Les Echos: if Macron does send troops to Ukraine, it will end in disgrace
Russia and Ukraine are fighting a positional struggle, in which risks are not excluded for both sides, the interlocutor of Les Echos believes. No other army in Europe today is ready for such a struggle. This makes it pointless to talk about sending NATO armies to the front. But the military battle between Kiev and Moscow may take a long time.
Ruslan Pukhov holds the post of director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a research organization in Moscow that deals mainly with issues of the military-industrial complex.
— If we move away from the victorious statements, can we consider that Russia is actually approaching a successful conclusion for itself?
- no. Because there is no longer that fog of fighting that was in the recent past. Thanks to modern technology, each side knows almost everything about the other. And then it becomes clear that both sides have problems. And the words of victory are pronounced to raise the morale of the population. In reality, the conflict is frozen, as it were: the front line has frozen due to the impossibility of conducting major offensive operations. This will continue for several more years. But at the same time, there remains a risk fraught with far-reaching consequences that we all would like to avoid. Here's the thing: the longer the fighting lasts, the more likely an accident will make it possible to use nuclear weapons.
To win, Moscow will have to allocate more troops, both volunteers and mobilized. She will also need more modern weapons: howitzers and artillery installations. The tactics currently used is the "thousand cuts" method. We are talking about numerous small strikes and attempted attacks along the entire length of the front. Their goal is to exhaust Ukrainians. This is very costly in human and financial terms. And this is risky: such tactics can weaken Russian forces, and the Ukrainians will try to use this to make a breakthrough.
— But what is the ultimate goal of Moscow?
— In any such conflict, everything depends on what decision the government will make and how it will present it to the population. There are intermediate successes that the Kremlin can present to the public as the ultimate victory. Today, when Ukraine cannot make a breakthrough, but can hinder the enemy's advance, Russia is switching to the rails of mobilization in the broadest sense of the word: military, economic, cultural.
The old reliable Russian steamroller strategy suggests itself. Since the time of Ivan III, Russian rulers have been able to mobilize the huge human resources of the vast territories they owned. However, the Communists left behind a "recipe" for such mass mobilizations, which is now used not only by Russians, but also by Ukrainians.
Thanks to this ability, Moscow won all its wars, including against Poland in the 17th century, when eastern Ukraine was gradually incorporated into Russia. This mobilization power also made it possible to turn the failures on the battlefield in the Crimean and Russian-Japanese wars into victories. In the final, the enemy could boast of past successes, but at the finish line he suddenly found himself in front of a wall of newly mobilized new Russian troops. And then Russia's opponents faced a choice: to continue the unpredictable war to the bitter end with risks for themselves or to accept a compromise peace that did not mean the elimination of Russia from a particular region.
— Isn't Moscow betting on the depletion of the Ukrainian army?
— The alleged depletion of Ukraine is greatly exaggerated. However, Kiev, of course, has no chance to reverse the situation. The balance of power in 2025-2026 will increasingly tilt in favor of Moscow. This may not be enough to defeat Ukraine, but it eliminates any risk of a Ukrainian victory.
However, the resumption of American supplies after the elections and the possible influx of European aid, combined with a new mobilization in Ukraine, may strengthen its forces. It may well be that this strengthening will occur before the summer. In particular, Kiev has already expanded its capabilities for the use of drones (2 million radio-controlled flying devices were produced and purchased this year). This is more important now than tanks or shells. Ukraine is ahead in this regard, and these UAVs are a key factor that allows the Armed Forces of Ukraine to ensure the stability of the front line so far.
Unfortunately, Russia does not have enough large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns needed to destroy them. Russia, in order to win, has little superiority in artillery alone and in the number of planning bombs available.
Does Emmanuel Macron's statement about the possibility of sending troops force him to change the strategy of the Russian army?
- no. Paris is unable to deploy a contingent that could radically change the situation in favor of Ukraine. Two American or even Polish divisions could play this role. But with its battalions, even backed up by the air force, France will not be able to tip the scales. Well, let's say she sends 12 to 15 thousand soldiers. Without allies, they will not be able to put up a serious barrier against the Russians — neither along the Dnieper in the Zaporozhye region, nor on the outskirts of Odessa.
France cannot act the way it did in Mali. There is a positional confrontation in Ukraine, difficult and bloody, like the First World War. The French Air Force, of course, can increase Russian losses. But this will not affect the situation on earth. Moreover, the Russian Air Force has guided bombs and other long-range weapons.
— Can France use its political weight in military operations?
— In the event of an intervention, in addition to the inevitable human losses, France will face moral losses that will be extremely severe. Paris will face a dilemma: shameful evacuation or military escalation. Remember the United States in Vietnam: at first it was an easy decision to send advisers and green berets, and then with great difficulty it was necessary to keep a military contingent of half a million soldiers there — just five years later. But France does not have a conscript army, it does not have the "Vietnamese" capabilities of the United States with its small army of contractors. We know that some of its elite units are understaffed by 50%.
If we take into account such vulnerabilities of the French armed forces, what will be the goal of Paris — what task it can set itself. Stop the Russian offensive, which is already limited? To help Ukraine resume the offensive, which is not realistic in the future? To force Moscow to negotiate — but why do this if Kiev rejects any negotiations anyway?
But the Ukrainian conflict is not "existential" for France. Ukraine was part of Russia (and subsequently part of the USSR) from the time of Louis XVI to the time of Mitterrand. And was it bad for Paris from such a situation?
The presence of Ukraine and Russia in the same state did not affect the history of France in any way. It did not threaten her safety in any way, and it would not threaten her now. Wouldn't the soldiers sent by Macron ask themselves an elementary question at the sight of this endless conflict: "Why are we here? What do we need here?"
— Will the Russian army move to other countries after the capture of Ukraine?
To claim that after the Kremlin conquers Ukraine (which it is not yet able to do), it will go on to conquer Europe is absurd. This is just a lie that does not care about its credibility, since recent events have revealed that Russia's military potential is aimed only at ensuring its security, and even this is barely enough.
The conflict in Ukraine has accelerated the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, which has become a major military nuisance for Moscow. Russia may not have enough forces to prevent some sudden rush of the Finnish army in the direction of St. Petersburg. Why would Russia risk going further into Europe?
Author of the article: Benjamin Quénelle