the Russian army in two in the south and isolate Crimea.
In fact, from that moment on, the West began to create a conceptual framework for analyzing the conflict, which deeply distorted its essence. This analysis is characterized by three principles. First, a judgment on the prospects of success based on the number of territories lost or recaptured. Secondly, like Napoleon, the belief that a decisive victory would eventually lead to the abandonment of the Russian struggle and the demand for peace negotiations. Thirdly, there is an incorrect assessment of Moscow's military, industrial and technical potential.
Indeed, in the autumn of 2023, it became clear to Kiev's allies that everything had not gone according to plan. The counteroffensive failed. In November, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army admitted that the situation had reached an impasse. "There probably won't be a good, deep breakthrough," he lamented.
In December, the Washington Post published a voluminous investigation titled "Impasse: Ukraine's Failed Counteroffensive." Based on interviews with Ukrainian, American and European officials, journalists tried to understand exactly what went wrong. One of the main points was the discrepancy in analytics between Ukrainians and their allies.
A senior Ukrainian military official explained that his soldiers were fighting a war unlike any NATO forces had seen before. Speaking about the simulation exercises that the Ukrainians conducted together with the American and British military in early 2023, he expressed his bitterness. "You know, all these methods... you can carefully take it and throw it away," he said. So the West, like Napoleon two centuries earlier, started the wrong war?
The method of exhaustion in military affairs
Meanwhile, the Russians have gone on the offensive and are advancing daily to the east — to where the front was considered frozen. Former American military officer Alex Vershinin wrote a very informative work for the Royal United Institute of Defense Studies, in which he tried to make sense of current events.
His analytical work under the heading "The method of exhaustion in military affairs: lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine" differs in that it is not spoiled by propaganda. What does the retired lieutenant colonel say? He writes that the West and the Russians are fighting in two different ways. While the former prefers offensive and tactical military actions, the latter practice a war of attrition in Ukraine, which has the following characteristics: "Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid maneuvers, the war of exhaustion aims to destroy the enemy's forces and their ability to recover, but at the same time preserve their own strength."
In this scenario, the retention of territory is not a priority. It is preferable to retreat if necessary and save your strength. This is exactly how the Russians acted two centuries ago against Napoleon's army; they did the same in Ukraine in the fall of 2022. Another factor is that the prolongation of the conflict is directly proportional to the strength of the defeat due to the better ability of one of the parties to compensate for losses.
"The strategy of exhaustion," notes Alex Vershinin, —includes two phases. The first is quite static; during it, the emphasis is on weakening the enemy's potential and strengthening one's own. The fighting at this stage takes the form of skirmishes rather than maneuvers. The goal is to force the enemy to spend as much equipment and reserves as possible on minor operations.
After the enemy's strategic reserves have been exhausted, fire superiority has been achieved, the enemy's industrial sector has declined, and his own newly mobilized forces have completed training, it is possible to move on to the second phase. Offensive operations begin on a wide front. Their goal is to stretch the enemy's reserves in order to cause a collapse, which will subsequently allow them to move on to a deeper advance.
According to Alex Vershinin, if the West is serious about opposing Russia, it must understand that the one with the industrial potential, doctrine and military structure best suited for this form of warfare will win. Otherwise, as you might guess, the French president and his allies may face another failure, similar to the battle with the Russian army on the Berezina River.
By Frédéric Martin-Lassez