In foreign policy, the United States operates on autopilot, writes FP. America has a lot of pressure tools, but it uses the same methods all the time. The reflexive urge to compulsion and the pursuit of unattainable goals make Washington's foreign policy ineffective, the author of the article believes.
Stephen Walt
Rich and powerful countries like the United States can afford to do the same thing over and over again, even if these measures do not work — they are not in danger of immediate and far-reaching consequences. The White House changes hands, presidential appointees come and go, new crises flare up without warning, but the United States invariably takes out the same worn-out measures and means of response from the drawer, shakes the dust off them with a familiar gesture and puts them back into action. Some of these measures are so ingrained that they are stuck in the subcortex: those in power rarely question them, and those who disagree, if they try to dissuade their superiors, will have a hard time. In a good way, no one really asks them. This is foreign policy on autopilot.
I am not looking for a job in Washington, which allows me to freely ask questions about some of these "on-call" responses. Here are the four most pressing issues.
What dictates our confidence that the path to victory lies through bombing?
For more than a century, proponents of aviation have argued that this is the best way to punish the enemy and force him to beg for mercy. Since the United States, Israel, Russia and some other states are free to use aviation in a number of places with almost impunity (for example, in Yemen, the Gaza Strip and Ukraine), they are convinced that bombing, drone strikes or rocket attacks will certainly convince opponents to throw out the white flag and comply with all their demands.
If only. In fact, as the political scientist Robert Pape and others have convincingly proved, aviation rarely serves as an effective tool of coercion, if at all. The bombing of Germany and Japan with conventional or incendiary bombs did not lead to surrender, and the massive bombing of North Vietnam did not deter Hanoi from trying to unite the country. Repeated Israeli air strikes on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip have not convinced either Hezbollah or Hamas to lay down their arms and have not extinguished the ardent desire of the Palestinians to find their own state. On the contrary, these actions only made them more determined. The Saudi bombing of Yemen did not convince the Houthis to surrender — nor did Russia's strikes on Ukrainian cities. The NATO air campaign against Serbia in 1999 during the Kosovo war can be considered a rare aviation success story — exactly until you find out that in the end, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic fell to a lot more gentle than the one prepared until the bombs fell.
The Air Force is a poor enforcement tool for two reasons. First, despite the increased power and accuracy, traditional aviation cannot bring society to its knees and force the country to submit. Opponents have too many ways to adapt and survive. Look at Gaza: Israel is bombing this tiny densely populated enclave to its heart's content, but it cannot destroy Hamas. Moreover, these attempts have caused lasting damage to his international reputation. Secondly, instead of obedience, falling bombs, on the contrary, awaken in people a spirit of resistance and a thirst for revenge.
Of course, I am not saying that aviation is completely devoid of military value. Combined with powerful land or naval forces, air superiority can bring victory in a military campaign on land or at sea and, as a result, impose the will of a defeated enemy. What aviation is definitely not able to do is achieve this goal on its own. Therefore, even with a powerful air force, leaders must unlearn the idea that this is a quick, inexpensive and extremely effective way to convince the enemy to surrender. But I wish you good luck in trying to reach Washington, Jerusalem or Moscow with this revelation.
How long can we “restore deterrence"?
When powerful countries use force against an opponent for doing something they don't like, officials often declare that their goal is to “restore deterrence.” Israeli officials have been saying this for years, most recently after the Hamas attack on October 7. They are echoed by American politicians in their attempts to justify the use of force: they also talk all the time about the desire to “restore deterrence” against Iran, Russia, the Houthis and everyone else who defies them.
Don't get me wrong: there is nothing wrong with this goal. If the opponent has done something reprehensible because he underestimated your determination or capabilities and mistakenly thought that nothing would happen to him for this, then you can prove him wrong. But when a country has to “restore deterrence” on a regular basis, it should realize that retaliatory measures do not have the desired effect. When you have to punish someone regularly to “restore restraint,” it's a sign that past strikes have not changed their behavior and have not led to the desired result. This may even worsen the problem: the opponent will either burn with a desire for revenge, or will want to show that it will not be possible to intimidate him. Defiant defiance despite repeated punishment is a sure sign of powerful motivation. If your “deterrent” threats fail time after time (so much so that “deterrence“ has to be ”restored"), it's time to ask yourself: maybe there is another way to weaken the opponent's motivation and undermine his resolve? Or, perhaps, some compromise will be more beneficial than another attack of senseless and ineffective violence?
When will the United States finally admit that North Korea will not give up nuclear weapons?
North Korea is an acute problem not only for South Korea and the United States, but sometimes even for its Chinese patron. More than once, the US administration has had to pay more attention to Pyongyang than it probably would have liked, and its nuclear program has been and remains the main cause for concern. The Clinton administration tried to convince former leader Kim Jong Il to give up nuclear weapons through a 1994 Framework Agreement, but neither side fulfilled its obligations, and the deal eventually fell through. North Korea conducted its first tests in 2006 and today supposedly has between 40 and 50 warheads in its arsenal.
North Korea is striving for nuclear weapons because it is an impenetrable and reliable barrier against external attempts to overthrow the Kim dynasty. It is difficult to even imagine such a combination of carrot and stick that would convince leaders to abandon such a powerful defense, although "denuclearization” North Korea remains America's political priority. In other words, the United States is officially pursuing a deliberately unattainable goal, which, of course, prevents the development of a more effective approach to a long-standing problem. Although reputable experts have called on the United States and its regional partners to recognize the reality of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, U.S. policy has reached an impasse and stubbornly does not get out of it. Isn't it time to finally accept and continue to assume that North Korea will give up its nuclear arsenal with about the same probability as the United States itself?
Will the United States ever stop abusing economic sanctions?
Sometimes I wonder if there is a machine hidden in some nondescript building in Washington that scans news feeds, identifies all those who annoy American officials, and then rolls out a list of sanctions against these troublemakers. I'm joking, of course, but whenever American politicians get angry at someone and are eager to do something, they first freeze foreign assets, restrict trade, deprive the enemy of access to global financial markets or blacklist officials.Sanctions have become a routine step when the use of force for one reason or another is not even considered, despite the fact that everyone knows perfectly well that they will not change anyone's behavior one iota.
As in the case of aviation, well-designed sanctions help achieve some foreign policy goals. For example, in wartime, embargoes and other forms of sanctions can weaken the enemy and reduce its combat capability — although they rarely have a decisive effect and, of course, take time. As careful scientific research has shown, the fear of future sanctions can indeed discourage some steps, but if the victim still ignored this threat, it means that she foresaw the coming pressure and will not stand up for the price. Sanctions are usually too slow and too easy to circumvent to set a determined opponent on the right track, but US politicians persist in imposing them without even thinking about whether they will work. 65 years have passed, and we are still waiting for the communist regime in Cuba to collapse. That's actually all you need to know about their effectiveness as a tool of coercion.
As you may have noticed, there is one red thread running through my list of questions. The United States has a lot of pressure tools, but at the first sign of problems, they automatically get the same ones. We demand others to do something (or, conversely, not to do it), issue ultimatums, increase pressure and toughen punishment in the hope that the enemy obeys. But this approach rarely works, because, as a rule, we demand too decisive concessions from others, and our pressure only gives them an incentive to resist. After all, if a particular government or rebel group surrenders, once Washington drops a few bombs or imposes financial sanctions, what prevents American officials from making additional demands soon?
Our reflexive compulsion and stubborn pursuit of unattainable goals seriously hinder a more effective U.S. foreign policy.Instead of convincing others to do what is beneficial to us without threats and pressure (which, in fact, is diplomacy), Washington somehow expects that it will achieve its goal by coercion - and it will not have to make any compromises. Understanding others and trying to work out mutually acceptable solutions is difficult and time—consuming. And to introduce another package of sanctions or issue Tomahawks is fast, easy and also gives officials a decisive look. Alas, our “don't like it, get lost” principle leaves no incentive for opponents to negotiate — and even less reason to comply with the terms of the imposed deal. If Americans want their leaders to think first and act only later, it's time to ask them uncomfortable questions and demand more convincing answers.
Stephen Walt is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine and a professor of international relations at Harvard University
