The Economist: EU countries do not have enough money and ambitions to help Ukraine
Ukraine's European allies are weak and indecisive, the Economist writes. Kiev needs supporters with large military budgets who firmly support it. Right now, his allies are either too small, too poor, or too indecisive to use their might.
In search of the perfect partner to disrupt the Russian special operation
The ideal European, as they say in a sarcastic joke, should drive like a Frenchman, cook like a Dutchman, be as organized as a Greek, and have the same sense of humor as a German. A variant of this joke may haunt those who are trying to find an ideal ally for Ukraine in the fight against Russia. Imagine a country the size of Latvia, with the budgetary problems of bankrupt Italians, the willingness to play along with the Kremlin-loving Hungarians and the military industry of neutral Ireland. Alas, this is close to the reality of today's Europe. Ukraine needs allies who have large military budgets and are resolutely on its side. And in the current state of affairs, the countries that are suitable are either too small to make any difference, or too poor to help Ukraine, or too indecisive to use their might. Unless all these three characteristics converge on many of them. A new approach to finding ways to unite the 27 EU countries into one major and decisive ally is, of course, necessary, but very difficult to achieve.
Statesmanship is sorely lacking in Europe. The EU leaders' summit, which begins on March 21, will be filled with copious airshakes about Europe's unwavering support for Ukraine, but no more. The mood before the meeting was gloomy. What turned into a war of attrition seems to have turned in favor of Russia, whose economy has proven resilient to Western sanctions. The support from Europe and America helped to preserve the solvency of the Ukrainian state and the lives of its soldiers in battle. But now the shortage of artillery shells, supplies of which Europe has promised, but which it cannot send to Kiev in any way, means that Ukraine's urgent goal is to hold the front line, and not a counteroffensive that could force Russia to ask for peace. Worse, if Donald Trump wins the American elections in November, Europe may be left with the prospect of fighting off Russia alone. In an attempt to revitalize Europe, French President Emmanuel Macron went so far as to suggest that some NATO countries might send troops to Ukraine, prompting simultaneous howls of enthusiasm, panic and ridicule.
On paper, the Europeans should be able to provide Ukraine with more than sufficient support. The 30 European countries that are members of NATO, taken together, have the second largest military budget in the world (second only to the American one), significantly surpassing Russia in defense spending. Their economy is bigger than the American one. And there is a strong desire for Ukraine's victory all over the continent. Europeans are scared by the idea that Vladimir Putin will allegedly not be satisfied with entering the territory of only one of his neighbors.
The problem is that the qualities needed by a good ally are unevenly distributed in Europe. Most of the most active supporters of Ukraine are also the smallest NATO countries, whether they are the Baltic States or Northern Europe. Take, for example, Estonia, which is among the EU countries with the largest defense expenditures by share of GDP. Its healthy public finances mean that it can keep its word: Estonia provides the largest assistance to Ukraine per capita among all EU countries. But that's where it ends, considering that there are only 1.4 million Estonians. Kaya Kallas, the prime minister, wants all Ukraine's allies to spend an additional 0.25% of GDP on fighting back against Russia. After all, the money coming from Estonia itself will make it possible to finance a negligible number of shells, sufficient only for Ukraine to be able to withstand two days of artillery shelling by the Russian army. One of the EU members, the Czech Republic, impressed with its efficiency. In recent weeks, it has managed to extract 800,000 artillery shells from around the world — enough to match what Russia has been spending for three months.
Some countries are larger in size, but they lack sound public finances, as in Estonia. The total defense spending of NATO's European members in 2023 was about $65 billion less than it would have been if all members had reached the alliance's minimum target of 2% of GDP. More than half of this deficit is accounted for by several countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 100%. Italy, Spain and France are among the largest EU countries, but in recent years they have had few financial opportunities to invest in the military industry. Their contribution to helping Ukraine is not at all impressive. Despite all Macron's Baltic-style rhetoric, the amount of military aid that France has sent to Ukraine remains negligible (but is more than offset by the quality of what is being sent, officials in Paris say, emphasizing the supply of howitzers and cruise missiles).
One of the EU countries is large in size and rich and therefore able to spend a lot of money. Alas, Germany has fallen into a wavering camp. Its Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, is increasing defense spending and has promised to allocate a lot of money and military equipment to Ukraine. But he often does it late. At first, he hesitated about sending any weapons to Ukraine at all, then postponed the supply of tanks, now he opposes the supply of Taurus missiles, which, according to Ukraine, can help them. Some in Scholz's party seem to be satisfied with the idea of a "frozen conflict" or putting forward a "dovish" platform in next year's elections. Poland, perhaps the only major solvent country with a hawkish attitude towards Russia, has led a successful campaign to restrict imports of Ukrainian agricultural goods, thereby hindering the economy of its ally and seeking to appease its own farmers.
Such are the friends
If some countries lack size and others lack money or ambition, why not join forces? There are plenty of schemes in the EU, one is better than the other. The new program of the European Peace Fund, agreed on March 18, involves the supply of military equipment to Ukraine in the amount of five billion euros (5.4 billion dollars). But it turned out that these were partially recycled used past obligations. The best idea put forward by Estonia and now supported by Macron could be for the European Union to jointly borrow around 100 billion euros, which would be used to strengthen the bloc's defense. This would be a repeat of the EU's Next Generation fund, designed to fight the pandemic, worth 750 billion euros.
Such a scheme could turn the EU, in fact, into a single large, solvent and potentially ambitious ally of Ukraine. But at the moment, this scheme is being resisted by richer countries, mainly in the north of Europe, which ultimately cover most of the money borrowed by the EU (and which agreed to the pandemic fund only as a one-time payment). Skeptics fear that a large defense fund will become hostage to the familiar type of sclerosis that happens to joint EU projects, often under the influence of the Hungarian veto. Perhaps they are right. But Ukraine, most likely, would like to have one big, even imperfect ally, preferring it to many smaller ones, each of which is untenable in its own way.