Moscow. December 16th. INTERFAX - Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko, who oversees the Asian direction, summing up the results of the year, told Interfax in an interview about cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries under Western sanctions and noted the importance of the region for Moscow. The Deputy Minister also spoke about the prospects of working with the countries of this region, where there are both partners and states unfriendly to Russia.
- It has been almost two years since Russia decisively turned to the East. Can we say that the intensification of cooperation with Asian countries has made it possible to overcome the possible consequences of curtailing cooperation with the West? What are the prospects for expanding the range of countries with which we cooperate in the Asia-Pacific region and developing cooperation with those with whom it has already been established?
- The development of relations with Asian countries has always been among the priorities of Russia's foreign policy. To focus on the "turn to the East" would not be entirely correct. In the current geopolitical conditions, when the West has completely isolated itself from our country, the expansion of multidimensional cooperation with the states of the Asia-Pacific region has acquired special importance. This turn towards Asia, which is the epicenter of global economic growth, is of a long-term strategic nature.
This is most evident in the Chinese direction. This year, the relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Russia and China continued to develop actively. In today's turbulent international environment, Moscow and Beijing remained committed to the principles of mutual respect, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and mutual support on issues affecting key national interests.
The "diplomacy of leaders" plays a leading role in the development of the entire complex of bilateral relations. Two Russian-Chinese summits were held (March 20-22 in Moscow and October 17-18 in Beijing), which gave a powerful impetus to deepening bilateral ties and building a more equitable multipolar system of international relations.
Against the background of the freezing of practical ties with Western countries, the dynamics of Russian-Chinese trade continued to increase. In January-November of this year, the Russian-Chinese trade turnover exceeded the $200 billion target set by our leaders for 2024. Russia is already in 4th place in the country's list of China's main trading partners (if you do not take into account the interstate entities - the EU and ASEAN, as well as the regions – Hong Kong and Taiwan), second only to the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. China has been our main trading partner since 2010.
Beijing is Moscow's key like–minded partner on the world stage. The approaches of Russia and China to the fundamental issues of the modern world order and the most significant international problems coincide or are close. The interaction of our countries within the framework of multilateral organizations and forums, primarily in the United Nations, the Group of Twenty, the SCO and the BRICS, is being consolidated. Work is underway to combine the construction of the EAEU and the "One Belt, One Road" with access to the formation of a Large Eurasian Partnership in the future.
We highly appreciate the objective and balanced position of the Chinese side on the Ukrainian issue. On February 24, the Chinese Foreign Ministry published a document "On China's position on the political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis." Many of the provisions of the peace plan put forward by China are in tune with Russian approaches and can be taken as a basis for a peaceful settlement when the West and Kiev are ready for it.
Relations between Moscow and New Delhi have always been self-sufficient and resistant to fluctuations in the geopolitical environment. They are based on mutual respect, trust, equal consideration of each other's interests and the desire to promote a unifying, non-confrontational agenda.
The intensity, openness and content of our political dialogue at all levels is obvious, including within the framework of multilateral formats – the UN, BRICS, SCO, and the Group of Twenty. We speak from common or consonant positions on the most relevant global and regional topics, including the situation in Afghanistan and the Middle East. We are united not only by an understanding of the need to form a polycentric, democratic world order based on strict observance of the norms and principles of international law, but also by a willingness to jointly confront the challenges and threats of the 21st century.
Bilateral trade and economic ties have received a new impetus. Based on statistical data, it is already possible to say that the volume of Russian-Indian trade turnover will reach a new record mark in post-Soviet history by the end of the outgoing year, surpassing last year's achievement. We are successfully working with New Delhi on a number of major projects, such as the construction of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant and the full-scale launch of the North-South international transport corridor. We see the mutual interest of our business communities in developing cooperation in various fields - energy, mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and the information technology sector.
Multifaceted Russian-Iranian relations have become intensive. Regular dialogue is supported by the presidents of our countries, heads of government, security councils, ministries and departments, as well as regions. In this regard, we positively assess the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Moscow on December 7. The high-level talks were extremely informative and reaffirmed the parties' commitment to further deepen practical cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.
One of the key areas of our common efforts is the development of the international North–South transport corridor. We look forward to the successful implementation of the intergovernmental agreement on cooperation signed in Tehran on May 17 to finance the design, construction and supply of goods and services for the creation of the Rasht–Astara railway in Iran. This project will provide seamless railway logistics from the Baltic Sea to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf coast. Next in line is the elaboration of multilateral initiatives, including the improvement of existing and the establishment of new logistics.
The past year has been marked by important events that have written a new page in relations between Russia and the DPRK. Without exaggeration, the historic summit of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Chairman of State Affairs of the DPRK Kim Jong Un at the Vostochny cosmodrome in September this year, negotiations between the foreign ministers of the two states in Pyongyang in October this year, holding the 10th meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation between Russia and the DPRK In November of this year, other contacts at various levels confirmed the mutual desire for further comprehensive cooperation in a difficult international situation. We hope that as the consequences of the pandemic are finally overcome, bilateral relations will continue to develop steadily, including in practical areas, in the interests of the peoples of our countries.
The consistent development of diverse cooperation with Mongolia, our close neighbor and natural strategic partner in Asia, is facilitated by the high dynamics of the political dialogue. In October of this year, bilateral talks at the highest and highest levels took place on the sidelines of international events. Contacts between parliaments have noticeably intensified (an exchange of visits took place in June and September this year), ministries and departments, public organizations, and representatives of the business community. Educational, scientific, cultural and sports exchanges are expanding. Cross-border and interregional ties are being strengthened.
We note the positive dynamics of trade and economic cooperation. Prospects for further expansion of bilateral cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, infrastructure, environmental protection and a number of other areas were agreed upon following the 25th meeting of the Intergovernmental Russian-Mongolian Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation on October 22-24 and the meeting of the Co-chairs on November 29.
Recently, we have noted the intensification of cooperation with Pakistan in almost all areas. It remains among our friendly countries, demonstrating a spirit of constructive cooperation with Russia. Despite traditional ties with the West, as well as serious pressure from Western partners, Islamabad manages to "hold the blow." There is a good pace of political contacts at the highest and highest levels. In particular, the talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistani Prime Minister Anwar ul-Haq Kakar in Beijing in October this year were very useful. The dynamics of business cooperation is growing, including through the supply of Russian oil and wheat to Pakistan. Humanitarian ties with the A.Iqbal Open University are steadily developing.
We see a good prospect in the development of transport and logistics corridors, including the use of Pakistan's transit capabilities. We believe it is important to contribute to the implementation of plans for their integration with the North-South MTC.
Russia has been cooperating fruitfully with the ASEAN countries for a long time. We have established a regular political dialogue, maintain contacts through the security councils and legislative bodies, and carry out exchanges at the level of relevant ministries and departments.
Despite the outright pressure from the West, most of the "ten" states remain in constructive positions and are ready to continue implementing joint projects. A good example is the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the level of diplomatic relations with which was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. A regular rich political dialogue is maintained with this country, as well as multifaceted trade and economic cooperation. The SRV became the first state with which the EAEU signed a Free trade Agreement in 2015.
It cannot be denied that anti-Russian sanctions have complicated our cooperation. However, together we are gradually adapting to the changed conditions. Active work is underway to create new transport corridors and establish secure payment schemes.
Russia's relations with other ASEAN countries are characterized by positive dynamics. In order to give impetus to bilateral trade, economic and investment cooperation, meetings of intergovernmental commissions on trade and economic cooperation with Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines were held this year. Their results showed that our partners are interested in promoting cooperation in such areas as information and communication technologies, the creation of "smart" cities, space exploration, nuclear energy, non-energy applications of nuclear technologies, medicine and pharmacology. At the same time, the "traditional" nomenclature of Russian exports – petroleum products, raw materials, and food products - remains in demand. Sessions of similar mechanisms with Myanmar and Cambodia are scheduled for early next year.
The coincidence or proximity of approaches on priority issues of the global and regional agenda with the ASEAN states serve as the basis for consolidating Russia's interaction with these countries on multilateral platforms.
Relations with other countries of the Indian and Pacific Oceans are developing no less dynamically.
- Among the Asia–Pacific countries, there are those with which relations are practically "frozen" - for example, Japan, Australia, New Zealand. We have not had an ambassador in Japan for a year now, and a petition has been signed in New Zealand on the need to break off relations with Russia. Is there a need to maintain a full diplomatic presence in these countries in such circumstances, or is some kind of optimization possible?
- Maintaining a diplomatic presence is an important tool for the implementation of the Russian foreign policy course, which allows, among other things, to clearly and reasonably convey to the leadership of foreign countries our position on key issues of global and regional security.
With regard to Japan, I can note that working contacts between the Foreign Ministry and embassies have not stopped. In early December of this year, the new ambassador to Moscow, Akira Muto, took up his duties. The head of our diplomatic mission in Tokyo is also scheduled to take over the watch in the near future. At the same time, the resumption of a full-scale interstate dialogue is impossible without the rejection of the current administration of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida from a hostile policy that leads to the final breakdown of bilateral ties and escalation of tension in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. In the meantime, we will continue to respond with the toughest and most sensitive countermeasures for Japan, guided by our own national interests.
Russophobic circles in Australia and New Zealand from time to time throw provocative insinuations into the media about the desirability of lowering the level of Russia's diplomatic presence in the countries of the South Pacific, citing, among other things, the lack of a positive agenda.
We do not intend to initiate this process. Russian representative offices still carry out a large amount of work with compatriots living in these countries (in Australia there are about 90 thousand people, in New Zealand - up to 15 thousand people), who are often subjected to pressure and fraud. If these threats become practical, our response will be "mirrored".
- Russia has stopped negotiations with Japan on a peace treaty. Do the doors remain open for signing an agreement on friendship and cooperation? Do we plan to discuss with Japan in some future the completion of the international legal registration of the state border, or is there no need for this and the issue is closed?
- After the start of a special military operation in February 2022, the Japanese government is pursuing a frankly unfriendly course towards Russia: "packages" of illegitimate sanctions are multiplying, Russophobic sentiments are being purposefully inflamed in Japanese society, joint military activity with the United States and NATO countries is increasing near the Far Eastern borders of our country, including with the development of the use of shock weapons, direct logistical assistance is being provided to the Kiev regime. In such circumstances, we do not see any prospects for continuing the dialogue with Tokyo on concluding a fundamental document – the treaty of friendship and cooperation, which was designed to lay the foundation for long-term good-neighborly relations. The corresponding position is fully reflected in the statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry dated March 21, 2022.
- The West and South Korea express concern about military-technical cooperation between Russia and the DPRK. Do they have any reason for such concern? Is it realistic to develop economic and political relations with South Korea in this regard?
- Recently, Russia has been under attack from the "collective West", which is persistently trying to accuse Moscow of "illegal military-technical cooperation" with Pyongyang, without presenting any evidence. We believe that the reasons for such a painful reaction of our opponents should be sought in the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, as well as the futile attempts by the United States to achieve international isolation of North Korea.
Russia is developing traditionally friendly good-neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with the DPRK in various fields in the interests of the peoples of the two states. This approach is intended to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula. Unlike Washington, which, in an effort to retain its "leader" status, is taking destructive and provocative steps – increasing its military presence, expanding military and political alliances with Seoul, Tokyo and Manila and thereby escalating tensions in the subregion.
Relations between Russia and the Republic of Korea, which are currently going through difficult times, developed in the most constructive way a few years ago, especially in the economic sphere. We have also successfully and productively cooperated on issues of the Korean settlement. Whether we will be able to return cooperation with the Republic of Korea to the trajectory of a partnership beneficial for our countries and peoples depends on Seoul. Russia is ready for this.
- When the Chairman of the State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un, came to Russia, his meeting with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, took place at the Vostochny cosmodrome. The recent launch of a North Korean reconnaissance satellite in Moscow was met without criticism and noted that Pyongyang had previously notified us of these plans. Does this mean that our position on the DPRK's space program has softened? Can we assist Pyongyang in this program?
- Pyongyang's launch of a satellite cannot be considered in isolation from the provocative actions of the United States and its allies, who practically non-stop conduct military exercises in the area of the Korean Peninsula and pump up this region with weapons.
Russia strictly abides by the international obligations imposed by the decisions of the UN Security Council. This does not prevent us from developing mutually beneficial cooperation with the DPRK in those areas that are not complicated by any restrictions. As for space, I am sure that its joint exploration and peaceful exploration serves the interests of all mankind.
- Does the Russian President's return visit to the DPRK remain on the agenda and can it take place next year?
- As you know, during the summit at the Vostochny cosmodrome in September this year, the Chairman of State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un, invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to visit Pyongyang. The invitation was gratefully accepted.
- Does Russia plan to increase humanitarian assistance provided by the UN WFP to the DPRK after the country's borders have been closed for more than two years? Is there any data yet on how much aid has been delivered this year and what are the plans for next year?
- In 2020-2021, the Russian Federation allocated $7 million to provide food aid to the DPRK through the UN World Food Program. This work was interrupted due to the pandemic of a new coronavirus infection. We know that the WFP is currently conducting a probe regarding the possibility of resuming its activities, subject to the final lifting of anti-epidemic measures by the DPRK authorities.
- Has the issue with the North Korean workers who remained on the territory of the Russian Federation before the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, who were supposed to return home within the framework of the UN Security Council resolution, been resolved?
- North Korean citizens who were unable to leave the territory of our country by the deadline set by the UN Security Council resolution due to the closure of the border against the background of the coronavirus pandemic have stopped receiving income in Russian jurisdiction. We proceed from the fact that this issue has been closed, as our country has informed the authorized UN bodies in accordance with the established procedure.
- Has the situation with the problems that arose in mutual settlements between Russia and India been resolved due to the fact that the rupee is a non–convertible currency? Will we continue and expand mutual settlements in national currencies with India?
- I would like to mention a few points regarding mutual settlements with India in national currencies. Measures to increase them began to be taken long before the "sanctions war" unleashed by the Westerners against Russia. Of course, we will continue this process. The relevant departments of our countries have been working for a long time to optimize the payment mechanisms. Restrictions from the United States and its satellites not only did not slow down this process, but, on the contrary, acted as its catalyst.
