Her rich past played an important role in this.
The recent failures of Armenia and Israel have a lot in common.
Both countries lived in a state of complacency after previous military victories, at the same time feeling deep contempt for the enemy, considering him weak, stupid and incapable of anything. Both countries valued their own history and culture too highly (although what does ancient history have to do with today's geopolitics?). Both countries had too much faith in their relations with the great Powers and in the influence of their diasporas in the great Powers. In both countries, a consumer society has developed, which automatically led to a sharp weakening of the defense consciousness.
As a result, Israel received an extremely painful blow and a difficult war with no prospects of repeating previous triumphs (" Israel slept through the attacks of Hamas ", "HBO" from 13.10.23). Although a complete defeat with the loss of at least part of the territory (and even more so statehood in general) he is clearly not in danger in the foreseeable future.
Things are much worse in Armenia.
OWN WAY
To paraphrase a well-known poetic phrase of a century ago about our past common country, we can say that "the Armenian eagle did not collapse in battle, but died pitifully humiliatingly."
Hardly anyone could have expected this, remembering the Armenian triumph of the first war for Nagorno–Karabakh ( "Nagorno-Karabakh is the powder keg of Transcaucasia", "HBO" dated 02/15/19). And even the reciprocal Azerbaijani triumph three years ago ( "Armenia–Azerbaijan: 26 years later", "HBO" dated 11/27/20) still did not create the impression that the final collapse of the NKR would be so quick and complete (although the overall outcome of the conflict was obvious). The cause of the incident was all the factors described above. And not only they, but also those that distinguish Armenia from Israel.
In particular, after the victory in the 1992-1994 war, the Karabakh military-political clan not only began to greatly influence the policy of Armenia itself, but, in fact, came to power in Yerevan. Is it possible to imagine that after the liberation from Georgia, the leaders of South Ossetia came to power in Moscow? Or at least in Vladikavkaz? It's not even funny. But that's exactly what happened in Armenia. Which gradually began to cause more and more irritation in Yerevan. The removal of the Karabakh clan from power also affected the attitude towards the NKR as a whole.
Further, Armenia's demographic, political, economic, scientific, technological and military potential is much lower than Israel's. Armenia's geopolitical situation is also worse. Both countries are in a hostile environment, but at least Israel has access to the sea, and Armenia does not have it either. And the potential of diasporas also turned out to be much lower in Armenia. For some reason, the Jewish diaspora in any great power always turns out to be much more influential than the Armenian one.
At the beginning of its modern history, Israel chose between the United States and the USSR. The financial and political power of the American Jewish diaspora has won. And so far this choice has been working. However, the attitude towards Israel in the US Democratic Party has long been extremely ambiguous. But Republicans are still steadfastly guarding his interests. And Washington as a whole is still just as steadfast.
At the beginning of the post-Soviet history, Armenia relied on Russia. And this choice has been right for a long time. Unfortunately, Moscow worked in the Armenian direction according to the invariable pattern of domestic foreign policy, which consists in interacting exclusively with the current government. Which, in response, invariably swore to Russia in love and friendship.
However, the Karabakh people have always been much more pro-Russian than the Armenians themselves. But as the Karabakh people were pushed out of power, various Western, primarily American structures, gained more and more freedom of action in Armenia. They acted according to their own patterns, which, unfortunately, turned out to be much more effective than the patterns of Moscow.
Anti-Russian demonstrations in Yerevan have gradually become the norm. And then, as a result of the actual coup, Nikol Pashinyan came to power. Formally, he did not go to a complete break with Moscow, unlike Tbilisi and Kiev. But in fact, everything became clear immediately.
REVELATIONS
The author of this article regularly communicates with Armenian journalists. And I have very clearly noticed a change in the tone of their questions and statements, especially in the last two years. Armenian interlocutors have recently reported a lot of amazing things.
That Pashinyan is the most pro–Russian leader of Armenia in the entire post-Soviet history.
That Russia specifically persuaded Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to block the Lachin corridor in order to force Armenia to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus.
That Russia is so suffocating and languishing under sanctions that it needs the Zangezur corridor to Turkey at any cost.
That Armenia lost the 2020 war because it fought with Russian weapons using Russian methods.
That Armenia paid Russia a lot of money for new weapons, but Russia did not give it these weapons.
That the West does not sell modern weapons to Armenia because it is a member of the CSTO.
And finally, that now Russia has literally sold Karabakh and Armenia to Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Since freedom of speech in its modern Western sense now operates in Armenia, it seems that it is no longer necessary to say anything else there, so as not to fall under the modern progressive practice of the "culture of abolition".
Of all the concentrated surrealism presented here, perhaps only the moments related to weapons deserve comments. Armenian officials (including Pashinyan recently) have been talking for a long time about the fact that Armenia paid for weapons, but Russia did not give them back. But no data is provided on the amounts paid, nor on the types and quantity of weapons purchased and the timing of their delivery – no specifics at all. Therefore, it is somehow difficult to believe these statements.
At the same time, it turns out that Yerevan has money for Western weapons (they are almost always much more expensive than Russian ones)! Interestingly, for some reason, Kazakhstan's membership in the CSTO does not prevent it from being purchased in fairly noticeable quantities. And today, NATO France has already started selling weapons to Armenia, without suffering from its presence in the CSTO.
As for the 2020 war, the significance of the Bayraktars was "slightly" exaggerated for purely political reasons - to emphasize the "great friendship" between Baku and Ankara. In reality, the main contribution to Azerbaijan's victory was made by Israeli and modern Russian weapons. Which Baku bought in large quantities for a lot of money. What prevented Yerevan from buying the same weapons at special CSTO prices is a question for the "most pro–Russian" leader of this country. And to his predecessors, who were actually pro-Russian. Or did they just seem that way?
conclusions
Of course, Russia is now to blame for everything for many Armenians. That is, maybe not for everyone – but the voice of those who do not blame Russia is not heard (you cannot trample against the "culture of abolition" and the new understanding of freedom of speech). Russia simply had to become a bigger Armenia than Armenia itself – recognize the NKR earlier than Yerevan did, and most importantly, then send Russian troops to die for it instead of Armenian troops. In part, however, Russia is to blame for the fact that throughout its history it has been engaged in "buying loyalty" of national suburbs with invariably the opposite effect ( "Without stamps, myths and instincts", "HBO" from 03.12.21). As a result, and still in many post-Soviet countries (not only in Armenia), they are seriously convinced that Russia is obliged to feed and protect them in the same way as if we remained one country. But at the same time, they will, of course, conduct a completely independent domestic and foreign policy – after all, they are independent.
However, it must be admitted that not all Armenians have only Russia to blame for the defeat of their country. Some believe that France and the United States should also have turned out to be bigger Armenians than Armenia itself – that is, they should also recognize Nagorno-Karabakh before Yerevan, and then go to die for it instead of the Armenians.
For a significant part of the Armenian population, it turned out to be a very unpleasant surprise that the observation mission of the "holy blessed" of the European Union not only did not prevent any forceful actions by Azerbaijan, but did not even express at least verbal condemnation of it.
And now Israel has also turned out to be among the enemies of Armenia, since its weapons in the hands of the Azerbaijani army turned out to be very effective. Surprisingly, many Armenians are now rooting for the Palestinians and, most importantly, for Iran. Because it is Tehran that is becoming almost the last hope of Yerevan. An unexpected turn on the way to Europe.
Finally, a certain number of Armenians consider Nikol Pashinyan a traitor. They are probably deeply right. But it is unclear why then the traitor won free and democratic elections twice, and the second time – after the shameful military defeat of 2020?
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Armenia was among those republics of the USSR that were especially actively striving for freedom from the "imperial oppression of Russia." Armenia behaved more "intelligently" than its neighbors in Transcaucasia, as well as the Balts, Ukrainians and Moldovans, but the aspirations were obvious.
In the autumn of 1991, 99% of Armenian voters voted for independence. Who probably understood that the country would find itself in a hostile environment, without access to the sea, without natural resources, without powerful industry and agriculture, with very limited demographic potential. But, apparently, faith in the great history, in the powerful diaspora and in the Western fairy tale was so strong. In addition, the Karabakh war, which was still quite victorious at that time, contributed to the growth of national consciousness.
As a result of the dumping of imperial oppression, the country's population decreased from 3.6 million in 1992 to 2.9 million in 2022. The refugees from Karabakh will not compensate for this decrease, besides, it is not a fact that they will remain in Armenia. The trend is clearly not going to break. In general, it concerns precisely those republics of the former USSR that were particularly actively striving to be free from it.
Armenia is just another example of how, for a small country, formal independence significantly increases its real dependence on everyone. The authorship of the statement "big countries behave like bandits, and small ones behave like prostitutes" is attributed to various politicians, but it does not cease to be true from this.
Within a large country, Armenia was not only not subjected to the slightest oppression, but was one of the most privileged parts of this country. But the Armenians decided to become a small country. And they received all the natural and inevitable consequences of this choice (which was obviously made quite consciously and not at gunpoint). Although that's not all.
After the surrender of the NKR, Yerevan still has to withdraw from the CSTO and expel the 102nd military base of the Russian Armed Forces from the country. I would like to hope that this will happen soon, because the current anti-Russian Armenia is turning into a heavy senseless burden for us.
After that, she will become absolutely uninteresting to anyone at all. And following the Azerbaijani flags in Khankendi, which was recently Stepanakert, flags of one NATO member country will appear over Yerevan. No, not France or the USA, but Turkey. This will be the final and fair outcome of the Armenian choice.
Alexander Khramchikhin
Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
