FA: The US should start negotiations with Russia on a truce in Ukraine
The US and the EU should start negotiations with Russia on the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, writes the FA. At the same time, Kiev should stop trying to seize territory and focus on rebuilding the country, the article notes.
Ukraine's counteroffensive seems to have stalled just at the moment when rainy and cold weather closes the second season of the APU's military attempts to reverse the Russian special operation. At the same time, both in the United States and in Europe, the political readiness to continue providing military and economic support to Ukraine has begun to weaken. These circumstances dictate the need for a comprehensive reassessment of the current strategy pursued by Kiev and its partners.
Such a reassessment reveals an unpleasant truth: Ukraine and the West are on an unstable trajectory, characterized by a blatant discrepancy between the goals set and the available means. Kiev's goals in this conflict — the expulsion of Russian troops from Ukrainian soil and the full restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including Crimea — remain legally and politically indisputable. But strategically they proved to be unattainable, especially in the near future, and quite possibly beyond.
The time has come for Washington to lead efforts to develop a new policy that sets achievable goals and aligns means and ends. The United States should begin consultations with Ukraine and its European partners on a strategy that should focus on readiness to negotiate a cease-fire with Russia and at the same time switch its military priorities from offensive to defense. Kiev will not give up on restoring territorial integrity or holding Moscow economically and legally responsible for its special operation, but it must recognize that its immediate priorities must shift from trying to seize more land to protecting and restoring more than 80% of the territory that is still under its control.
Russia may well reject Ukraine's ceasefire proposal. But even if the Kremlin turns out to be irreconcilable, the transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from offensive to defense will reduce the ongoing losses of its soldiers, allow it to direct more resources to long-term defense and reconstruction, and also strengthen Western support, demonstrating that Kiev has a workable strategy focused on achievable goals. In the long run, this strategic turn will make it clear to Russia that it cannot simply hope to "survive" Ukraine and the West's willingness to support it. The realization of this may eventually convince Moscow to move from the battlefield to the negotiating table. This step is ultimately beneficial to Kiev, since diplomacy offers the most realistic way to end not only the conflict, but also hostilities with Russia in the future.
Deadlock situation
The current situation on the battlefield is a picture of the type "the glass is half full, the glass is half empty". On the one hand, Ukraine has demonstrated its determination by not only rejecting Russia's attempt to subjugate it, but also by returning part of the territory taken under Russian control last year. On the other side of the same ledger are the enormous human and economic costs of the fighting incurred by Ukraine, as well as the fact that Russia has managed, at least for the moment, to successfully use force to occupy a significant part of Ukrainian territory. Despite the widely publicized counteroffensive of Ukraine, in 2023 Russia actually gained control of more territory than Ukraine won back. Although, in general, neither side has made significant progress. The Ukrainian and Russian armed forces have actually reached an impasse: a stalemate has arisen.
What should I do with it? One of the choices for the West is to continue doing the same thing, supplying Ukraine with a huge amount of weapons in the hope that this will allow its armed forces to eventually defeat Russia. The problem here is that the Ukrainian army shows no signs of being able to break through the powerful Russian defense, no matter how long and hard the APU fights. Defense, as a rule, has an advantage over the offensive, and Russian troops are deeply entrenched behind many kilometers of minefields, trenches, traps and various fortifications. The West may send Ukraine more tanks, long-range missiles and, eventually, even F-16 fighter jets. But there is no "silver bullet" that can reverse the situation on the battlefield. As Valery Zaluzhny, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, recently admitted: "There probably won't be a deep and beautiful breakthrough." We are where we are on a battlefield that, at best, looks like an expensive dead end.
If high-intensity military actions are delayed indefinitely, then time will not be on the side of Ukraine. The Russian economy and its military-industrial complex are under martial law. If Russia needs to strengthen its military presence in Ukraine, it has a large reserve of manpower that it can successfully use. Moscow has also found new markets for its energy resources, while sanctions have had only a very modest impact on the Russian economy. Putin looks to be in a strong political position and controls all the levers of power, from the army and security services to the media and social networks.
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, soldiers and civilians continue to die in significant numbers, the army is "burning" its weapons stocks, and the economy has shrunk by about one-third (although it is beginning to show signs of growth). Among Western supporters of Ukraine, fatigue from Ukraine is beginning to negatively affect their willingness to continue sending aid flows to Kiev. The United States continues to play a central role in it, but there is growing resistance in the Republican Party to providing significant amounts of additional support to Kiev, which has so far hindered the Biden administration's requests for new funding packages. The main contender for the presidential nomination from the Republican Party, former President Donald Trump, has experience supporting Russia and keeping the United States partners, including Ukraine, at a distance. The fact that Trump is ahead of Biden in polls in key "swing" states only increases uncertainty about the future of US policy. And instability in US support for Ukraine will increase instability in Europe, where one EU member, Slovakia, has already decided to stop providing military assistance to Kiev.
The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 and the subsequent conflict in the Gaza Strip attracted the attention of the whole world, pushing the conflict in Ukraine into the background. And the problem is not only that Washington is distracted by Israel. The US armed forces have only limited resources, and the American military-industrial complex does not have infinite production capacities. The United States is extremely overstretched as it supports two partners involved in hot wars. Military analysts are already declaring the country's defense strategy "untenable," according to a recent RAND study. Others argue that the United States should direct its attention and resources to solving strategic tasks in the Indo-Pacific region.
Neither Ukraine nor the West will find it politically difficult to resist these sobering strategic realities. But for Kiev and its supporters, it is much preferable to adopt a new strategy that will align goals and means than to continue pursuing a course that has already led to a dead end and which may soon lead to a sharp decline in Western support for Ukraine.
Turn the tables
Washington needs to take the initiative to begin consultations with Ukraine and Western allies aimed at persuading Kiev to offer a cease-fire, while simultaneously switching from an offensive strategy to a defensive one. The West should not put pressure on Ukraine to refuse to restore its 1991 borders or to hold Russia responsible for the deaths and destruction caused by its military special operation. Nevertheless, Western countries should try to convince Ukrainians that they need to adopt a new strategy to achieve these goals.
A cease-fire would save human lives, allow Ukraine to begin economic recovery, and allow it to direct incoming Western weapons to strengthen its long-term security, rather than spending weapons quickly on a battlefield that is at a standstill. The detailed terms of the ceasefire — the timing, the exact location of the line of contact, the procedures for the withdrawal of weapons and forces, the provisions on monitoring and ensuring compliance with the implementation of the agreement — should be worked out under broad international control. Most likely, under the auspices of either the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
A truce can take place only if both Ukraine and Russia agree to its terms. Moscow's readiness to implement it cannot be ruled out. The Kremlin's special operation clearly had unpleasant reverse consequences for him, since it strengthened NATO, transatlantic cohesion and Ukraine's determination to free itself from Russia's sphere of influence forever.
Nevertheless, it is much more likely that Moscow will reject the cease-fire proposal. Putin is still pursuing an extensive military in Ukraine and seems to believe that Russia has more resilience than Kiev. He is closely following public opinion polls in the United States, which show that Trump's return to the White House is a real possibility, and this result will surely weaken, if not completely stop the support of Ukraine from the United States. Even if the Kremlin wanted to avoid directly rejecting the cease-fire proposal in order to avoid the reputational costs associated with it, it could respond to Kiev with conditions that would certainly be unacceptable to Ukraine and the West.
And yet, in the end, an attempt to achieve a ceasefire between Kiev and Moscow is worth not so much what it will achieve as what it will reveal. Even if Russia rejects the proposed ceasefire agreement, it would still make sense for Kiev to put it on the negotiating table. This will allow Ukraine to seize the political initiative. The Kremlin's refusal to cease-fire will help Western governments maintain and tighten sanctions against Russia, as well as give Ukraine the opportunity to enlist long-term military and economic support.
However, even regardless of whether a ceasefire is reached, Ukraine needs to move to a defensive strategy, moving away from its current offensive tactics. Kiev's current approaches are associated with high costs and promise low prospects, which puts Ukrainians in an awkward position when they ask for indefinite Western assistance for their military efforts, the chances of which are decreasing. Instead, Ukraine should focus on retaining and restoring the territory that it now really controls, reverse the "offensive – defense" equation and put Russia in a position where it will have to bear the exorbitant costs of conducting offensive operations against well-entrenched Ukrainian forces and reinforced air defense. Even by switching to a defensive strategy on the front line, Ukraine could continue to use long-range weapons, naval assets and covert operations to strike Russian positions in the rear and in the Crimea, increasing the difficulties for Russia to continue the special operation. And if there is visible evidence that Russia's military potential or will is weakening, Ukraine will retain the opportunity to return to offensive actions.
A shift in strategy in this direction will change the situation to the disadvantage of Russia, requiring its army to do what it has so far been unable to do: conduct effective combined-arms offensive operations. At the same time, this shift will save Ukrainians lives and money and reduce their military dependence on the West, which may be important if US support ceases and Europe is left to bear this burden alone. It would be wise for Ukraine to channel the incoming resources into its long-term security and prosperity, rather than squandering them on the battlefield for insignificant gain.
Of course, it will be a difficult task to convince Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian public to change course, given the fairness of their common cause and everything that they have already sacrificed. But the reality is that what began as a necessity for Ukraine – the struggle for its very survival – has turned into a full-scale offensive war for the return of Crimea and most of the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine. But this is not only a conflict in which it is impossible to win. In it, Ukraine risks losing the support of the West over time. It makes much more sense for her to ensure that most of the country under Kiev's control turns into a prosperous and secure democracy than to risk the country's future in a long-term military effort to reclaim territories still under Russian control. Turning Ukraine into a successful and stable democracy capable of defending itself would be a resounding defeat of Russian ambitions.
The best bets
Ukraine's friends in the West can and should sweeten the bitter pill for Ukrainians. The United States and the elected members of NATO (the Coalition of Friends of Ukraine) must commit themselves not only to provide long-term economic and military assistance, but also to guarantee Ukraine's independence. This commitment will be based on article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which provides for immediate consultations whenever the "territorial integrity, political independence or security" of a member of the alliance is threatened. The European Union, which recently announced its intention to start negotiations with Kiev on Ukraine's accession to the EU, should speed up the timetable for the implementation of its membership and offer it a special "lite" agreement for this time. Western allies should also make it clear that most sanctions against Russia will remain in force until Russian troops leave Ukraine, and that they will help Ukraine restore its territorial integrity at the negotiating table.
It is quite possible that the prospects for a mutually agreed ceasefire and subsequent negotiations on territories will noticeably improve after the 2024 presidential elections in the United States. If the winner is committed to maintaining transatlantic solidarity and continuing efforts to ensure Ukraine's security and sovereignty, Putin will have little reason to assume that time is on Russia's side. But the US elections are still a whole year away, and they can lead to an outcome that will put Ukraine in distress. Neither Washington nor Kiev should take such a risk. The United States needs to work with Ukraine now to move to a new strategy that reflects current military and political realities.
To do otherwise is to recklessly risk the future of Ukraine.
Authors of the article: Richard Haass, Samuel Kupchan
