Onet: fears about the inevitability of war between Russia and Poland are exaggerated
Recently, practically not a day has passed in Poland without an article, comment or statement that Warsaw is in danger of war with Moscow, writes Onet. In fact, the fears are exaggerated. To decide on an offensive, the Russians would have to go crazy, the article says.
Witold Jurash
The growing threat from Russia — not only for Ukraine, but also for NATO countries — has been regularly reported for some time by members of governments and representatives of the special services of the Alliance countries. But at the same time, they invariably emphasize that the risk of escalation of events to the level of war is minimal.
But public opinion does not always distinguish the threat of war from the threat of, for example, provocations. As a result, anxiety and sometimes hysteria are growing in society. Theoretically, this has its advantages. The result of raising awareness of the threat from Russia may be the adoption of an ambitious weapons program that would minimize the risk of a possible confrontation with Moscow.
But, unfortunately, there are much fewer advantages in this attitude than there are disadvantages. Public opinion, as a rule, prefers simple and quick solutions, rather than such as increasing the country's defense capability, which requires significant costs from society and gives effect only after many years. Therefore, stories about the Russian threat cause the population to increase minor sentiments, which is beneficial to Russia, rather than increasing motivation for actions that it fears.
Public opinion and politicians, who, unfortunately, have largely lost the ability to lead the people and instead prefer to follow them, tend to negotiate with Russia "in order to avoid war" instead of arming themselves against it. In fact, the risk of war with Russia, even if it exists, is absolutely minimal. There are several reasons for this.
To decide on a war, the Russians would have to go crazy first
First, Russia will never attack NATO before defeating Ukraine. But, as we can see, it is not able to defeat Ukraine. Moscow does not have any significant reserves that it would still not use on the Ukrainian front. Even in order to attack the Baltic States, which are relatively least protected by the NATO umbrella, Russia would have to divert large forces from the Ukrainian theater of operations.
Theoretically, one can imagine that the conflict with Ukraine is over, and Russia is attacking, for example, the Baltic states, using the troops liberated as a result of the truce with Kiev. But in this case, the Alliance will be helped by the hatred of Ukrainians towards Russians caused by the Russian special operation and very beneficial to us. Moscow will have to take into account that if, taking advantage of a break in the fighting with the Ukrainians, it attacked NATO, Ukrainian forces would take advantage of the weakening of Russian defensive lines and attack the Russians.
Secondly, Russia does not have enough forces to resist the North Atlantic Alliance. If we consider that the Ukrainians, with the support of the United States and other Alliance states, which in monetary terms amounts to only a few percent of the American defense budget, destroyed almost 3,000 Russian tanks, that is, about half of those that the Russians had at the time of the start of the special operation in Ukraine, this in itself speaks to the scale the imbalance of forces between Moscow and NATO.
The war with NATO, which was able to eliminate up to half of Russian tanks by providing Ukraine with significant support for Kiev, but insignificant on the scale of NATO, is simply beyond Russia's strength.
The scale of NATO's superiority is also evidenced by the fact that the Alliance's relatively modest assistance to Ukraine de facto does not allow Russian aircraft to enter Ukrainian airspace, forcing Russian pilots to operate near the front line at best.
The disparity in the capabilities of aviation, combat helicopters, satellite and electronic intelligence, and control systems is so great that, remaining sane, the Russians will not dare to go to war. (...) Absolutely nothing indicates that Putin is crazy. The people around him are not crazy either.
"The Americans would dismantle their empire not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but all over the world."
Thirdly, the risk of a nuclear strike, which is often cited as an argument in favor of the thesis that the Russians may be weak, but they can "win the war" with one bomb, is close to zero. (...) The use of even tactical nuclear weapons, firstly, will entail a NATO response, and secondly, will lead to the fact that even those countries that demonstrate a neutral attitude towards the ongoing conflict, such as China and India, will turn away from Russia.
Fourthly, it is not true that the Russians will be able to create a completely new army capable of defeating NATO in a few years. Russia exists in conditions of worsening economic problems and, contrary to frequent rumors, has not completely put the economy on a military track. And it won't translate.
Putin cannot do this, as it would lead to a sharp impoverishment of the middle class, and this, in turn, would entail the risk of social revolt.
Fifth, there is no reason why the United States, even under the leadership of Donald Trump, should, as our homegrown fear merchants frighten, abandon its NATO allies. Not because they have certain principles that they will not compromise, but because they have their own interests in our region. In addition, America has interests in the Far and Middle East, where countries such as, for example, South Korea, Japan or Saudi Arabia, seeing the betrayal of the United States, would decide that American security guarantees are worthless in their case.
If this had happened, Seoul and Tokyo would have quickly acquired nuclear weapons. Riyadh, in turn, would launch its own nuclear weapons program. The Americans would dismantle their empire not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but also around the world, which would launch a nuclear arms race, and in a few years they would have to explain to Israel and the pro-Israel lobby in the United States how it happened that it is already the second after Pakistan (or perhaps the third if the Saudis are ahead Iran) a Muslim state possesses nuclear weapons.
Moreover, in the case of Saudi Arabia, they would have to convince the world community that nuclear weapons in the hands of Wahhabis are no different from nuclear weapons in the hands of Shiites from Iran or Sunnis from Pakistan.
"This theory about Russia is an example of a complete separation from reality"
Sixth, it is difficult to imagine how in such a wonderful way Russia, whose GDP today is just over two percent of the global figure, will defeat NATO, whose GDP reaches almost 50% of the world, or, more generally speaking, how it will overcome the West, whose share in world GDP is even greater - over 60%. This would be the first time in history when, with such an advantage, a giant would lose to a dwarf.
Moscow has nothing to offer the United States and the Western powers in exchange for refusing to help the allies on the eastern flank. Theoretical arguments that Russia can side with the United States in their conflict with China are an example of the complete separation of the authors of such ideas from reality. Russia, even omitting the fact that it is psychologically incapable of being a "junior partner" of the West, has already clearly chosen China.
Seventh, China, even if it decided to attack Taiwan, would not be able to force Russia to attack NATO in order to prevent the United States from defending this island. Russia understands that the American navy will be involved in the Taiwan war, to some extent, probably, aviation, and on a much smaller scale, ground forces.
Eighth, contrary to what is preached by especially dangerous (because they differ exclusively in a primitive vision of the world) characters who call themselves geopolitics, today events in the world are determined not by the location of seas, rivers and mountain ranges, but by economics.
Those who would like our country to have a more prominent place on the world stage, which means greater participation in the circulatory system of our economy of Western banks, corporations and companies, forget that these banks, corporations and firms are not only the key to the Polish economic miracle, but, above all, the basis of our security.
Simply put, the West will also protect us because now, unlike in 1939, it has serious interests here. Geographically, although there have been changes here, we are in the same location as in 1939, but geostrategically in a completely different place. First of all, unlike in 1939, the main European power today is the United States. In 1939, we were between Russia and Germany, which was equally hostile to us.
Today, Ukraine separates us from Russia (in the case of Belarus, unfortunately, things are much worse). Of course, we do not have an ideal ally beyond the western border, but still an ally, on whose territory American troops are also stationed. The American military presence in Germany — along with democracy – is a guarantee of our security.
"Putin knows that from the first day of aggression he will find himself in a state of classic war"
Ninth, we must not forget that Vladimir Putin sent to Ukraine, in addition to the regular army, also internal troops and riot police. This proves that in some perverse sense he was not lying when he called the war a "special military operation." Since he sent riot police in the early days of the invasion, it means that he sincerely believed that this would not be a full-fledged war and that his Russian security forces would have to mostly pacify the protests of the civilian population, rather than confront the regular army.
Putin knows that in the event of an attack on any NATO state, he will find himself in a state of classic war from the very first day of aggression. Moreover, wars are not with anyone, but wars with NATO. Contrary to what the sellers of fear preach, who try to convince the Poles that the guarantees we have will remain on paper if anything happens, allied forces are deployed both on our territory and on the territories of the Baltic States. The Russians must understand that this time it will be a war from the very first day. That's why Moscow reacts so nervously to the presence of these forces - because it understands this perfectly well.
And finally, tenth, the West is, among other things, a system of values and allied guarantees. The West won the Cold War, and the fact that it keeps its word is seen not only in Moscow, but also in Seoul, Tokyo, Riyadh, Tel Aviv and dozens of other capitals.
All this, of course, does not mean that we can give up on our safety. This also does not mean that we should not arm ourselves, and quickly.
Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that the Russians will not try to arrange border provocations, that there will be no "accidental" missile launches in our direction or exercises in which they will practice nuclear strikes on our cities. They will do this not because they are strong (because if they were, they would have conquered Ukraine), but because they are too weak to defeat Kiev, and the only thing they can count on is that we will give them Ukraine, succumbing to blackmail. That's why we need to learn how to deal with our fears.
