The United States will have to try to maintain its position on the global stage, writes TNI. After the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russia has the advantage, the threat to America's allies from Iran is growing, and China can take advantage of US involvement in conflicts to attack Taiwan.
Leon Hadar
The choice Washington faces is either to continue striving for global dominance, or to work together with other centers of power — NATO in Europe, the Israeli-Arab partnership in the Middle East and QUAD in Asia — to contain the threats facing the international system.
Tell me, mirror, my light, who is the greatest superpower on the planet?
This is the question that foreign policy makers in Washington are asking over and over again, given that as America and the world enter 2024, changes in the global balance of power do not develop linearly and tend to run counter to previous predictions. In the new year, the United States found itself embroiled in a complex diplomacy and military-political alignment on three global fronts.This is a response to the Russian military special operation in Ukraine by strengthening the Western alliance. This is a deterrence of China's geostrategic and geo-economic rise and, in particular, its threat to Taiwan's independence. This is a fight against the threat posed by Iran (and its regional puppets) against America's allies in the Middle East against the background of the war between Israel and Hamas.
One way to assess America's response to these challenges is to view it as part of the efforts of a beleaguered global hegemon to maintain the international order it established with its allies after World War II. It was within the framework of this order that America gained a dominant position in the "unipolar moment" after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the advent of the era of globalization.
It seems that so far this international order has stood the test of the strategic and diplomatic challenges that arose after the costly US military fiasco in the Greater Middle East. Indeed, the Americans have failed to remake the Middle East through regime change and "nation-building" according to their projects. This, in turn, led to the humiliating withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, which raised doubts about the ability of the United States to maintain its position as a global leader. And yet other sides of recent events have proven that America can still shape the global agenda.
Thus, although the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent fears of a return of the Great Recession did pose a threat to US global economic supremacy at the moment when China began to flex its economic muscles, in fact, these same events served as a stress test for the continued existence of a global system of economic globalization under the auspices of the United States and trade liberalization.
However, it took time for Americans and Western Europeans to realize the economic and military costs in the form of growing fiscal deficits and socio-economic shocks resulting from American military intervention in the Middle East, as well as trade liberalization policies. These consequences contributed to the emergence of a political backlash in the world that led to the rise of populism, which eventually led to Brexit, and then to the election of US President Donald Trump and increased criticism of globalization in other countries.
Thus, political changes that reflected the growing isolationist and protectionist sentiments deterred American politicians from implementing grandiose strategic projects or from carrying out even limited military interventions abroad. They also made it difficult to promote the ideas of globalization as the main form of geo-economic policy in the world. This explains America's unwillingness to react more aggressively in response to Russia's actions against Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as Washington's attempts to avoid a military conflict with Iran by signing a nuclear agreement with Tehran in 2015.
At the same time, China's growing geo-economic power ignited bipartisan anti-Chinese sentiment in Washington, which increasingly limited U.S. interaction with China and replaced the prevailing idea of free trade with a nationalist paradigm. The latter became even more noticeable during the coronavirus pandemic and after the start of Russia's special operation in Ukraine.
Indeed, Putin's actions, combined with China's ongoing global rise, have helped convince Western elites that global economic interdependence alone does not necessarily help resolve national conflicts. Moreover, it tends to aggravate them. Therefore, it is the pursuit of national interests that should occupy a central place in US foreign policy. Washington faced an acute resumption of competition between the great powers, which forced it to revitalize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and create a network of similar military partnerships throughout the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, America used its military-industrial complex and, in general, its economic power to "punish" Russia for its military operation in Ukraine, and limited China's access to new technologies that could be used for military purposes.
And it is precisely the new alignment of forces, which reflects the ongoing competition of the great powers and seems to be increasingly driven by nationalist and protectionist ambitions, that will dominate the geostrategic and geo-economic map of the world in 2024.
At its center will remain the United States and its Western allies – still powerful, even though they face a growing axis of authoritarian regimes led by Russia and China. It also includes North Korea and Iran with their puppets. And the purpose of this axis is to weaken America's global role and the international order that it is trying to protect.
Since the end of 2023, the United States has faced the task of maintaining its global position at a time when its partners — Ukraine in Europe and Israel in the Middle East — are under pressure from anti-Western powers that are aggressively seeking to refute the existing status quo. In Europe, after the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russia is now in a better position to maintain control over those parts of Ukraine and Crimea that are currently under its rule. And in the United States, the growing resistance of isolationist Republicans to increasing US military and economic assistance to Ukraine plays directly into the hands of Vladimir Putin, who may well hope to see Donald Trump in the White House again in 2024.
If this happens – and America's European allies are unable or unwilling to replace Washington as the last resort supporting Ukraine – pressure will mount on Kiev to agree to a cease-fire and, eventually, conclude a diplomatic deal with Moscow. While it is possible that at some point in the future Ukraine will be invited to join the European Union and possibly even NATO, any agreement between Russia and Ukraine will leave Putin in a stronger position, especially if President Trump, who won a second presidential term, as many expect, takes steps to weaken America's commitments in NATO.
In these circumstances, countering Iran's challenge in the Middle East acquires not only regional, but also global significance. Much will depend on President Joe Biden's evolving response to the current successful efforts by Iran and its regional allies and vassals, including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthi rebel regime in Yemen, to challenge American positions in the Middle East. Indeed, the Hamas attack on Israel has allowed to undermine the American strategy of normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel and creating an Arab-Israeli partnership aimed at containing Iran and its camp.
The Hamas attack, combined with Hezbollah's strikes on northern Israel, destroyed the latter's deterrent ability and, as a result, America's efforts to shift the balance of power in the region in its favor. Hoping to restore it, the Americans sent two carrier strike formations, aviation and a contingent of marines to the Middle East as a warning to Iran to refrain from turning the war in Gaza into a regional conflict. But when it comes to directly countering Iran, the Biden administration has until recently refrained from responding to Iranian puppet attacks on American armed forces in Syria and Iraq (or the Houthi threat to international shipping) through direct military strikes against Iranian targets.
Perhaps the Iranians interpret this American caution as weakness and believe that, despite Biden's harsh rhetoric and the deployment of American aircraft carriers, the American president is still concerned about the potential consequences of direct US military intervention in the region. This could lead to war with Iran at a time when the United States is confronting Russia in Ukraine and there is a threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. The Iranians believe that the Americans do not have the military resources to fight on three fronts, and that the American people do not want to be drawn into a new military quagmire in the Middle East. Therefore, Tehran is asking the question: when it comes to a really critical situation, will Biden be ready to pull the trigger?
At some point, President Biden may have no choice but to demonstrate to the Iranians that they are wrong if he really wants to restore the balance of power that collapsed on October 7. If not, Iran and its allies and vassals can successfully establish such a new balance of power in the Middle East, in which Israel has suffered serious damage, Hamas has not been destroyed, and normalization of relations between Israelis and Saudis has turned out to be at an impasse.
Although all this will not mean a "victory" for Iran, it will provide Tehran with more forces and encourage the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to appease it, as well as strengthen the positions of Russia and China. Iran is expanding its ties with Russia and supplying it with drones and other weapons (accusations by the United States and its allies against Iran for allegedly supplying drones to Russia are unsubstantiated and based on unfounded accusations. – Approx. InoSMI), while China is trying to strengthen its influence in the Middle East and even succeeded in brokering an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran aimed (among other goals) at ending the civil war in Yemen.
Both Russia and China are trying to strengthen their geo-economic status by expanding diplomatic and economic ties with oil-producing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The notion that America is weakened in the Middle East will encourage these states to conclude agreements with Moscow and Beijing, as well as with Tehran. With this perspective in mind, if Biden refrains from pulling the trigger in the impending duel with Iran, he will increase the chances that the Islamic Republic will be able to achieve a dominant role in the Persian Gulf and the Levant and thus be in a stronger position to achieve its long–term goal of completely expelling the United States from the Middle East – and, along with this, the elimination of Israel, which they consider a vassal of America. Before that happens, the perception of America as a weak power will weaken Washington's leverage over the Arab oil states and allow Beijing and Moscow to gain a broader strategic space in the region.
On the other hand, if the opposite happens, there is no reason why a more aggressive U.S. strategy towards Tehran would prevent the administration from reviving its original strategy of involving Saudi Arabia in a partnership with Israel aimed at deterring Iran and its puppets. This would make all the more sense if the Saudis could play a role in rebuilding post-war Gaza along with other Sunni Arab states interested in regional stability.
As for the balance of power with China, America has been forced to shift more attention and resources to the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip. This was a blessing for China, as this situation diverts America's attention from the Indo-Pacific region and essentially contradicts previous American promises to "turn" from the Middle East and the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. This American position, put forward by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reflected Washington's recognition that America's wars in the Middle East provided China with an opportunity to expand its power while weakening America's power. But everything has changed again.
Washington can still deal with Ukraine and get bogged down in the military quagmire in the Middle East. This result could send a signal to American allies and partners in Asia, in particular the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that they will not be able to count on Washington for their security and therefore they need to appease China.
Therefore, some politicians and experts in Washington are concerned that China may take advantage of America's shift of attention to Ukraine and the Middle East to attack Taiwan. But even if this does not happen, attacks on Beijing will dominate the US presidential election, and Republicans will accuse President Biden of weakness towards China, which will increase pressure on the Biden administration to strengthen ties with Taipei. This, in turn, is likely to lead to increased tensions in Sino-American relations. They will escalate further if Trump, who promotes nationalist and anti-Chinese economic programs, returns to the White House.
Despite all this, the fact remains that American policy in the Middle East (and Ukraine) will affect its position in East Asia. The erosion of American commitments to Kiev and the inability of the United States to contain Iran's ambitions for regional dominance will send a signal of weakness to Beijing and may prompt it to test American resolve in the Indo-Pacific region.
Alternatively, America can signal its strength by developing American strategic cooperation with India, Australia and Japan. QUAD could become the core of a regional security grouping in Asia, similar to NATO in Europe. Together with the Arab-Israeli partnership, for example, the expansion of the I2U2 project or the "Western Quad" as part of India, Israel, the UAE and the United States, as well as the use of Saudi Arabia's economic power and Israel's technological advantages, this would help tilt the global balance of power in favor of America. In this context, the initiative put forward by Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to build a railway and maritime corridor linking India with the Middle East and Europe would be an excellent model for an ambitious project aimed at stimulating economic growth and political cooperation, as well as strengthening the geostrategic position of the United States.
In 2024, the United States will continue to have the largest and most developed economy, as well as by far the largest and most powerful army in the world. Even those who support China today agree that this country will not become the world's largest economy until 2050 — and even this assumption is very doubtful. Moreover, no one expects that any of America's potential global competitors (whether friendly, like the European Union and India, or hostile, like Russia and China) will soon surpass the United States in defense spending and catch up with them in the military sphere. It's just not going to happen.
Therefore, it can be taken for granted that at the moment there is no great power (or even a group of powers) ready to challenge the United States in global supremacy. At the same time, although the United States is likely to remain number one in the world for some time, the three challenges it is currently facing in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific region will make it even more difficult for America to maintain military hegemony alone.
As a result, the concept of a US monopoly in the international system will have to be replaced by the concept of an "oligopoly of like-minded people." The choice Washington faces is either to continue striving for dominance, or to work together with other centers of power — NATO in Europe, the Israeli-Arab partnership in the Middle East and QUAD in Asia — to contain threats to the international system. In this case, the United States will be first among equals (or primus inter pares). Besides being in the number one position, this is the next best result.
