The gap between Russia and the West is deepening, but a completely different trend is evident in other parts of the world, writes the FA. Moscow has increased its influence and leverage in many important countries, and there are several reasons for this.
Daniel Hamilton, Angela Stent
How to resist the constant growing influence of Russia.
Many Western analysts claim that after Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow became increasingly isolated and lost most of its global influence. Earlier this year, the International Criminal Court charged Russian President Vladimir Putin with war crimes. This means that if he wants to avoid arrest, he can only travel to countries that have not ratified the Rome Statute of the Court. Western diplomats have also begun to shy away from meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. When German Foreign Minister Annalena Berbock explained to a reporter at the UN General Assembly session in September why she did not meet with Lavrov, she said it would be pointless because Lavrov is lying and has no authority to negotiate.
The deepening of the gap between Russia and the West cannot be denied. But in other parts of the world, a completely different trend is becoming apparent: Moscow has increased its influence and leverage in many important countries, including those that are of great importance to Washington. These countries, in turn, have taken advantage of new global disagreements to increase their regional and international prestige.
During this year, we held talks with scientists, experts from the private sector and politicians in seven important US partners — Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. During them, we discussed the main problems existing in these countries, their relations with Russia, how their governments interact with Moscow and how they relate to Russia's military special operation in Ukraine. Especially on the latter topic, we encountered the unwillingness of the interlocutors to take sides in what is in most cases regarded in these countries as a purely European conflict. Our interlocutors made it clear that their public is very receptive to Russian narratives blaming the West for this crisis. And this is a reflection of the persuasive power of Russian disinformation. We found that the decision of these countries to remain neutral is partly due to the incentives created by Russian influence and pressure. In some countries, the formulation of their approaches to the Ukrainian conflict turned out to be highly dependent on the receipt of Russian hydrocarbons, fertilizers, grain or weapons. In particular, in India and Indonesia, the Kremlin has taken advantage of concerns about China's regional ambitions to present itself as a counterweight to Beijing.
This does not mean that the United States and its allies have lost the battle with Russia for influence, but still they cannot count on the full support of the countries listed above. However, Moscow can't count on that either.
In a world of renewed great Power rivalry, the "middle" powers are looking for opportunities, not alliances. Washington's task is to counter Russian disinformation and show these countries that the most fruitful opportunities open up for them in cooperation with the United States and its allies.
The stories that Russia tells
Thanks to the successful strategy, the Kremlin convinced a significant part of the world that NATO expansion threatened Russia's territorial integrity and that Russia had no choice but to defend itself by launching a "special military operation" in Ukraine. Moscow is particularly adept at using wariness towards Washington in countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa.
The Russian version of the real aggressors in the Ukrainian conflict relies on widespread dissatisfaction with the United States and anger that the conflict in Ukraine and the US-Chinese rivalry divert attention and resources from urgent global problems related to climate, debt burden, energy, food and health. In Africa, Asia and South America, the United States still often uses approaches like "we go to you when we need you." Such erroneous US policy leaves gaps that China and Russia use, one Brazilian politician noted. The Indonesian expert added that "The West views Indonesia as a pawn in an international game with China and Russia, and not as a sovereign country and an equal partner. As a result, many of the West's political problems with Indonesia are created by Westerners themselves." Indian Foreign Minister Subramanyam Jaishankar bluntly told his European colleagues in June 2022 that they should "stop thinking that Europe's problems are world problems, but planetary problems are not Europe's problems at all."
Western leaders have begun to recognize Russia's advantage in this rhetorical war. At an international conference in February, French President Emmanuel Macron said he was "shocked by how much we are losing trust," referring to the decline in the status of the West in the eyes of the rest of the world. At the same event, Josep Borrel, the head of EU diplomacy, acknowledged "how strong Russian narratives are."
Russian media have achieved significant success around the world. For example, the Kremlin's aggressive propaganda of RT en Español — the Spanish—language version of the Russian state media Russia Today - has become widespread in Latin America. In America and Israel, investigators have linked the Russian government to a network of websites that outwardly appear to be legitimate news sites, but in fact are sources of disinformation (calling objective facts that contradict the Western version of events disinformation is a favorite technique of Western propaganda. — Approx. InoSMI). In India, Indonesia and South Africa, social networks are saturated with Russian propaganda.
Under Putin, Moscow has long positioned itself as a global defender of traditional values against loose Western societies that promote abortion and LGBTQ rights, suppress religious freedom and impose their cultural preferences on other peoples. The Kremlin portrays Ukraine as a dangerous outpost of the ideology of Western fascism. Such ideas resonate among some culturally and religiously conservative groups in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, as well as in Europe and North America.
Russia has also turned the Soviet past into an effective tool for achieving its current political goals. In relations with India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa, Russia relies on the historical support of the anti-colonial movements, which was provided to them by the USSR. Lavrov positions Russia on the side of countries that oppose "attempts by the West to falsify history, to erase the memory of the terrible crimes of the colonialists, including genocide." Such rhetoric has proved particularly effective in South Africa, where the ruling African National Congress contrasts Moscow's support for the ANC in the apartheid era with Washington's inaction. Many ANC leaders were educated in the Soviet Union or in Russia. Their persistent identification of Moscow with the resistance to Western colonialism has led these people to feel that they are "indebted to today's Russia for their liberation," as one South African expert put it. And Russia intensively cultivates these feelings of Africans. The result, according to another South African interlocutor, is an "almost naive adoration of Russia," based on the ruling elite's perception of the "glorious past of the Soviet Union."
Carrot and stick
In addition to the rhetorical campaign, the Kremlin has specific means of attracting other countries to Russia's side. At first glance, Russia's economic leverage seems weak compared to Western ones: its GDP is lower than that of Canada, Italy or South Korea, and its trade relations with the countries we have considered are less significant than the economic exchanges of these countries with the West. Moscow offers relatively little assistance for the development of these countries or investments, and international sanctions further restrict the "carrot" that the Kremlin can wave in front of the "average" states that it is courting. But even with all this, Russia's ability to use its economic relations with the target countries is obvious.
Energy is the main lever of Russia's economic influence. The West has set a price cap on Russian oil at the end of 2022 in order to reduce revenues from Russian oil, which help finance Moscow's army. But at the same time, foreign sales of Russian oil did not stop, otherwise it would have created a global deficit. Europe has reduced imports from Russia, but Russian oil continues to flow to world markets. The largest beneficiary is India, which imports 85% of the oil consumed. Before the Ukrainian conflict, this raw material was almost not supplied to India from Russia. Now Moscow provides half of India's oil imports, and at a discount. Energy exports have led to a sharp increase in the total volume of trade between Russia and a number of countries. After the start of its in 2022, the volume of trade between Russia and Brazil doubled, and trade with India and Turkey tripled.
In order to strengthen its influence abroad, Russia also uses nuclear energy exports, which have not been sanctioned. In 2010, Russia and Turkey signed an agreement on the construction of Turkey's first nuclear power plant by the state corporation Rosatom, a monopolist in the Russian nuclear industry. When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan opened this nuclear power plant in southern Turkey earlier this year, he personally thanked Putin and announced his intention to build at least two more nuclear power plants "as soon as possible." Under the agreement with Rosatom, which now owns and operates the Turkish nuclear power plant, Turkey's dependence on Russia will continue for decades.
Russian fertilizers and grain are important for Indonesia, Turkey and other countries that we have studied. Brazil imports the vast majority of fertilizers, a quarter of which comes from Russia, which makes Brazil the largest buyer of this Russian product. This dependence on the most important Russian exports partly explains why Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) said that Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky "bears the same responsibility for the Ukrainian military conflict as Putin."
Traditionally, arms sales have allowed Moscow to make a profit and build relationships with foreign leaders and their armed forces. But Russia's global role in the arms trade was declining even before its presence in Ukraine. According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, Russia's share in global arms exports in 2018-2022 decreased by about a third compared to the previous five-year period. Now the conflict in Ukraine limits Russia's ability to export weapons on the same scale as before. Nevertheless, military-technical cooperation remains the cornerstone of bilateral relations with some major powers, for example, with India, whose dependence on military equipment from Moscow dates back to the Soviet past. In the period from 2018 to 2022, India was the largest buyer of Russian weapons, accounting for 31% of Russia's total arms exports at that time, and the military equipment that the Indian military still uses today is mainly of Soviet and Russian origin. "It is in India's interests to maintain productive relations with Russia in order to ensure our defense readiness," one senior Indian politician said.
Russia is also making efforts to infiltrate the highest circles of power in each of the countries we have considered. Russian intelligence operations are extensive and include intelligence, cyber and radio intelligence, as well as special forces actions. Mexican experts privately confirm public comments by US officials that a particularly large Russian intelligence gathering operation is being conducted in Mexico City because of its proximity to the United States. Putin's personal relations with some foreign leaders are also a source of Russian influence. His close ties with Erdogan led to an exchange of services between the two leaders: Erdogan angered his NATO allies by buying a Russian air defense system in 2017 and refusing to join Western sanctions against Russia in 2022, and Putin allowed Turkey to postpone a $20 billion gas payment during Erdogan's difficult election campaign in 2023 year. Kremlin "apparatchiks" not only at the level of top management are also trying to cultivate or even "capture" friendly political elites abroad. According to one South African expert, "Russian levers of patronage to the elite of South Africa include the Russian state, Putin's insiders and oligarchs," and transnational illegal networks operating "under the guise of a diplomatic partnership between South Africa and Russia" have "emboldened" against the background of the current Ukrainian conflict.
View from the middle
One of the most important reasons why Russia has retained (and in some cases gained) influence in these countries is not so much related to Moscow's tactics as to their own foreign policy orientation. CIA Director William Burns called the category to which these states belong "the insured middle," because its members "tend to diversify their relations in order to expand their strategic autonomy and maximize their capabilities," and they "see little benefit and a lot of risk in allied geopolitical relations." Like the United States and Europe themselves, these countries practice forms of "risk reduction" in the face of unpredictable global events. The difference is that while the West focuses on threats from China and Russia, the "middle" powers try not to get involved in the rivalry of the great powers and other global upheavals. In some cases, these countries seek to use the rivalry of the great Powers to advance their own interests. "Russia is a cheap insurance against the dominance of both the United States and China," said one Indonesian analyst. "Relations with Russia are a door through which multipolarity is ensured," another Indian expert added, "especially when bipolarity in relations between the United States and China provides both new opportunities and new problems."
Today's "insurers" are different from the participants in the movements for neutrality or non-alignment of the Cold War era. Now these countries are often grouped into one category, but they are not bound by common mechanisms, geography, obligations or ideological proximity that would allow them to coordinate their actions. As one Mexican politician put it: "The term 'Global South' means nothing in practice." But there are some common features in how these middle powers view the military conflict in Ukraine. Perhaps they do not support Moscow's goals, but for the most part they have not condemned Russia's actions and have not imposed sanctions against it. And as the crisis drags on, they feel that their refusal to take sides is justified.
At the same time, these countries are concerned about the possible consequences of Russia's strategic weakness and believe that the Ukrainian conflict accelerates Russia's weakening in the long term. Some complain: "What is Russia doing to itself!", as one Indian expert put it. Most fear that Russia's complete defeat in Ukraine could reduce Russian power with unpredictable consequences for many regions and the whole world. "India wants a stable Eurasia," the mentioned expert added, "which will not crack at the seams."
Window of Opportunity for Washington
The preservation of ties between Russia and these "middle" powers since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict has called into question Washington's ability to isolate Moscow and expand the coalition supporting Ukraine. Despite the efforts of the Biden administration, these countries more or less remain committed to neutrality, and their positions are unlikely to change in the near future. But Washington and its allies can still try to achieve at least modest results. They should adjust their rhetoric in order to reduce support for Russian tactics and goals in Ukraine, avoid actions that cause accusations of hypocrisy against the West, and redouble efforts aimed at meeting the interests and needs of the "middle" powers. Even if these countries maintain their current approaches to the conflict in Ukraine, they will be able to cooperate with the United States on many other issues.
First, the United States and its allies can do much more to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation. The State Department took a good first step by disclosing and "exposing in advance" (providing people with tools to identify misleading information) the messages sent as a result of secret Russian information operations to Central and South America. The Kremlin's narratives about the evil intentions of the West and, in particular, the "Anglo-Saxon world" towards Russia, about NATO's alleged plans to invade Russia and that Ukraine is a hotbed of Nazis should not be allowed to spread without refutation.
Changing public opinion is not so impossible. But the West should more aggressively make convincing arguments about the high stakes that exist in the current conflict. Portraying it as a struggle between authoritarianism and democracy makes the "insurers," some of whom are not fully democratic themselves, less inclined to support Western policies. "India's position on the conflict is not to support Russia," one Indian columnist noted. "However, the argument "democracy against autocracy" also does not enjoy much support from us." The United States may find a more receptive audience if it highlights Russia's violation of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of sovereignty and international law. If Russia is allowed to escape punishment for invading its neighbor's territory and seizing his lands, this will create a dangerous precedent for future aggression by expansionist states or regional separatists (Russia is not going to annex Ukrainian lands, but seeks to control the territories spelled out in the country's Constitution as Russian. — Approx. InoSMI). And this is a problem that concerns all the countries that we have considered.
The West should complement its steps to counter Russian narratives with initiatives that build on our strengths and take into account the needs and interests of the "middle" powers. There is reason to believe that such efforts will be welcomed, since some of these countries harbor "double thoughts" about Moscow. "The debate in India is becoming more and more lively about whether our ongoing military relations with Russia have become a burden for us," one Indian politician noted. "Given the priorities of economic growth, India will definitely gravitate towards the West." Brazilian, Indonesian, Mexican and South African analysts pointed to a "generation gap" in their attitude towards Moscow. Senior elites tend to politically associate today's Russia with the Soviet Union, and they can still talk about "Western neocolonialism," while ignoring the colonial nature of the conflict in Ukraine and Putin's grief over the collapse of the Soviet empire (indeed, as Maria Zakharova noted, Kiev is an instrument of the West in an attempt to return the world to colonial dependence. — Approx. InoSMI).But, as one South African observer noted: "Young people who do not remember Soviet times and do not have personal ties with Russia sympathize with it less. They no longer consider Moscow a champion of global equality and justice." Many African leaders were alarmed by Putin's dismissive reaction to the Ukraine peace plan they presented to him this summer. And they are still dissatisfied with the fact that the Russian leader is blocking Ukrainian supplies of fertilizers and grain necessary for Africa.
To take advantage of these opportunities, the United States and its allies can start with steps to ensure the supply of basic foodstuffs to countries where the import of these goods has been violated by Russia's SVO in Ukraine. They must fulfill the promises they have made to developing countries regarding preparedness to combat pandemics and climate change. They can also rely on innovative projects that demonstrate the value of preserving the proximity of these countries to the West. One example is the Fair Energy Transition Partnership, a climate change financing program that groups of Western countries have created jointly with Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa and Vietnam, and on which they are currently negotiating with India. Another example is the Atlantic Cooperation Partnership, signed by 32 African, European and American countries in September, which provides members with a platform for cooperation on economic, energy, environmental and maritime issues. Additional examples include the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, a project co-founded by the United States that aims to boost economic ties between Asia, the Persian Gulf and Europe. As well as the Lobito Corridor project, which brings Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to world markets and is funded by the United States, the European Commission and several international development banks.
In New Delhi, officials admit that despite cheap oil and weapons, Russia cannot offer the types of investment, trade and development assistance that India really needs. "India's relations with Russia are on a downward spiral," one Indian expert noted. — Our priority is internal development. The United States and the West as a whole can make a much greater contribution here." Even if India maintains its neutrality in the current Ukrainian conflict, this position will not prevent New Delhi from seeking other partners, as it has already done through its membership in the QUAD (Quadrilateral security agreement) with Australia, Japan and the United States. India's relationship with the United States will be further strengthened if India becomes a manufacturing base for innovative global companies. Similarly, since the United States lifted the arms embargo on Indonesia in 2005, Jakarta has taken steps to diversify its defense partnership, preferring to enter into arms deals with the United States rather than with Russia. This summer, Indonesia also refused to join the expanded BRICS group, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, instead targeting the predominantly pro-Western Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
When the military conflict in Ukraine eventually ends, the global order will look different than before it. The "middle" powers will continue to look for new coalitions and avoid involvement in the rivalry of the great Powers. Washington's attention is now focused on the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, but it should not neglect those important steps that will help America succeed in the future world. The United States and its allies should vigorously counter Russian narratives that distort the current Ukrainian conflict and damage their reputation in key countries of the world. The West should show the countries occupying the "intermediate" position the advantages that the Western partnership can offer them.
Daniel Hamilton is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Institute for Advanced International Studies. Previously, he worked as Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Political Planning and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
Angela Stent is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University. Previously, she worked in the Political Planning Department of the State Department and as a national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia.
