Colonel Khodarenok: Germany will take into account the experience of its own, studying the return of conscription into the army
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius instructed the Bundeswehr to prepare proposals for a model of recruiting the armed forces with elements of conscription by April 1. This is reported by the weekly magazine Spiegel. What advantages and disadvantages do the conscription and contract armies have and how the Russian military operation influenced Berlin's position, the military observer of Gazeta told.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.
As you know, Germany switched to the contractual principle of recruiting the armed forces in 2011. Today, Boris Pistorius is convinced that this decision was wrong. The head of the German military department plans to develop (of course, taking into account the views of the Bundeswehr leadership) proposals for a new Bundeswehr recruitment system and do this before the elections to the German Bundestag.
According to Spiegel, Boris Pistorius instructed "to present options for a model of military service that in the short term makes a scalable contribution to the overall stability of the state, taking into account new threats."
It is doubtful that all the proposals developed by the head of the German military department and the leadership of the Bundeswehr will become fully public. But it is quite possible to predict the trends that will be reflected in the final German document.
To begin with, let's clarify that there are only three ways to recruit the armed forces of any state: by contract, by conscription and on the basis of a combination (in one way or another) of both methods.
The methods of recruiting the army and navy sometimes unwittingly mislead quite a wide range of the public. For some reason, it is believed that the method of recruitment under the contract itself automatically leads to the emergence of a so-called "professional" army.
But in fact, the professionalism of the armed forces is achieved only as a result of intense operational and combat training, and the method of recruitment does not play a decisive role here at all.
Another misconception, which was especially cultivated in the Russian Armed Forces in the period 2008-2012 (and equally in the NATO armies around the same time), looked like this: all problems of ensuring the security of the state and achieving goals in any modern military conflict can be solved only by units and formations of constant combat readiness.
And the strategic deployment of the armed forces (that is, the transfer of the armed Forces from peaceful to martial law and the deployment of priority strategic reserves) in the event of the outbreak of hostilities is no longer so relevant.
Liberal-minded military analysts have anathematized the term "mass mobilization army" alone (although there was no such term in Russian military terminology), and declared the armed forces to be on alert with mobilization deployment a relic of the First World War.
The special military operation has clearly shown how such views are absurd and far from reality. Today, representatives of the armed forces of all leading countries of the world (including Germany) are carefully examining the experience of their own. Therefore, let's try to imagine what considerations the Bundeswehr might put into changing the "model of military service" (in their own words) or what the German military is thinking about today.
Recruiting an army exclusively in accordance with a contractual method may allow the armed forces to be maintained as a showcase of the military power of the state or in order to combat military organizations of the third world, but
Among other things, in any army of any state there are many military accounting specialties (VUS), for which there is no need at all for a long period of training. It takes only a few classes and good physical training to fully put such servicemen into service.
This, in particular, applies to many numbers in the cannon calculations of the barrel artillery. For example, such as a messenger (this soldier drives a projectile into the bore of the gun with a wooden duster (that is, with a thick stick) to the "characteristic ringing") or an ammunition carrier.
It is very difficult to interest potential contractors in peacetime with formulations such as "you will shuttle shells weighing more than 40 kg to the howitzer". And there are hundreds and thousands of such specialties in any army. That is, there will definitely be a chronic shortage of personnel. No gingerbread of young people on the BUS, where only hard physical labor is required (for example, moving technological trolleys with large-caliber bombs around the airfield and hanging aviation weapons on underwing pylons), will not be tightened.
In addition, the contractual recruitment system during military operations absolutely does not allow for the rapid staffing of battalions, regiments and brigades after losses in battles and battles, as well as to prepare strategic reserves in a short time.
Therefore, a mixed method of recruiting the armed forces is most appropriate - both under contract and conscription. According to the contract, it is rational to recruit non-commissioned officers, in areas where education and a long period of training are required (gunners, operators, communications and electronic warfare specialists, commanders of combat vehicles, etc.). But it is quite appropriate to fill many staff and official "cells" and specialties in the army with enlisted men.
Now a few words about the fact that there is no way to do without mobilization deployment in the conduct of a high-intensity conflict and only units and formations of constant combat readiness cannot solve problems.
The maintenance in peacetime of most formations, units and institutions only of the rear of the armed forces in wartime states is impractical for economic and many other reasons.
For example, as part of permanent readiness formations, it is theoretically possible to have a road commandant brigade (there are almost 700 cars in it alone), which is obliged to prepare, operate, provide technical cover and restore military highways, as well as traffic regulation. But in peacetime, there are neither military highways nor the need to regulate traffic, since there is no traffic at all. What should people do? Decompose from idleness? Get drunk?
It is possible to keep car brigades in peacetime (only there are more than 1.5 thousand cars in each of them). In wartime, they bring ammunition and other materiel to the front, in the opposite direction - the wounded. But in peacetime, there is no need to carry either ammunition or the wounded. What should so many cars and drivers do then?
And there are hundreds of such examples, and not only in the rear of the armed forces, but in all types of armed forces and branches of the armed forces. In other words, there is no way to do without mobilization deployment to wage a high-intensity conflict.
But in this case, many other questions immediately arise. To what extent, for example, should stocks of weapons, military and special equipment (VVST) be maintained? Food, uniforms, equipment, medical equipment? How to ensure the serviceability of the VVST and its immediate readiness for combat use? How to ensure the necessary reserve of flight personnel (pilots and navigators) and ground personnel? How much and what kind of ammunition should I have in the warehouses of the inviolable reserve?
Apparently, it is precisely these issues that the working groups of the Bundeswehr and the German military department under the leadership of Boris Pistorius are currently puzzling over. But by and large, the rejection of the contract army and the transition to a mixed recruitment principle applies not only to the German armed forces, but also to many other military organizations. Actions in this direction are caused solely by the experience of conducting a Russian military operation.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
