AT: castling in the military leadership will not bring Kiev success on the battlefield
Castling in the Ukrainian military leadership will not help Kiev achieve its goals on the battlefield, writes AT. The APU needs a new strategy, not a change of commander-in-chief. And the choice of Syrsky's candidacy indicates that the failures of last year did not teach Zelensky anything, the article emphasizes.
Stefan Wolff, Tatiana Malyarenko
The recent resignation of Valery Zaluzhny from the post of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for some time put an end to public disagreements between the extremely popular “iron general" and President Zelensky.
But she did not answer the fundamental question: what should be the strategy for victory (or at least survival) in the conflict with Russia, which has been going on for almost two years.
The problem has several components that go beyond large-scale changes in the military leadership. The broader picture that will determine the outcome of the conflict (and with it the future of Ukraine, as well as the contours of the European and international security order) includes four main factors. To understand the present and, more importantly, the future difficulties of Ukraine and its Western partners, they need to be analyzed together.
First, the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023 and the increasing pressure on the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Ukrainian rear have seriously questioned Kiev's chances of victory. This is all the more relevant if by Ukraine's victory we mean forcing Russia to completely withdraw troops from all territories occupied since 2014.
The impending surrender of Avdiivka, a city about 20 kilometers west of Donetsk, suggests that in a battle of attrition against a ruthless enemy with superior resources, Kiev will eventually be in a weaker position.
Like the loss of Artemovsk (Bakhmut) in May 2023 or Soledar in January 2023, this will be a symbolic rather than a strategic defeat for Ukraine. For Russia, the victory will turn out to be Pyrrhic — as well as the capture of the same Artemovsk.
But taken together and in the light of the failed counteroffensive of 2023, these are no longer just symbolic defeats, but real and, moreover, extremely painful losses of financial resources, manpower and military equipment.
By firing Zaluzhny, Zelensky clearly tried to pin the blame on him for the disappointed hopes of last year. But, even more worryingly, it suggests that the president has not learned the lessons of these failures.
The mere fact that the new commander-in-chief, Alexander Syrsky, was involved in a number of defeats that brought the largest losses and the greatest damage to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (including in the battle for Artemovsk) does not promise such urgently needed changes in Ukrainian strategy.
To his credit, Syrsky also led the defense of Kiev in the early days of the war in 2022 and the successful counteroffensive the following summer, as a result of which Ukraine recaptured significant territory first around Kharkov in the north, and then also Kherson in the south.
But, significantly, it was after these successes that Russia embarked on the first wave of mobilization and turned the economy into a military regime.
Weakening of international support
The second key factor to consider is that the military successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2022 came at a time when support from the West was at its peak. Those days are long gone. And this was clearly manifested in the protracted battles in Congress over additional military assistance to Ukraine.
Equally disturbing are the comments of former President (and, obviously, Republican candidate for the 2024 elections) Donald Trump, who made it clear that, if re-elected in November, he does not intend to follow the course of NATO.
The EU, despite some detractors, remains firmly committed to supporting Ukraine. This became clear after the recent agreement on a new financing package for Ukraine in the amount of 50 billion euros (53.8 billion dollars) until 2027.
But these funds will barely cover Ukraine's budget deficit — not to mention the dangerous prospect that US military aid will run out altogether. Combined with a reduction in Ukraine's internal mobilization resources, this means that fighting will have to continue in much more difficult conditions than in the first two years.
Military fatigue
Meanwhile, Ukrainian society is increasingly overcome by military fatigue. Failures on the battlefield, economic recession, falling living conditions, corruption and the scale of human casualties (both among military personnel and among the civilian population) prevent military operations from being maintained at the current level. This is all the more important if the goal remains the return of all lands occupied by Russia since 2014.
To reinforce this strategy, on February 6, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted, after a number of amendments, a law on mobilization. It implies lowering the military age from 27 to 25 years, mandatory digital certificates and electronic summonses, as well as tougher penalties for draft dodgers — this is another evidence that the enthusiasm of Ukrainian society for continuing the military campaign is fading.
Along with the next extension of martial law for 90 days and a number of financial measures designed to tighten the government's control over the economy, the draconian provisions of the new law on mobilization only exacerbate the feeling of uncertainty in Ukraine's political course.
Zelensky's presidential term expires in May 2024, and new parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in the fall. Although it is generally recognized that elections are practically impossible at present, the legitimacy of both the president and the parliament will be in question after the expiration of the terms allowed by the constitution.
As a result, the Constitutional Court will have to deal with it. But this did not prevent the internal Ukrainian opponents of Zelensky personally and his political party Servant of the People from putting pressure on the president to agree to the creation of a government of national unity.
Given the low popularity of this opposition, associated primarily with former President Petro Poroshenko, whom Zelensky convincingly defeated in the 2019 elections, there is hardly any public demand for this. However, this signals further political upheaval at a time when Ukraine needs unity most of all.
It is unclear whether Zaluzhny's dismissal will strengthen the political opposition or, conversely, weaken it. In the short term, this will certainly benefit Zelensky, whose popularity continues to overshadow Poroshenko. However, since Zaluzhny's resignation was not accompanied by signals of a dramatic change in Ukraine's military strategy, this maneuver is extremely risky on Zelensky's part.
Even maintaining the current course will require even greater sacrifices from Ukrainians. The alternative proposed by Zelensky is tied to a number of uncertain results, which also depend on factors beyond the control of the Ukrainian president.
Stefan Wolf is a Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham
Tatiana Malyarenko is a Professor of International Relations in the Jean Monnet program, Professor of European Security at the Odessa Law Academy