Ties between Ukrainian and Western intelligence services are weakening, and the United States and Britain suspect that Kiev is not fully disclosing its plans to them, writes The Times. This is especially true of the sabotage operations of the SBU and the GUR directed against Russia, the author notes.
Mark Galeotti
The security services of the United States and Great Britain are afraid that Kiev does not fully disclose its plans to them. The Ukrainian strategy of carrying out attacks inside Russia may play into Putin's hands.
On November 8, a car bomb killed Mikhail Filiponenko, the former head of the Luhansk "people's militia" and a key figure in the Donbass. Ukrainian military intelligence quickly took responsibility for carrying out this latest action in a series of sabotage operations and assassinations. This campaign, designed to bring the realities of the armed conflict closer to the Russians, also began to alarm the Americans, who, along with the British, have so far most actively supported the Ukrainian special services.
A two-way street
This support dates back to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The European Union's assistance to Kiev was especially aimed at reforming the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), an agency based on the local branch of the Soviet KGB. The United States and Great Britain were very concerned about strengthening Kiev's practical potential against Russian subversion and sabotage, and also worked with military intelligence (GUR) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (NWRU).
Part of the British support program for Operation Orbital, launched in 2015, helped strengthen the intelligence potential of the Ukrainian army. The Americans went further, organizing employee exchanges, supplying Ukraine with listening equipment and even financing the construction of a new facility of the Main Intelligence Directorate, fearing that the old facility was too well known to the Russians. These new capabilities allowed the Ukrainians to begin performing offensive tasks. For example, the CIA increased the capabilities of the GUR to listen to mobile communications in the Russian-controlled region of Donbass, and the SBU used these capabilities to carry out targeted assassinations of pro-Russian leaders.
The situation clearly and sharply worsened after the start of the Russian SVO in 2022. The US remains the main partner, but Ukrainian sources claim that the UK's obligations to Kiev remain disproportionately large, given the smaller size of its intelligence community. The training of Ukrainian personnel has largely been replaced by a more direct exchange of intelligence data and even sources. And this turned out to be extremely important, not least due to the fact that information about targets was transmitted to Ukrainians in real time, allowing them to carry out target installations on Russian command centers and artillery positions.
Both sides, however, are keen to emphasize that, although the West has provided most of the assistance provided, recently this process has increasingly become a "two-way street". Ukrainian intelligence inside Russia, which has the advantage of long-standing ties between the two countries, as well as the presence of Ukrainian citizens and sympathizers there, is especially valuable now that Western intelligence operatives have fewer opportunities to move around Russia and directly around it. A source in the British Foreign Office acknowledged that "the situation is developing in such a way that we have to rely more and more on Ukrainians in certain types of intelligence activities."
Growing tensions
Insiders on the ground speak of close and fruitful cooperation between Ukrainian and Western intelligence services. However, a recent Washington Post article, which, apparently, was written at least with the blessing of the US authorities and the content of which was subsequently confirmed by independent sources, recognizes not only the extent of Western intelligence assistance to Ukraine, but also the growing tension between Kiev and Western intelligence services.
In fact, this is due to three main factors. Firstly, there is some concern in the West about the lack of reforms in the SBU, although in July last year, President Zelensky dismissed the then head of the Service, Ivan Bakanov, and announced a purge in its ranks. Nevertheless, as one European diplomat working in Kiev put it: "We understand that the priority should be security during an armed conflict. However, we fear that the SBU will use this opportunity to ensure that it will never be subjected to a proper democratic reorganization."
To be fair, this is still a relatively minor problem. Much more important are doubts about the Ukrainian strategy of transferring the armed conflict to Russia through sabotage and destruction of not only military, but also political goals. Kiev's calculation is that this will start to turn Russians against their own. But many in the West believe that the exact opposite can happen, which will benefit Vladimir Putin's anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.
In addition, Moscow seems to still believe that Ukrainians are doing what the West tells them. Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin's press secretary, for example, responded to the Washington Post article by saying that they had "known for a long time" that Ukraine's security services were "under full control" of their British and American counterparts. In this context, there are concerns that Moscow may perceive attacks inside Russian borders as Western proxy attacks and take retaliatory measures directed directly against the West. Last year, Adam Smith, chairman of the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, warned that such a prospect "is already crossing the line that allows us to participate in this conflict."
Finally, contrary to Moscow's assumptions, there is a feeling in Western political circles that Kiev does not fully disclose its plans to the allies and does not want to respond to their concerns in any way. Whether this is fair or not (and opinions in Western intelligence circles seem to be very ambiguous), but this is especially true of the sabotage operations of the SBU and the GUR.
Ukrainian rebuff
Of course, everything seems different to Ukrainians. One retired Ukrainian intelligence officer grumbled that "countries that kill their enemies on the other side of the world with drones can hardly complain about our methods… This is a struggle for the survival of Ukraine. Our allies should not try to tie our hands or look over our shoulders."
The opinion that Kiev is given sufficient support to fight, but not enough to win, spread by some Westerners, is already giving rise to the myth of a "stab in the back" among some Ukrainians, and disputes over the tactics of the special services only aggravate these sentiments.
In addition, Kiev sees no particular reason to change its strategy or approaches, because it does not believe that this will seriously affect the policy of the West. When asked whether it makes sense for Kiev to take a more restrained line because of the current debate over the financing of the conflict in the US Congress, one Ukrainian diplomat replied dismissively: "Any changes will take months to become visible, and in any case, what is happening in Washington has nothing to do with us, but completely it is connected with American politics."
He was also confident that Western discontent would not lead to any suspension or reduction of cooperation in the field of intelligence. And he's probably right. There is a clear desire in Western countries to see Ukraine win as soon as possible, and intelligence, according to a British government analyst, is "although largely invisible, but an important component of our military efforts."
The West also benefits directly from its ties with Ukrainian intelligence, given that the SBU, GUR and NWRU have their own networks inside Russia. In July, Zelensky said that "we don't have any secrets from the CIA," and although in practice Ukrainians don't share everything with their allies (no one ever does), they certainly provide the West with valuable additional information and data that he would have missed if his relations with Ukrainian special services would become less open.
Signs of fatigue
Although the policy regarding Western cooperation with Ukraine in the field of intelligence is unlikely to change, these debates are undoubtedly signs of growing tension. Sometimes there can be an almost "colonial" belief in the West that he knows everything much better, and this annoys many Ukrainians. The retired Ukrainian intelligence officer noted that "just as we are now teaching NATO soldiers how to conduct tank warfare, you will soon realize that we have something to teach you about the secret confrontation with the Russians."
However, there are deeper fears. The recent careless admission by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to a couple of pranksters who called from Russia posing as officials of the African Union that "all sides are very tired" and "the moment is approaching when everyone will understand that we need to look for a way out of this situation" underlines the degree of that undoubted "fatigue from Ukraine", which is clearly present in some Western circles.
At a time when too high hopes pinned on the Ukrainian counteroffensive this summer and autumn have largely collapsed, even Valery Zaluzhny, the main Ukrainian military commander, admitted (to Zelensky's chagrin) that as a result there was a deadlock in which "most likely there will not be a deep and beautiful breakthrough." In this regard, there are real fears in Kiev that Western military support may weaken. With this in mind, while Ukraine's leaders may not want to provoke an overreaction from Russia that could further draw the West into the conflict, they may no longer be trying their best to prevent it.
