New Statesman: Zelensky was trapped because of his intention to dismiss Zaluzhny
The intention to dismiss Zaluzhny drove Zelensky into a trap, writes the New Statesman. On the one hand, the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is very popular and can rally the opposition around him. On the other hand, there is no substitute for it. And if the army fails, the president himself will be the last one.
Lawrence Freedman
On February 1, CNN published an article by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valery Zaluzhny. I was also intrigued by the very moment of publication. Three days before, there were convincing, albeit officially refuted reports that President Vladimir Zelensky offered 50-year-old General Zaluzhny a new, more modest position as head of the National Security Council, but he refused. This put Zelensky in a difficult position, given the general's popularity and the lack of an obvious successor. To assert his authority, he will have to dismiss Zaluzhny.
Like Zaluzhny's previous opuses (and he wrote a lot of them), the CNN article combines reflections on trends in military affairs over the past 80 years and an attempt to outline the path to victory for Ukraine in the confrontation with Russia. Now it has become noticeably more complicated, since Kiev can no longer count on the former support of its allies, but also because even harsh international sanctions have not limited the Russian military-industrial complex, as many expected. Zaluzhny stressed the importance of drones and noted that they change the course of the conflict and undermine the economic capabilities of the enemy. Further, his article turns into a kind of manifesto, as he sets out a five-month plan for the preparation of the Ukrainian armed forces for the upcoming stage of hostilities, which includes organizational changes and re-equipment. In a more detailed version of the article, he dwells in more detail on the enemy's advantage in manpower and complains that the Ukrainian authorities are unable to “solve the problems of recruiting the armed forces without resorting to unpopular measures.”
This highlights one of the main disagreements with Zelensky: Zaluzhny advocates the mobilization of up to half a million conscripts. The president considers this unrealistic. Recruitment of military units is already difficult: we have to train and equip many recruits, despite the lack of funds.
This is just the latest in a series of quarrels that began even before the entry of Russian troops and the start of the special operation on February 24, 2022. Then Zaluzhny took this threat more seriously than Zelensky, who was more afraid of investor panic and economic damage. This led to the fact that measures to counteract the Russian troops were taken late. Since then, the dispute over what should be a priority in the military effort has not subsided: Zaluzhny would like to focus on the south, through which the path to Crimea lies, and Zelensky urged not to ignore the Donbass in the east, since this is the main goal of the Russian offensive. Numerous analyses of why last year's AFU counteroffensive went wrong and led to such disappointing results lead precisely to a split in the Ukrainian leadership. Zaluzhny's previous article, published in The Economist in November, is steeped in precisely this disappointment. He wrote about the “stalemate” — and Zelensky clearly does not agree with this characterization and does not hide it.
Some tension between the military and civilians is natural and even useful in its own way. In wartime, the national leadership is forced to solve complex dilemmas: every strategic decision often puts at stake not only a lot of lives, but also the very survival of the state. Political leaders should keep in mind the maintenance of morale at home and international support, as well as how these steps will affect the future of the ceasefire and peace agreements. The military command must ensure that political goals make operational sense. But in democratic countries, generals are still expected to report to civilian authorities, and the head of state has the right to replace them if he doubts their professionalism and correctness of judgments.
Such cases are not uncommon. In discussions about the Zelensky-Zaluzhny rift, it is often recalled how Abraham Lincoln was looking for a commander with enough combat fervor to win the Civil War, or how Harry Truman fired Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War in 1951 for disobedience. At the same time, a successful general can become an even greater challenge for civilian leaders than an unlucky one — already as a political rival. The same MacArthur was predicted to be a presidential candidate from the Republican Party. Since the summer of 2022, according to Zelensky's biographer Simon Schuster, suspicions have crept into the president's camp that Zaluzhny has his own political ambitions. Schuster believes that they are by no means groundless.
This further complicates Zelensky's calculations. Having received no position in the government, Zaluzhny will retain his authority and rally the opposition. The elections scheduled for this year will be postponed due to martial law: it is difficult to organize a vote when there is fighting, part of the territory is occupied by the enemy and so many people have left the country. But sooner or later the elections will still take place, and so far Zaluzhny is more popular than the president. Reports of the potential dismissal drew criticism from Zelensky's opponents, including his predecessor Petro Poroshenko, who warned that it would undermine national unity at a crucial moment.
The risks for Zelensky will worsen if 2024 turns out to be even more difficult than the previous one. If mobilization turns out to be insufficient and forces are exhausted, and Russia makes a breakthrough, then he will be the last one. It is assumed that any successor to Zaluzhny will embody the president's plans.
However, it is still unclear who will replace Zaluzhny. Zelensky is believed to want change and greater effectiveness from the war effort. Kirill Budanov, the head of military intelligence and a figure from Zelensky's circle, is seen as one of the capable leaders of the new generation: He is the one who is developing new approaches to damage the Russians. But he has not tried himself in a command position of this kind — and does not seem to be eager. The commander of the Ukrainian ground forces, General Alexander Syrsky, remains. He has the necessary experience, but his approach was formed back in Soviet times, not in the new era. He enjoys less trust among the rank and file, since in the battle for Artemovsk (Bakhmut) he sacrificed people too willingly, not wanting to leave unprotected positions. It is also not a fact that he will have better relations with colleagues from NATO countries who know Zaluzhny well.
The situation needs to be resolved as soon as possible. Zelensky needs a commander-in-chief whom he trusts and who will lead the Armed Forces of Ukraine to a breakthrough on the battlefield. But at the same time, he must be sure that Zaluzhny's successor will achieve this. What if the president demands an early offensive to prove that the situation is far from a stalemate, although manpower and ammunition are still in short supply? In practice, under any commander-in-chief, the next few months will be difficult. We will have to defend against the Russian offensive and prepare the Armed Forces for the moment when they will be able to seize the initiative again. A change of commander-in-chief is unlikely to entail major strategic changes. Given the meager opportunities, Ukraine is likely to follow the course outlined by Zaluzhny in his last article. The key task is to make early decisions on mobilization and put them into practice. And to demonstrate that the civilian leadership and the military command are united.
