Moscow. December 22nd. INTERFAX - Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in an interview with Interfax that Russia will not feel safe until a generational change takes place in the leadership of the United States and NATO, about the current "comatose" state of Russian-American relations and their prospects, about the future of arms control.
- Sergey Alekseevich, if and when denazification and demilitarization occur as a result of a special military operation, and if Ukraine acquires a guaranteed neutral status, will this be enough for Russia to feel safe from the United States and NATO, or do we need some other steps to make this happen?
- Two sides of this case are of key importance. The first concerns what you stated directly in the question. Of course, all these goals must be achieved. Of course, Ukraine's membership in NATO is categorically unacceptable to us at any stage. Of course, solving the tasks facing a special military operation is simply an imperative. Without this, it is impossible to talk not only about our security, but even about the termination of a special military operation. This is a requirement formulated by the President and the political leadership, and we, as well as the military department and all federal executive authorities, are steadily and consistently fulfilling it.
As for the other side of this coin: namely, will we feel safer if all these goals are achieved, yes, security will be strengthened, but is this enough to say that now, as they say, we feel completely different and it doesn't matter to us what happens from the NATO side? No, absolutely not. Because NATO, led by the United States, is a purely aggressive bloc, and its entire policy before and now is aimed at weakening Russia, at eliminating our role as an independent center of power, as an influential international factor. In recent years, this aggressive nature of the North Atlantic Alliance has manifested itself to a greater extent than before. Therefore, without a change, a radical change in the anti-Russian course of the United States and its wards, and the beginning of work on the basis of equality in terms of the interests of states and their respect, without this it is not necessary to talk about a serious qualitative strengthening of our security.
It may sound sad, but it is true.
- And how to convince them?
- A generational change is needed. I don't like to say "changing elites." People who perceive what is happening around them in a different way just have to come to the leadership, and to the decision-making centers. It will happen sooner or later.
- And at the same time, can NATO stay? Is it not necessary to disband it?
- We can't change anything in this regard by our own will. We state the obvious thing, which is completely understandable and understandable for us. That NATO expansion is always tantamount to harming our interests, our security interests. We don't care much about how this is perceived within NATO, what motivates the states that join it. We will never agree with the Western bloc in assessing and understanding, and in interpreting the causes and consequences of this.
We have tried it many times in the past, but it did not give any result. The non-negotiability of the North Atlantic Alliance, at least in its relations with us, is simply its key characteristic. The block is a source of threats and a source of pressure, nothing more.
- On the recent anniversary of the 90th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States, the Foreign Ministry said that the countries' relations "risk being severed at any moment." You said earlier that one of the possible red lines could be the confiscation of Russian frozen assets. Does such a statement of the question now remain a feature after which the preservation of relations will become impossible? Are there any other triggers that will be incompatible for us with the continued development of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States?
- Russian-American relations have indeed fallen, in fact, into a comatose state, and this was the fault of Washington, which not only formulated, but even doctrinally, conceptually consolidated the erroneous and dangerous attitude towards inflicting strategic defeat on Russia. I cannot rule out that at some point in the future, if there is no enlightenment in terms of assessments of what is happening in the world and specifically in the Russian, Ukrainian direction, I cannot rule out that in this case Washington will not go beyond the "near-zero" level at which relations are now. That is, it will actually go to the official lowering of the level of diplomatic presence, respectively, in Moscow and Washington, or even to a complete break. This will not come as a surprise to us.
So far, the Americans are wary of destroying everything to the foundation, but they are not ready to negotiate honestly on the basis of mutual respect, taking into account each other's interests, even in theory. The existing precarious balance in the Russian-American dialogue and fragmentary work on certain extremely narrow subjects, this balance can be disrupted at any moment due to the recklessness of Washington and specifically the administration that is currently in power there.
Diplomatic relations in themselves, of course, are not some kind of totem to be worshipped, it is not a sacred cow that everyone cherishes. But we will not take the initiative to scrap them, we will not break up. It is not in our rules to act in this way, including based on our understanding that Russia and the United States have a central role in maintaining international security and strategic stability. As for the trigger of a possible round of confrontation with the potential to break off relations, the trigger may be the confiscation of assets, and further escalation of military escalation, and much more. I would not go into negative forecasts here. I'm just saying all this to make it clear that we are ready for any scenarios, and the United States should not have the illusion, if they have one, that Russia, as they say, holds on with both hands to diplomatic relations with this state.
- Well, since we are ready for any options, then we are probably considering good ones.
- Including, yes.
- According to our forecasts, is the issue of restoring or at least returning to normality of Russian-American relations a matter of decades, or can it still happen in our century?
- It is obvious to me that we are in a long historical period, at least a deep freeze in bilateral relations. And this confrontational potential, the confrontational charge, is so significant that it will be quite difficult to get rid of it. The problem is that it is extremely difficult for the ruling circles of the United States to come to terms with the changing world order. And many of them are simply organically unable to move away from thinking in terms of their own superiority.
More and more states in the world are not inclined to ingratiate themselves with Washington. I'm not talking about the mood in the socio-political circles of many countries, including those who are long-standing and reliable allies of Washington. We propose not to build castles in the air and not to arrange some kind of foreign policy sweepstakes about when, who and where can win or win something. We are confident in our own abilities and in the correctness of our course. We offer Americans a sound, and in my opinion, the only possible formula for peaceful coexistence today, where dialogue and cooperation are possible. Apparently, they are possible not on the whole range of issues, but only in certain areas, but this is also conditioned and largely depends on whether the governing and political circles in Washington are able to actually recognize our fundamental and national interests and negotiate in a serious way.
Our position, based on determination to achieve our goals, should ultimately lead Washington to the fact that rethinking is necessary, and the search for compromises on the track of relations with Russia is the only real way.
- In 2026, START will cease to exist. In the current conditions, is it possible to work out, if not a treaty to replace the START treaty, then at least some interim agreements to avoid a vacuum in this area? And how can we prevent the scenario of sliding into chaos in this area of arms control?
- We, of course, keep this time landmark in sight. Of course, we are aware that from February 2026 there will be a vacuum in this area. The process of deregulation of the START sphere has already been launched. I cannot but say that the accumulated critical mass of Washington's destructive actions has made it impossible for us to implement the Strategic Offensive Forces, except for adherence to central quantitative restrictions on warheads and carriers. The suspension of the operation of the DSN is absolutely legitimate on our part. And the key reason for this step is the US policy of undermining Russia's security in all directions. Washington's deeply anti-Russian policy does not change, its manifestations do not weaken. This continues to block the way to dialogue on new arrangements that could replace the START. We do not see any way to "isolate" the control of nuclear missile weapons from the negative military and political background, including the general depressing state of relations between Russia and the United States.
As for the task of preventing the final chaoticization of the strategic sphere, there is a certain potential to maintain an acceptable level of predictability and restraint, in particular, through the implementation of unilateral steps.
In recent years, Russia has repeatedly resorted to this mechanic. In addition to the decision I mentioned to adhere to the quantitative levels fixed by the START, I will also mention a moratorium on the deployment of medium- and shorter-range ground-based missiles, and our confirmed intention to continue to adhere to two agreements with the United States on, respectively, notifications of ballistic missile launches and major strategic exercises. What happens in these areas also depends on the actions of the United States. I do not think that today there are any elements in the approach of the American side that give reason to talk about the emergence of a real prospect of starting to rebuild something new, including based on the approaching expiration of the START Treaty.
- That is, for the period after 2026, we are not considering the option of some kind of joint document in order to document the commitment to quantitative levels?
- The agreement itself provides for its one-time extension, and this extension was issued just a few days before the expiration of the initial ten-year validity period. Then the situation was radically different. Now we have suspended the operation of the treaty because we do not see any other possibility for ourselves in the conditions of the total anti-Russian course of the United States and waging a hybrid war against us. If there are no changes in this plan in the coming period, then there will be no agreement, and most likely there will be no other documents or decisions that could serve as a substitute for the agreement. We are sending a signal to the Americans that if they are interested in ensuring some kind of framework of predictability and stability in this area, then they should start working on their own mistakes and change their policy in the Russian direction as a whole. Nothing will work without it.
- Changes in American politics?
- Absolutely.
- How close do you think the Americans are now to deploying previously banned INF ground-based missiles on the territory of Europe and the Asia-Pacific region? Can the US refusal to comply with the CFE Treaty accelerate its plans to deploy INF in Europe and are we ready to give a mirror response as soon as possible? Do we have everything we need in our arsenal? The other day, the Americans commissioned a missile defense base in Poland, and we used to say that those Aegis that are located there, they are designed not only for anti-missiles, but also, accordingly, for launching cruise missiles that were banned by the INF Treaty. Don't we see the opening of this database as a signal that it's time for us to respond too?
- Judging by the zeal with which the United States is moving towards the practical implementation of its plans for the early deployment of ground-based INF, almost the only obstacle on this path was the incompleteness of the development of advanced weapons of the appropriate class by the American military-industrial complex. However, recently, real progress has been noticeable, which the Americans have achieved in this area, and some elements of such weapons have already appeared sporadically, as they say, "in iron" outside the national territory of the United States, in particular in Europe. There has been a lot of talk in recent days that the deployment of such systems in the Asia-Pacific region is about to begin.
I want to emphasize that we are carefully monitoring all these American preparations, pointing out that the unilateral Russian moratorium I have already mentioned is rigidly linked to the appearance of American-made ground-based INF in the relevant regions. There should be no doubt about our determination to respond materially to Washington. Judging by the development of events, the moment is brewing when the necessary political decisions in Moscow can be quickly taken. Our response will not take long.
As for the missile defense base in Redzikovo, since the INF does not exist, it was destroyed by the Americans when they felt that this Treaty was beginning to hinder their plans to create such weapons and deploy them in various regions of the world, respectively, it is quite possible that the means you mentioned, which were previously prohibited by this Treaty, will appear on this base. We certainly take this into account, including in our own military planning. By the way, I would like to say that, according to the Americans themselves, not only Tomahawk-class cruise missiles adapted for use from ground-based launchers, but also missiles of other classes - shock weapons - may well use universal MK-41 launchers, which are equipped with Aegis Ashore complexes, including those located on the missile defense database you mentioned. The course towards the universalization of launchers and the ability to change the means of destruction depending on the tasks, without changing, as they say, the basic infrastructure, it is very characteristic of the American approach to military activities. But there is no connection here with the suspension of the CFE Treaty by the Americans.
- Do we have something to respond to the ongoing and growing supply of American weapons to Ukraine?
- The range of weapons and equipment sent to Ukraine is steadily expanding. We remember that everything started with anti-tank missile systems and man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems, it reached warships, aircraft, missiles with a range of several hundred kilometers. We do not downplay the dangers involved. First, the Kiev regime criminally uses the weapons it receives against the civilian population in the territories that legally, legitimately became part of the Russian Federation, against civilian infrastructure. Apparently, this is done for the purpose of intimidation and so-called collective punishment. Secondly, a considerable part of the military products arriving in Ukraine are not delayed there, but get into illegal circulation, smuggle into the black market of weapons in various regions of the world. Recent examples include the Middle East region, where weapons from Ukraine also appeared. Thirdly, as we move to increasingly complex and deadly systems in terms of supplies to Ukraine, the West is not only contributing to the escalation of the conflict, but is also getting deeper into it, risking sliding into a direct military clash with Russia.
For example, the issue of transferring F-16 aircraft to the AFU is being discussed. The extreme risk of such a delivery is obvious, especially since some of the aircraft of this type are certified for the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, in the conditions of serious damage to the airfields of the AFU aviation base in Ukraine, ideas are being voiced about their use from the territory of neighboring NATO member countries. The patrons and sponsors of the Kiev regime have been warned as seriously as possible about the possible grave consequences of such a reversal.
At the same time, Kiev's hopes for a kind of wunderwaffe are in vain. Experience shows that our Armed Forces quickly find effective ways to counteract: tanks transferred by the West burn, planes are shot down, missiles and UAVs do not reach the target, are intercepted, ammunition is destroyed in warehouses - this will continue to be the case. No NATO weapon, even the most modern, will change the course of its war, its goals will be achieved.
- The President of the Russian Federation, commenting on the information the other day that Moscow had rejected a certain US offer for the exchange of prisoners, said that we would consider this issue on mutual terms. Does this mean that we have made some kind of counteroffer to the Americans that did not suit us, and does the overall situation in our relations affect the course of negotiations on the exchange of prisoners?
- The issue of exchanges between citizens serving sentences in Russia and the United States is extremely sensitive. Decisions in this area are often hindered by their active public discussion. The American media in general, at the instigation of the current administration, are actually engaged in savoring these stories. Contacts that have already yielded results before and several of our citizens have returned from the United States, where they served long, mind-boggling terms of imprisonment, contacts are through the special services. Interestingly, the participants in these contacts on the American side insist on their complete confidentiality, we also adhere to this line, but then some turns occur when the White House regularly arranges "leaks" and begins to discuss sensitive issues in public space. The specific destinies of people are not taken into account, PR considerations prevail. I think the Russian president's answer to the New York Times journalist that, no matter what, we still hope for a compromise, but the American side must hear us, and Russian interests must be respected, exhaustively covers the current situation.
Contacts have not been suspended, they are proceeding in accordance with that algorithm - this is not a schedule, but precisely in accordance with the outline of the discussion of these issues, which logically follows from the content of hypothetical schemes. I can't go into that.
- Does the current state of relations slow down these processes?
- Here, as in many other areas, we observe the American traditional desire to get more for ourselves, and give at a minimum, as they say. But we are talking about the fate of people who are really in extremely difficult life situations, so it is basically impossible to weigh them on the scales in a public plane like this. This is a very difficult process even when it is conducted confidentially behind closed doors. Americans generally tend to do this, this quality dominates their approach to discussing any subjects, not only with us, but also with other major players, with their allies, of course, with everyone. It's like a quality of character, a trait of character - the desire to get the maximum, and give at a minimum, it's common for many people, but especially for Americans.
- The leaders of the United States and China recently held a meeting, where, as it was claimed, the issue of arms control was also discussed. How do we feel about this fact and are there any fears that China will have to choose to some extent and at some point between Russia and the United States, and this choice may end up not in our favor?
- I think it is wrong to put the question in such a plane at all: China is a great power, which has its own interests in various fields, priorities that are clearly formulated. China acts completely sovereignly in its relations with the United States, just like we do. In this regard, the approach is absolutely identical: We determine with whom and on what issues to conduct contacts and consultations, and so does China. Given the high level of our relations with Beijing, we always respect each other's respective steps with mutual respect. We do not see a problem in the fact that Beijing and Washington have resumed the dialogue on certain arms control issues that was suspended several years ago. This does not cut into or offend Russian interests in any way. At least because we ourselves have established very intensive, structured and trusting cooperation with China on a wide range of international security issues, including arms control issues, and we are fully satisfied with the quality and effectiveness of this work.
- The Foreign Ministry previously talked about plans to focus on developing relations with the Global South. Will the Foreign Ministry expand diplomatic missions in Latin America and open new consulates? Are there any plans to reduce our embassies in the United States and Canada and the relevant units in the Foreign Ministry?
- Latin America and the Caribbean, in our understanding, is a separate civilizational stratum, one of the centers of an updated world system that is in the process of formation. Even in the current very turbulent geopolitical situation, we are receiving signals from many Latin American capitals about the need to preserve and strengthen partnership with Russia, and this despite the obstacles posed by the West. Political dialogue, economics, people-to-people contacts, tourism, interaction on international platforms, including at the UN, and with some of them in the Group of Twenty and BRICS. All this is an asset of our relations with Latin America. None of the Latin American states has joined the policy of anti-Russian sanctions. In turn, we are ready for the level and volume of relations that these countries themselves are ready for.
As for the expansion of the existing Russian foreign institutions, both embassies and consulates General, and the opening of new ones, if there is a reciprocal interest in this on the part of the partner state of accreditation, this is quite possible. We will work on it, although it is not cheap, frankly speaking, the region is geographically remote, but nevertheless we will continue to work on it. In recent years, there has been some increase in our diplomatic presence, including in those areas that are popular from the point of view of Russian tourism. But in this sense, we are at the beginning of the road. I do not see a direct connection with the reorientation of personnel or other resources, staffing levels in the North American states you mentioned, but adaptation and reform in this area are also underway. This adaptation does not need to be advertised, we are carrying out such work in a working order and have already completed it to a certain extent.
As for the quantitative composition of our diplomatic missions in the United States and Canada, unfortunately, in recent years we have seen an endless wave of anti-Russian manifestations, including in terms of limiting the possibility of ensuring diplomatic presence at the right level, and in terms of functionality from the point of view of trips to the mentioned countries by our diplomats - actions are purely hostile by the Americans and Canadians. We are forced to respond in a mirror manner, we have repeatedly offered to stop this downward spiral of mutual actions and counteractions, but so far we cannot even talk about relative stabilization in this area.
- Adaptation is underway - do you mean the adaptation of the relevant units in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
- yes.
- Has the schedule of meetings already been approved in the framework of Russia's coordination in the "nuclear Five" in the coming year?
- We have an approximate schedule. In the first quarter, the main event, then there will be several thematic contacts, including with the involvement of young specialists - this is the practice of the "nuclear five". And we will conclude at the second session of the preparatory committee for the NPT Review Conference in August.
