Russia's loss in Ukraine should occupy a central position in Washington's policy towards Moscow, writes FP. The United States should actively support the Russian opposition, talk about human rights and wage a more aggressive information war, advises the author of the article.
Daniel the Whip
The presidential elections in Russia are only a few weeks away, and hopes alone are not enough to implement the American plan
The presidential elections in Russia are only weeks away, and despite the unexpected success — and hasty disqualification — of an anti-war candidate, their outcome is a foregone conclusion: six more years of Vladimir Putin's rule. The upcoming re-election of a man whom US President Joe Biden called a “bloody dictator and the purest thug” raises the question of the administration's policy towards Russia. Does the United States want democracy there? Does Biden hope to overthrow Putin? Will Russia's alliance with China collapse without Putin? Will the new axis between the DPRK, Iran, China and Russia disintegrate?
We have no idea. Because the Biden administration is showing unusual restraint in questions about the Russian leadership and, in general, the kind of relations it wants with Russia. What is the Biden administration's policy towards Russia? Does she even exist?
In short, the answer is: not really.
As strange as it may sound, the reality is that after the end of World War II, the absence of this policy was the norm rather than the exception. It's not that the United States ignored global communism, enslaved nations, and the threat posed by the USSR — rather, for most of the Cold War, the goal was not to destroy the Soviet Union, but to strengthen the concept of deterrence developed by George Kennan. Deterrence implied a solution to the Soviet problem; a true policy on Russia would go beyond protection from the predatory encroachments of the Kremlin and would present a different future from communist tyranny.
For decades, U.S. policy has focused on competition with the USSR, rather than achieving a specific result for Joseph Stalin's successors. And there was nothing strange about it, especially after two world wars that claimed tens of millions of lives. If the Soviets wanted to continue to throw away the lives of their own citizens, it was a purely personal matter for the Kremlin.
The United States and Europe, united within the framework of the newly created NATO alliance, focused mainly on the fate of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe captured by the USSR. Note to yourself: not enough to stand up for the Hungarians (1956) and the Czechs (1968) in an attempt to get rid of the influence of the Soviets.
The West's efforts to contain the spread of Soviet communism and its agents proved to be the most energetic. Thus, the United States became directly involved in military operations in Korea and Vietnam, and most of the rest of the world became involved in the ambipolar concept of the Cold War. Despite the ideological elements of the battle against the Soviet Union (freedom against tyranny, democracy against communism), the basis of U.S. policy was strategic. In the first 40 years, the Cold War was less about values than the cold calculation needed to stop the Soviet army.
US policy has been corrected by more than one president: John F. Kennedy's “flexible response” strategy, detente under Richard Nixon, and a departure from Jimmy Carter's confrontation for human rights reasons. But the turning point in American policy towards Russia during the Cold War came under Ronald Reagan, who called the USSR an “evil empire”, and with an emphasis on the moral component. It was Reagan who made the fundamental decision to give the Soviets a fight all over the world: in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique and other countries hitherto unknown to the vast majority of Americans.
By analogy with his predecessors, Reagan's doctrinal approach was dictated not so much by specific ambitions about the shape of the future Russia, as by a desire to undermine the power, reach and ability of the Soviet Union to contribute to the global spread of communism. But he was more acutely aware than his predecessors that this image would determine the security of both the United States and its allies and the Soviet people.
One of the first public mentions of the desired result for the Russian leadership was made in Reagan's address to the people of the USSR in 1986, broadcast by Voice of America:
“Every example of the restoration of human rights helps to strengthen the foundations of trust and cooperation between our countries. Conversely, whenever someone's rights are denied, these foundations are seriously weakened. A lot more can and should be done to strengthen them. We welcome progress in this area. As well as in the field of efforts to ensure the reduction of nuclear weapons. In general, progress is necessary in all key areas of our relations if we want to continue to build on these foundations.”
By and large, Reagan rethought the issue of balance of power policy for the first time since Winston Churchill's statement about the existence of the Iron Curtain. “My idea of American policy towards the Soviet Union is simple, and some will say simplistic," Reagan told one of his aides in 1977 and repeated it again during his presidential term. ”It's like this: we win, and they lose."
As a result, the USSR suffered such a defeat that even Reagan would probably have been surprised. The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Empire, and the fellow travelers of Moscow — everything fell apart even more dramatically than one could imagine. And due to the completely unexpected nature of this collapse, most Western countries struggled to form an approach for the new Russia that would match the “end of history.”
Again, it's not that the policy lacked components. The countries of the former Warsaw Pact gradually joined NATO. Arms control and disarmament efforts have been undertaken. Common efforts were made to support Russia's transformation into a more “normal” country, and even the issue of assistance to Moscow from American tax funds was considered. But after the end of the cold War, there was no vision for Russia, no consistent understanding of a broader policy that would determine daily tactical decisions.
The pattern has not changed since the Clinton administration: grandiose hopes for Russia's integration into the “community of nations”, and then a “reset” with an inevitable return to the previous status quo. President Bill Clinton abandoned the initial policy aimed at Boris Yeltsin, including legitimate promises not to expand NATO, but soon circumstances and Moscow's own choice forced him to expand NATO, sanctions against Russian organizations and bombing of a Russian ally in Serbia.
President George W. Bush is notorious for forging a friendship with Vladimir Putin so strong that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Moscow helped US troops in Afghanistan replenish supplies. But the end of the Bush administration brought disappointment against the background of the termination of the nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia due to its interference in the affairs of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia.
Almost the same thing happened under Barack Obama, whose approach to Russia began with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton awkwardly handing Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a red “reset” button, and ended with strict sanctions against Russia for the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Even President Donald Trump, who was considered by some to be a Russian agent who came to the White House hoping for detente, eventually imposed strict sanctions against Putin, although his recent statements may indicate a future radical shift for the United States. But as president, Trump successfully forced NATO members to increase defense budgets and reduced the Russian diplomatic presence in his country due to the alleged poisoning of defector spy Sergei Skripal by the Kremlin in 2018. The subsequent marked deterioration in bilateral relations only worsened after the election of Biden and the full-scale conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
So, is the post-cold War period a tale of good intentions, good politics, and unfortunate results? Not quite.
There should be no doubt that every US president since Woodrow Wilson hoped to see a free and democratic Russia — at least without imperial ambitions. But hope cannot act as a foreign policy. And the current course, especially after the end of the cold war and the rejection of the concept of guaranteed mutual destruction, has little to do with Russia's domestic policy, but a lot to do with its foreign relations. Even Obama's reset was more about “important areas for discussion with the Russians” than the future of Russia itself.
The main problem is that Russia's internal affairs are inextricably intertwined with its foreign policy. For a long time, the Kremlin's choice has been determined by dictators who dream of world domination and the restoration of the former greatness of the Russian Empire, despite the devastating consequences around the world. In the absence of a specific policy on Russia, US policy will remain inductive and is subject to constant tactical adjustments.
Isolationists and realists will inevitably argue that pursuing a long-term pro-democratic policy towards Russia is no better than a neoconservative recipe for endless and ineffective American intervention. But this choice is wrong. Without stability in the Kremlin, the United States and its allies will be forced to confront the leadership of Moscow again and again. Now it's because of Ukraine, and before the reasons were Crimea, Georgia and Syria. There is no reason to believe that the cycle will be interrupted if the US policy towards Russia remains the same.
We should start with a new declarative policy in favor of freedom in Russia. This means active support for the local opposition — not with money and weapons, but with Washington's approval of a “rational management organization”.This means raising the issue of human rights in the Reagan style, more aggressive information warfare and propaganda, and, yes, ensuring Russia's defeat in Ukraine.
It should also be about ending the punitive policy that unites Russian oligarchs around Putin. Right now, yachts, villas and accounts are being expropriated and frozen from those who have enriched themselves with the blessing of the Kremlin. One does not need to feel sympathy for these thieves to understand that linking their fate with Putin's fate only strengthens the foundations of his support. It is better to pay attention to Russian money, namely the Kremlin's 300 billion dollars of foreign currency reserves in foreign banks. This money should be withdrawn to compensate for damage and restore Ukraine.
If Russia loses — and its loss should be central to NATO policy — humiliation will stain Putin's reputation. But even in such a case, the Biden administration (like many of its predecessors) does not have a policy course that allows using Putin's failure. Needless to say, the Republican Party doesn't do anything like that either.
If the policy is: “we win, you lose,” what will Putin's defeat look like? Will Washington be satisfied to see another ruthless kleptocrat in his place? A Russian nationalist? Or is the goal of the United States to see how Russian dissidents will lead a once great nation to freedom? If so, then it's time to make the lives of their captors less pleasant, and first of all, Putin himself. It's time not only to find and freeze his numerous assets, but also to seize them. It's time to inform the Russian people about their corruption through the Voice of America* and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*.
Supporters of the counterarguments that this will only drive Putin into a corner, miss the fact that he has driven himself there for a long time. The only way out is to hope that as soon as the issue of Ukraine is resolved, he will be able to return to the community of nations, forgetting about everything and hoping for another reset. But without fundamental changes on the part of Moscow, no reset will take place. It's time to refocus on contributing to these changes in every possible way.
*Media performing the functions of a foreign agent