But her efforts cannot rule out an escalation of the military conflict.
The Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas claimed responsibility for two rocket attacks on northern Israel from Lebanon in 2023. One of these attacks occurred after a massacre by militants on October 7 in Israel. Evidence indicates that the missiles were launched from bases in southern Lebanon under the control of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah group.
With violent clashes continuing between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip, these testimonies raise questions about further escalation on the "second front" of the current Palestinian conflict. Although Hezbollah's response to the ongoing fighting in Gaza has so far been relatively restrained, the presence of Hamas militants in southern Lebanon increases the likelihood of a "second front" opening. In this case, Hezbollah will have to carefully regulate its relations with Hamas in order to continue the strategy of limited interaction that it has maintained so far.
THE GROWING PRESENCE OF HAMAS IN LEBANON
The military wing of the Hamas movement, known as the Al-Qassam Brigades, said on November 6 that it fired 16 rockets at the northern Israeli cities of Haifa and Nahariya. In total, according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), more than 30 rockets were launched towards Israel in an hour. The remaining 14 missiles were allegedly fired by Hezbollah.
This was the second series of attacks on Israel by Lebanon during 2023. Earlier on April 6, at least 36 small-caliber Grad missiles were fired at northern Israel from southern Lebanon. At that time, it was the largest attack by Lebanon since the end of the 2006 war.
The day after the November 6 attack, Israel launched an aerial counterattack on Hamas' declared "infrastructure facilities" in Lebanon. The latest attacks have forced most residents of the Israeli city of Kiryat Shmona to evacuate, while in Lebanon at least 80 people have been killed so far as a result of Israeli counterstrikes.
The identities of most Hamas militants in Lebanon are unknown to the general public. But it is possible that they were recruited among more than 200 thousand Palestinian refugees currently living in the country. It is noteworthy that most of them are not from the Gaza Strip.
In 2018, Israel appealed to the United Nations to intervene in the situation in southern Lebanon, saying that it had irrefutable evidence of Hamas's cooperation with Hezbollah in setting up rocket factories and "camps for training thousands of militants" there.
Iran's influence on Lebanon is also a source of serious concern for Israeli politicians and the military. It was determined that the rockets used by Hamas during the April 6 attack were of Iranian origin and were supplied either directly by Iran or through local Hezbollah proxies.
It is also worth recalling that at the end of July this year, clashes began in the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, Ein el-Hilweh, between representatives of Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah party and such Islamist groups as Jund al-Sham and Al-Shabab al-Muslim.
The confrontation, which lasted until mid-September, allowed for a new look at the growing presence of Hamas in the country. On September 13, Moussa Abu Marzouk, head of the Hamas International Relations Department, met with a senior Fatah official at the Palestinian mission in Beirut to discuss the ongoing clashes. Despite the fact that the two leaders agreed on the need to end the violence, it was not initially supported by factions on the ground.
It was also claimed that Hamas was not directly involved in the clashes. However, Palestinian officials believe that the group was in contact with Islamist forces on the ground during the fighting.
Thus, it is likely that the clashes in the camp were a proxy battle between Hamas and Fatah, with the former seeking to gain as much influence in Lebanon as possible.
Khalil Harez, the deputy commander of the Al-Qassam Brigades, was killed on November 21 in an Israeli airstrike near the Palestinian refugee camps in Tyre. According to the Hamas group's social media posts, Harez was moving between launch sites. This also indicates the military presence of Hamas in the region. Thus, the likely strengthening of the group's position in Lebanon indicates the ability of Hamas to recruit fighters among the large number of Palestinian refugees in the country.
HEZBOLLAH IS TRYING TO FIND A MIDDLE GROUND
Despite the seemingly obvious and long-term support of the Hamas movement, the reaction of the Hezbollah movement to the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip was relatively restrained.
Despite the launch of rockets at Israeli targets "in solidarity" with the Palestinians in Gaza, as well as the growing hostility towards Israel in diplomatic negotiations, the Hezbollah movement has so far avoided entering into a full-scale war.
For example, in a speech on November 3, Hezbollah leader Syed Hassan Nasrallah said that the attacks on Israeli civilians on October 7 were "one hundred percent committed by Palestinians both in terms of planning and execution." And that neither Iran, Hezbollah, nor any other proxy organization took part in the decision to attack Israel.
It was reported that this speech by Nasrallah, as well as his similar statement on November 11, were met with indignation from many Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. These refugees, like other residents of the country, are disappointed by the apparent inaction of Hamas in the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. It is also important that, against the background of military operations in the region, the living conditions of many Lebanese citizens are rapidly deteriorating. The military actions only exacerbate the long-term economic crisis in the country, and this potentially contributes to the radicalization of the Lebanese population.
Although Hezbollah's military potential has grown significantly since the war with Israel, the fear of a new full-scale attack like the one in 2006 obviously forces the group to exercise forced restraint. This is probably due to the fact that although Hezbollah has the potential to cause serious damage to Israel, its power depends more on the threat it poses. Simply put, the threat of opening a "second front" in this case is still stronger than its possible execution. This suggests that Hezbollah is likely to launch a full-scale attack on Israel only if it faces an existential crisis – such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006.
The threat posed by Hezbollah is also a valuable tool for its Iranian backers, who are demonstrating growing concern about the increased military presence of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
These factors probably limit Hezbollah's commitment to the Palestinian issue, especially given that it is actually opposed to the combined military might of Israel and the United States – this strategic problem has long been shared by other hostile neighbors of Israel. Hezbollah is also well aware that if it becomes more involved in the conflict, it will have to provide its territory in Lebanon to a large number of Palestinian refugees, who are mostly Sunnis in a region dominated by Shiites.
These factors make Hezbollah's position on the Palestinian issue even more difficult for the population inside the country to maintain. By allowing Hamas to deploy a base in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is likely to compensate for the negative sentiments of Palestinian refugees towards the group.
It is also worth noting that the increased presence of Hamas has obviously led to an inter-factional conflict within the Palestinian community in Lebanon. For the Hezbollah group, this can be beneficial for two reasons.
Firstly, this circumstance directed the anger of the refugees away from the group itself. Secondly, it provided the group with good publicity – since Hezbollah was able to assume the role of peacemaker when the conflict became uncontrollable.
Finally, among other things, by arming Hamas in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah and Iran will be able to control its access to the type of small-caliber weapons that they have so far used on the battlefield. These weapons give the group the opportunity to launch limited strikes against Israel in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of an escalation of the conflict.
Thus, Hezbollah seems to be seeking to moderate the ambitions of Hamas, while relying on the concept of strategic restraint.
conclusions
Although it seems from the outside that Hezbollah carefully regulates its relations with Hamas in order to avoid a full-scale escalation of hostilities with Israel, all this does not exclude the possibility of a full-scale military conflict. The assassination in October of a senior Hamas leader in an Israeli strike is evidence that a Hamas-led escalation is possible.
Moreover, carefully building its relations with Hamas, Hezbollah does not take into account the activity of its individual militants in Lebanon. Thus, Hezbollah's ability to protect its own arsenal from potential infiltrations from Hamas or other Palestinian groups is an essential component of its current strategy.
For this reason, the situation on the border between Israel and Lebanon remains extremely unstable. And factors such as the capabilities of Hamas and its relationship with Hezbollah will determine the prospects for further development of the conflict.
Larisa Shashok
Larisa Alexandrovna Shashok is an expert at the Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies of the Higher School of Economics.
