Colonel Khodarenok: Zaluzhny can be made the main culprit of the failure of the AFU
The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valery Zaluzhny, gave an extensive interview to the British edition of The Economist. In particular, he compared the events on the Russian-Ukrainian fronts with the First World War. How correct such a statement is and why the military commander suddenly started talking about the failures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the military observer of the Newspaper understood.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.
To begin with, it should be noted that the statements of the leadership of the armed forces of a critical nature, and even made during the war, are evidence of a certain disadvantage and significant disagreements in the military-political leadership of the country, and they do not just get into the media. It is very characteristic that in almost every paragraph of his interview, the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny, in fact, justifies himself for failures on the fronts of his own.
What does the First World War have to do with it?
In particular, the current situation in the zone of a special military operation reminds the commander of the First World War (WWI).
It should be noted that it has become fashionable to compare the situation on the line of contact with the times of the PMV, and almost all political scientists and military experts like to do this. However, all such comparisons are very conditional, and thinking by analogy is almost always counterproductive.
For example, Valery Zaluzhny claims that "just like during the First World War, we have reached a level of technology that puts us at a dead end. Most likely, there will be no deep and beautiful breakthrough."
What is wrong with Zaluzhny
In fact, during the First World War, it was not the level of technology development that led to a positional deadlock, but on the contrary, their absence. So, when the troops rushed to the attack (they came out of the first trench or, as they said then, "went over the edge"), all communication was lost with them and operational control of units and units during the battle became almost impossible. Radio communication in the tactical link was then at a rudimentary level and, for example, artillery fire control during the fire support of the attack was practically absent.
But, be that as it may, the artillery preparation of the attack during the First World War was carried out so effectively that the fire of the guns practically swept the front edge of the enemy off the face of the earth.
But it was almost impossible to transfer heavy guns (which were relocated during the First World War exclusively on horse-drawn vehicles) after the advancing troops over almost impassable terrain due to the lack of tracked tractors. That is, the task of artillery escort to the depth of the task of the day was not solved in any way. In a word, having mastered the first trench (having achieved initial success), the advancing troops stopped and lay down under the destroying enemy fire.
Finally, bomber and assault aircraft were at the stage of formation at that time, and armored and mechanized troops were simply absent. That is, not the achieved level of technology led to a positional deadlock in the years of the PVM, but, on the contrary, their absence. So in this regard, a significant mistake has already crept into Zaluzhny's reasoning.
In this regard, it is enough to recall at least the Brusilov breakthrough (the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front under the command of General Brusilov, during which Austria-Hungary and Germany were defeated in August 1916, Bukovina, Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were occupied. - "Newspaper.Ru"). Thus, if there is a military genius, then there will certainly be a "deep and beautiful" breakthrough.
Based on the experience gained during the First World War, in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Red Army) back in the 1920s, a theory of deep operation was developed, the essence of which was to strike at the entire depth of the enemy's defense, hacking it in several places and introducing highly mobile mechanized units into the breakthrough to develop a tactical breakthrough into operational success. For some reason, Zaluzhny did not remember about it, but as an example he cited the work of Major General Pavel Smirnov "Breakthrough of the fortified strip", published back in 1941. By and large, he was never considered a theorist in the Red Army.
"Perhaps the soldiers are not fit for purpose"
In his previous interview with The Economist, General Zaluzhny told in great detail what he needs for successful combat operations. This list includes the air force, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, counter-battery warfare, various means of combating mine-explosive barriers, strategic reserves.
But the general did not give an answer to the question: why did the AFU launch an offensive operation at the beginning of June this year, having neither technological nor numerical superiority over the enemy? That is, there was no superiority over the enemy on any item of the above list, but nevertheless the Ukrainian units rushed to the attack.
Failures during the offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine led Zaluzhny to the idea that some commanders of units and formations do not correspond to their positions.
"At first I thought there was something wrong with our commanders, so I replaced some of them. Then I thought that maybe our soldiers are not suitable for this purpose, so I transferred some to other brigades," Zaluzhny told The Economist. But personnel changes have not led to any significant changes in the fighting of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
They always carry out the task set by the Supreme High Command - that is, the political leadership of the country.
Only after receiving the operational directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (that is, President Vladimir Zelensky), the armed forces of Ukraine, under the leadership of General Zaluzhny, begin operational and strategic planning and subsequent conduct of operations and combat operations.
Who will be responsible for the failures of the APU
On June 4, Valery Zaluzhny launched an offensive operation without having superiority in electronic means, air supremacy, without having a general fire and numerical superiority over the enemy. It is quite possible that he was aware of this (we will not find out about this soon). It turns out that he was initially given unrealistic combat and operational tasks. Only President Vladimir Zelensky could do this.
Moreover, this defeat is not so much military as political in nature. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have shown during the fighting that they cannot solve the problem of entering the state borders of 1991 by military means. And the collective West has a well-founded question - is it worth providing military assistance to the armed forces and the country that are unable to achieve the required results in the war?
Most likely, General Zaluzhny will be declared the main culprit in the failure of the "counteroffensive". Hence his stories about personnel changes in the Armed Forces - they say, he changed commanders, but this did not lead to radical changes at the forefront. In fact, the general is talking about something else. And it sounds something like this - "you will make me guilty of all the troubles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, remove me from my post, demote me in rank, but this will not lead to a cardinal coup in the armed struggle with Russia."
Here it is necessary to add all the other arguments of Zaluzhny about the positional impasse and the need to possess new technologies. After all, it can be read like this - "what is the demand from me if I do not have modern means of conducting armed struggle."
And there can be only one conclusion from all of the above - the problem does not have a military solution on the part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And the most realistic way out of this situation is as follows - "immediate peace in exchange for territories." Otherwise, the Ukrainian state may disappear.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for the newspaper.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy Commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
