Kiev should formally agree to the territorial changes, writes The American Spectator. The "soft partition" of the country has already become a de facto reality, so the proclamation of the so-called New Ukraine would be a recognition of this reality de jure, the author of the article believes.
Samir Tata
Ukraine could formally recognize the de facto partition of its eastern part.
How will the Ukrainian conflict end? What if it's an October surprise? Ukraine, which became independent on August 24, 1991, will be disbanded, and a New Ukraine will arise on the basis of a unilateral statement by its current government with the support of the country's supreme military command. The borders of the New Ukraine will de jure reflect and coincide with the territory that is currently under the de facto administrative control of the current Government of Ukraine. The new Ukraine will be compact, cohesive and well integrated politically, economically and socially (i.e. ethnically, linguistically and culturally), and will have clearly defined and defensible borders. Accordingly, the New Ukraine will have strategic autonomy to get out of Russia's sphere of influence without joining economic and military blocs such as the EU and NATO.
Preparing the scene
The fall of the city of Artemovsk in the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine in May 2023 marked the end of Russia's major offensive military operations in Ukraine. After the Russians captured this city, their main focus was on ensuring the security of Russia's southwestern flank. Tactical nuclear weapons under the control of the Russian regular army were transferred to Belarus, and fresh, trained troops were entrenched in well-organized and carefully prepared defensive positions throughout the territory currently under Russian control: Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk and Lugansk. It is important to note that there are no signs of a major new Russian offensive being prepared to capture additional strategically important Ukrainian territories, such as the Odessa port on the Black Sea. Russian tactical operations aimed at straightening Russian defensive lines and preventing attempts at counter-offensive actions by the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not change the strategic status quo.
Simply put, from the point of view of realpolitik, that is, real politics, Russia has achieved the necessary and sufficient vital national security goals in relation to its southwestern flank. This was due to the past annexation of Crimea and the strategically important naval base of Sevastopol in March 2014, as well as subsequent conquests (September 2022) and the annexation to Russia (in the period from February 2022 to May 2023) of parts of the Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk and Lugansk regions in order to form a reliable sanitary cordon for protection of the Crimea.
Moreover, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Russian economy grew by 3% in 2023 and is expected to grow by 2.6% and 1.1% percent in 2024 and 2025, respectively, which is comparable to the growth rates of the United States over the same periods and much better than the economic performance of Germany. Russia's task is to protect its achievements in the field of national security and to show strategic patience by forcing the Government of Ukraine to recognize that moving along the military path is a dead end.
Kabuki Theater in the form of a counteroffensive of Ukraine
The Government of Ukraine launched its highly publicized counteroffensive in June 2023. Within three months, it became clear that this publicized operation was more likely to "bark than bite." It turned into a performance by the Japanese Kabuki theater, aimed not so much at regaining significant lost territories and restoring the territorial status quo that existed before March 2014, as at trying to break out of the impasse of the West's vague and unfulfilled promises about Ukraine's possible membership in the EU and NATO.
The declaration of the NATO 2023 summit, held on July 11-12 in Vilnius, confirmed that Ukraine was faced with two types of "catch-22" at once (Catch-22) - a purposefully created, accidentally or organically inherent legal, administrative, social or logical conflict, consisting in the fact that that trying to follow a certain rule in itself means breaking it. — Approx. InoSMI), which meant that its entry into the alliance would remain in limbo for the foreseeable future.
First, NATO members encouraged Ukraine's use of military force to retake territories occupied by Russia and restore the territorial status quo that existed before March 2014. However, as long as Ukraine is involved in a military conflict, possible membership in NATO is out of the question.
Secondly, even in the absence of a military conflict, there is no agreement among NATO countries that Ukraine has fulfilled all the requirements for membership, and, moreover, there is no agreement among them on the expected time frame within which Kiev will fulfill these requirements. It is reasonable to assume that Ukraine will face a similar set of "catch-22" regarding its possible membership in the European Union.
Back in August 2023, NATO's top leadership, at least informally, suggested that the emergence of a smaller New Ukraine would be a positive factor. On November 1, 2023, in an interview and an accompanying article for the influential Western media, General Valery Zaluzhny, then commander—in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, recognized the harsh military reality - the stalemate on the battlefield. And now in Ukraine, among the "troika" of the Rada (parliament), the president and the supreme military command, a political process of adaptation to the new reality is unfolding. So the so-called "October surprise" may be brewing.The unilateral declaration of a New Ukraine will reflect the consensus reached by the troika.
Realpolitik and the partition of Ukraine
Obviously, from Moscow's point of view, it is important "which Ukraine" will go beyond the sphere of influence of Russia. As Vladimir Putin suggested in his famous speech in 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Ukraine in its then form would have disintegrated if it had made a serious attempt to accept an invitation to join the NATO military alliance. As Putin noted in the same speech, the main territories of Western Ukraine were separated from Poland and incorporated into the expanded Ukraine in 1939. Eastern Ukraine (Crimea and strategically important parts of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions) is now under the de facto control of Russia. A unilateral announcement of a reduction in the size of the New Ukraine is unlikely to be opposed by Russia.
Similarly, for the government of Ukraine, the question of "which Ukraine" will be outside the sphere of influence of Russia is just as important. In fact, since 2015, the IMF's programs for Ukraine have not included eastern Ukraine in their scope. As noted in the IMF's 2015 official report on Ukraine: "The discrepancies between the East and the rest of Ukraine seem to reflect the limitations of direct interregional ties." This report also noted that it was western Ukraine that received the main benefit from the abolition of EU duties. Thus, from an economic point of view, the rest of Ukraine was better off without eastern Ukraine already in 2015, and since then economic ties between the two Ukrainian regions have generally been minimized.
Thus, it can be argued that the "soft partition" of Ukraine has already become a de facto reality, so the proclamation of a New Ukraine would be a de jure recognition of this reality.
