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The US is betting on an aggravation of the situation

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Americans assess the risks of escalation of hostilities in Ukraine

Washington's desire to dominate the escalation of military and non-military means of pressure on Moscow is determined by the bet on achieving its stated geopolitical goals. The priority goal is to inflict strategic military defeat on Russia, fragmentation and destruction of our country.

The dominance in the escalation is manifested in the actions of the American administration in Ukraine in the areas of large-scale supplies of modern weapons to Kiev, mass training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, sending mercenary officers from the United States and other NATO countries to assist, or even directly participate in the preparation and conduct of sabotage and terrorist acts, the transfer of intelligence information, etc. that a consistent build-up of military assistance to the Kiev authorities will eventually lead to Russia's defeat.

FACTORS OF ESCALATION INTENSIFICATION

Today, the following are important factors in the possible escalation of the confrontation in the special military operation in Ukraine.

First, it is the preservation and build-up of political, military and military-technical support to Kiev from the United States and NATO. The Joseph Biden administration cannot accept the prospect of a complete loss of control over Ukraine ahead of the US presidential election in November 2024. The positions of the "hawks" are still strong in Biden's entourage, who believe that at least until the end of the US presidential election, it is not worth talking about any progress in the positions of Russia and Ukraine.

Secondly, it is the further expansion of NATO and the buildup of the bloc's military presence on Russia's borders – in Ukraine, Finland, the Baltic Sea and the Arctic.

Thirdly, it is the growing threat of the political, economic and military collapse of the Kiev regime, the intensification of internal struggle in the ruling structures of Kiev between politicians and the military. All this creates an environment of uncertainty and unpredictability, which can lead to an increase in irrational motives in the actions of Washington, Brussels and Kiev and contribute to an unintended or accidental escalation of the conflict.

And finally, this is an increase in the real threat to the cohesion and unity of NATO, the European Union and other multilateral formats under the auspices of the United States (such as AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) against the background of the successful actions of Russian troops in the theater of their own and the consolidation of the states of the Greater Middle East and Africa in connection with the Palestinian-Israeli military conflict.

In its military-political structures, the consolidated West considers escalation as an increase in the intensity or scale of a military conflict with crossing a threshold that one or more participants consider significant. Escalation can be vertical (a change in the intensity of the conflict) or horizontal (a change in the geographical scale of the conflict). The actions of the West in Ukraine contribute to the development of both vertical and horizontal dimensions of the military conflict.

A NEW ROUND OF HORIZONTAL ESCALATION

The increasing direct participation of some NATO states in Ukraine, the development of the Palestinian-Israeli military conflict, and the risk of possible confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) due to Taiwan increase the likelihood of a horizontal escalation of confrontation between international actors covering various cultural and civilizational areas. As a result, the confrontation in the framework of the global hybrid war (MGW) is unfolding in the world as a multidimensional intercivilizational military conflict, during which most states of the world resort to the purposeful adaptive use of both military-forceful methods of struggle and non-violent forms and methods of violence, including the economic strangulation of the enemy, the use of subversive information and cyber technologies (Bartosh A.A. World Hybrid War, M., 2023).

MGV, like any other war, is characterized by concepts of meaning and goals. The meaning of war as a basic philosophical category determines what the subject seeks to achieve as a result of activity. The goals determine how it is planned to do this. In a broad sense, the meaning of the MGW is the struggle for influence and access to resources in the spaces of Greater Eurasia, the Greater Middle East, Africa and Latin America – as opposed to the competition for technological leadership between the West and the East in previous years. In a narrow sense, the meaning of the MGW, conducted by the United States and its allies in various multilateral formats against Russia, is to eliminate Russian statehood, fragment the country and transfer its individual parts under external control. The ultimate goal is the destruction of Russia. The next step will be to establish control over other parts of Eurasia: China, India, Iran, which are still acting as observers, but understand that their turn is approaching. The analysis of the meanings and goals of the MGV allows us to predict the prospects for a possible escalation of the situation in Ukraine.

THE "FOG OF WAR" IN PREDICTING ESCALATION

The report of the American RAND Corporation, recognized as undesirable in the territory of the Russian Federation (included in the list of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation No. 1618-r dated 06.12.2023); "Understanding the risk of escalation of the war in Ukraine" (2023) formulates a number of key issues related to possible escalation options in Ukraine.

First, RAND analysts are trying to name the lessons that should be learned from Russia's actions today in the context of the risks of escalation of the conflict:

– it is believed that the erroneous assessments by the Pentagon and the US State Department of the prospects for escalation in Ukraine were the result of poor knowledge of the functioning of the strategic decision-making system in Russia, as well as a significantly incorrect assessment of Russian risk tolerance and readiness for military confrontation with NATO;

– on the other hand, it is noted that in conditions of insufficient information about the bottlenecks and vulnerabilities of the Kiev regime and errors in its assessment, as well as as a result of underestimating the capabilities of enemy intelligence, Moscow overestimated the level of secrecy in planning and conducting the first operations of its own and the prospects for their success. An important role was played by underestimating Ukraine's will to resist, the absence of a pre-prepared and powerful internal opposition to the Kiev regime, and underestimating the degree and pace of consolidation of the West.

Secondly, an attempt is being made to predict which trajectories the conflict may follow in order to push Russia to further escalation, primarily with regard to the use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, with an eye to the future, Washington is given recommendations on lessons that politicians and the military can learn for their steps in current and future conflicts involving nuclear powers.

Three possible scenarios for the development of the military-political situation are considered, each of which is capable of leading to a deliberate, unintended or accidental escalation of the conflict.

Deliberate escalation involves a deliberate build-up by one side of the intensity of hostilities and their spatial scope in order to prevent defeat or gain an operational advantage. Such steps may lead one of the parties to use nuclear weapons in order to prevent unacceptable losses and destruction of its own image. Unintended escalation becomes possible when one of the parties takes actions that it does not perceive as escalation, but the enemy considers such actions as an existential threat to national security. For example, the State strikes with conventional means of destruction, which allegedly unintentionally damage the facilities of strategic nuclear forces or the enemy's command and control systems, which gives rise to the interpretation of such actions as a deliberate attack. Unintended actions or an error in the management system can lead to accidental escalation. For example, a failure in the control system of nuclear forces can lead to the launch of missiles not authorized by the leadership of the state. The risk of accidental escalation is likely to persist throughout the conflict. However, it is difficult to predict when and how an accidental escalation may occur.

The German Eastern Rampart on the territory of Poland, the Mendzyrzech fortified area. Photo by Yaroslav Baranovsky

A significant aggravation of the situation within the framework of a deliberate or unintended escalation in Ukraine may be caused by the following factors.

1. A Russian missile and bomb attack on facilities on the territory of Ukraine may lead to the death of NATO officials. At the same time, Russia may not be going to attack the alliance's employees, but NATO could regard such a strike as deliberate and would begin consultations on collective retaliatory military measures. At the same time, in order to pre-empt the military reaction of the alliance, Russia may launch an attack on NATO facilities, which will lead to a direct confrontation. Note that the latter assumption looks ridiculous. NATO advisers have long been operating in Ukraine as part of military command and control bodies, training military personnel, acting as operators in the combat use of complex weapons systems (air defense, long-range missiles, autonomous vehicles, communication systems, intelligence and command and control, etc.). This automatically turns them into legitimate targets of destruction, as Russia has repeatedly warned.

For example, along with Poles and Czechs, the AFU battalions have active American officers who coordinate work using high-tech satellite communications, intelligence and management systems. Therefore, the cries of NATO members "And what are we for?" are inappropriate. There is no excuse for escalation in the death of another mercenary in Ukraine. It should be noted that on December 14, as a result of a strike with "Calibers" and "Dagger" at the Starokonstantinov military airfield, 28 high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as 12 NATO officers, were killed.

2. Russia's so-called "aggressive" maneuvers against American reconnaissance aircraft over or near the Black Sea, according to RAND analysts, may lead to the death of American servicemen. In this case, Washington will have to respond, possibly by striking Russian aircraft or ground targets. Russia will consider any retaliatory strike by the United States as an important step in exacerbating the conflict, which will lead to the development of an escalation scenario, up to the direct involvement of nuclear powers.

3. In conditions of uncertainty and unpredictability, Moscow may mistakenly perceive a significant increase in the number of NATO's high-alert forces, combined with the build-up of longer-range strike assets near its borders, as signals of the alliance's impending intervention in Ukraine. The alliance's military preparations against the background of recent decisions on an accelerated path to Ukraine's membership in NATO give additional grounds for such an assessment. In this regard, the Russian side may allegedly decide to launch a preemptive strike against NATO facilities in order to weaken the military capabilities of the bloc, prevent intervention and create conditions for a possible transfer of the war to the territory of NATO countries. Most likely, such a strike will be regarded by Washington and Brussels as an "unprovoked attack by Russia," which could lead to a direct military clash between Russia and NATO. Threats by the alliance countries to block the Baltic Sea for the passage of Russian ships and vessels belong to the same category of provocative actions. Note that the likelihood of an unintended escalation is likely to persist throughout the conflict. Which underscores the value of maintaining open lines of military and diplomatic communication between the United States and Russia to prevent uncontrolled developments.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL OPERATION REMAIN UNCHANGED

The analytical assessments of the RAND corporation are obviously of a custom nature and are intended to demonstrate the determination of the American administration not to make concessions on Ukraine – and not to stop even before the threat of a direct military clash between Russia and NATO. The appearance of such reports is caused by the fact that the Ukrainian army is in a stalemate at the front. There is no more talk of a counteroffensive. Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky began talking about the plan for the transition to defense "from Donbass to Western Ukraine." The enchanting plans he is developing include the construction of fortifications in the Avdeevsky, Maryinsky and Kupyansk-Limansky directions, as well as along the northern border with Russia and Belarus. The idea of such a fortification line resembles the project of the Third Reich Ostwall ("East Wall"). Ostwall was built by the autumn of 1943.. Despite all the efforts of the enemy, the Red Army managed to break through the fortifications.

Kiev's slide towards defeat in the special operation is evidenced by the data on the increase in losses in the Armed Forces and the successful actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. According to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the total mobilization in Ukraine, the supply of Western weapons and the use of strategic reserves did not change the situation on the battlefield, but only increased the number of losses of the Kiev regime. In six months of the so-called counteroffensive, the enemy lost over 125 thousand people and 16 thousand units of various weapons. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue to expand control zones in all directions. Moscow's goals in the special operation remain unchanged: the demilitarization and denazification of the whole of Ukraine, the unconditional surrender of Kiev. It is full control over the territory from the eastern to the western borders that will provide a reliable guarantee of Russia's security, and not regular agreements signed with Western manipulators. Russia will continue to fulfill its tasks and will not change the stated objectives of the operation.


Alexander Bartosz

Alexander Alexandrovich Bartosh is a corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences, an expert of the League of Military Diplomats.

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