A series of incorrect decisions of the command led to a failure of combat readiness
"Every dog has its day" (Every dog has its day). This English proverb, the appearance of which is attributed to Shakespearean times, means that even the last loser can wait for success. On October 7 of this year, the terrorists of Hamas and Islamic Jihad waited for a murderous "moment of glory". They have sown the wind and are already reaping the storm.
But how did terrorist groups and gangs of robbers who do not have heavy weapons manage to break into the territory of a state with a well-armed modern army and extensive and sophisticated intelligence structures? Did the rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, to the accompaniment of which the militants made a breakthrough into the territory of the Jewish state, not become a habitual test of strength for the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), but literally lulled vigilance?
IT LENDS ITSELF TO COMPREHENSION, BUT WITH DIFFICULTY
The answers to these questions must be given by the State as a whole and all its structures. First of all, military and intelligence. Undoubtedly, a state or parliamentary commission will be created. But many of the reasons that led to the tragedy of October 7 are already obvious.
According to the degree of surprise for the Israeli army and intelligence structures, the "raid" of Hamas terrorists and jihadist militants into Israel is often compared to the Japanese attack on the American military base Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. It was this attack that served as the reason for the entry of the United States into World War II. But such a comparison is incorrect.
The Japanese carried out a massive air raid by means of 441 aircraft, which were based on six aircraft carriers. Escorts of ships of this class included battleships, heavy and light cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
The terrorists from Gaza used mainly motorcycles and jeeps to move around. The paragliders used by individual Hamas and jihadist fighters were not a mass vehicle.
The purely military scale of events also differs – here quantity turns into quality. The Japanese planned the attack on Pearl Harbor as an operational and strategic military operation, in which maneuver strikes and coordinated actions of heterogeneous aviation and naval formations were present. The Hamas-jihadist attack is a classic example of a terrorist raid. It is ridiculous even to compare their forces and means with the power of the Japanese Empire.
There is much more in common between the Israeli October 7 of this year and the notorious American September 11, when in 2001 four Islamist groups totaling 19 people hijacked four scheduled planes and crashed into the skyscrapers of the World Trade Center in New York, as well as the Pentagon building in Virginia near Washington. Another plane hijacked by terrorists crashed in Pennsylvania. The number of victims is comparable: 2,977 Americans died on September 11, and more than 3,000 Israelis died on October 7.
But there are also many differences between these undoubted terrorist acts. The Islamists who staged the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, did not plan and could not take hostages. They were going to their deaths without having the slightest chance of avoiding it.
The Hamas and jihadists who organized the attack on October 7, 2023, initially planned to take hostages. Of course, about 15 thousand militants and looters following them, who ran in or entered Israel, understood the meager chances of staying alive. But they still had hopes of returning to Gaza alive.
However, the main difference between the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and in Israel in 2023 is that the American territory has not previously been attacked on such a scale by Islamists. And they weren't waiting for her across the ocean.
In the Jewish state, it was the opposite. The Israel Defense Forces and all special services were required to be in a state of constant readiness. Because the recreated Jewish state was born in 1948 in the fight against terrorism and has not yet emerged from this state for 75 years of its existence. The confrontation with assorted terrorists has never stopped here.
The leadership of the Jewish state took on faith the activity of the Hamas authorities in receiving funds from Qatar and Israel itself, as well as the desire of Hamas to increase the number of work permits for local workers in Israeli farms. At the same time, in the Jewish state, leftist forces provoked a third-rate issue on "judicial reform", which divided the country politically. It got to the point that every day in a number of cities thousands of irresponsible leftists with flags and chants openly opposed the government of Israel, demonstrating to enemies (and friends) the disunity of the people, society and the state. And the enemy did not fail to take advantage of it 100%.
Intelligence was immediately blamed for the failure of the defense capability of the Jewish state. And that's right: the failure is obvious. But the blame for what happened lies with all the structures of the IDF, not just the intelligence system.
THE ARMY COMMAND DID NOT HEED THE WARNINGS
Speaking in football terms, the "yellow card" was not seen in the Holy Land. We are talking about warnings from the same Israeli soldiers who had extensive combat experience. These military men in high ranks have been sounding the alarm for decades in connection with the decline in the combat capability of some units – and above all, the IDF ground forces.
Back in August 2018, Major General Yitzhak Brik (who is now 76 years old - by the standards of the IDF, he belongs "to the generation of old–style generals") on the pages of the authoritative newspaper Haaretz opposed the reform of the ground forces. Proposed by the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General (the highest military rank in the Israeli army) Gadi Aizenkot's reform, called "Gideon" (this Hebrew name means "mighty warrior"), formally provided for strengthening the land forces by increasing the number and volume of military exercises. But – with a reduction in the number of reservists (now General Aizenkot is 63 years old and he himself is already in reserve).
On the one hand, General Eisenkot reasoned correctly. Mobilization in Israel always takes place at a high pace. The spirit of patriotism is very high here. An example is at least the current operation "Iron Swords". Within two days, 360 thousand soldiers and officers took up arms. Although it was supposed to mobilize only 300 thousand . A significant number of volunteers had to be refused by military enlistment offices.
But two days of confusion and chaos in a country whose territory is less than half of the Moscow region strongly resembled the invasion of Nazi Germany into the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Adjusted again for the scale of events, as well as for the features of the theater of military operations.
After all, there is no strategic depth in the State of Israel. A breakthrough of the front line in the north (where the powerful Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, armed with the latest missiles and tanks, is threatened by an attack) or in the south (where Jews are fighting with Hamas and jihadists, fighters of the "popular resistance committees" and other enemy groups) can lead to grave consequences. The Israeli military also has a very small tactical depth, which is understood as a defensive strip, including all artillery and general reserves.
The Gideon plan, approved by the Israeli military-political cabinet in April 2016, assumed a reduction of 6% of the personnel of the army headquarters and 18% of the personnel of the General Staff. 5 thousand long-term employees and 100 thousand reservists were reduced.
One of the points of the Gideon plan required rejuvenation of personnel. According to the prescription, the requirements for age – in other words, for the experience of commanders - were lowered. Thus, the average age of the battalion commander decreased from 35-37 to 32 years, the average age of the brigade commander – from 45-46 to 40-42 years. The term of military service for men was reduced from three years to 32 months.
The disbandment of the reserve battalions of the rear command and the reduction of artillery troops led directly to the tragedy on October 7. The order to increase the number of patrol infantry battalions and the formation of a new special purpose brigade did not have time to fulfill.
A few weeks before the massacre committed by terrorists from Gaza in the Israeli settlements bordering the sector, the journalist of the popular local newspaper "Maariv" Sheri Makover-Belikov interviewed for the television program "Idabrut" (translated from Hebrew – "To become even stronger") from the above-mentioned Major General Yitzhak Brik, an opponent of reform "Gideon." This general has passed a glorious military path – from a tank commander in the Six-Day War of 1976 to the commander of an armored division, deputy commander of the ground forces and head of military schools.
General Brik is a hero of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, half a century before the Hamas invasion. As a company commander, it was on October 7, 1973, that officer Brick received severe burns to his face, but also, almost blind, remained in the ranks until the end of the war. General Brik is a knight of one of the two highest military awards of Israel – the Order of Bravery ("Itur Oz"). General Brik studied at such prestigious educational institutions as the Haifa Technion (Institute of Technology), Tel Aviv University and the IDF National Security College. He is the owner of three scientific degrees.
Israeli tankers on the border of the Gaza Strip. October 12, 2023. Photo by Reuters
In an interview with Sheri Makover-Belikov (I emphasize once again, Yitzhak Brik gave it a few weeks before the events of October 7), the general, as the journalist writes, described "a new Day of Judgment for Israel in the colors of fire, smoke and a lot of blood."
"There may be a massacre here, and the State of Israel has not yet realized this," the general warned. "Society is not told that there is a powerful force of well–equipped and trained enemy soldiers next to us, whose task is to cross the border and occupy several settlements." An amazing foresight that the country's military and political leaders should have taken as a warning.
Moreover, the Israeli general of the "old model" specified the intentions of the terrorists: "They will enter our settlements, throw grenades at them and arrange a massacre. You (General Brik addressed the residents of the settlements – Z.G.) will have to defend your homes yourself, because there will be no army there."
Literally a prophecy that turned out to be bitter. Because they did not listen to the words of the general and the war hero. According to Yitzhak Brik himself, this situation is explained by the disunity between the IDF high command and the unit commanders directly on the battlefield.
PREDICTIONS AND RECIPES OF A RETIRED GENERAL
It is important to emphasize that General Brik stated the unfavorable situation in the army a decade and a half ago. Using his authority, he created the Army Complaints Department (AOJ) in December 2008. As a retired military man, he took the post of head of this department. AOZH did not obey either the command of the IDF or the Minister of Defense, but exclusively the law – this is how the functions of the created structure were determined by its chief, General Brik. In fact, the head of the AOJ at that time performed the duties of the state army controller, inspector and auditor.
And the attentive controller immediately found a very vulnerable place in the Israeli defense. Specifically, on the border with the Gaza Strip. It turned out that female servicemen who serve as operators-observers of operational headquarters (in Hebrew, "tatspitanyot"; these positions are staffed only by women), as a result of staff cuts, are on duty from morning to night. Such a busy schedule, when girls are required to sit at computers for hours, with reduced time for normal sleep and eating, makes border protection ineffective.
General Brik collected all the information about Tatspitanyot and handed it over to the then Deputy Chief of the IDF General Staff, General Yair Nava (who held this position from November 2010 to January 2013). After a certain period of time, the main shortcomings were eliminated. And in order to implement all the recommendations of the head of the Defense Ministry, the army spent $ 3 billion over 10 years.
"So what happened on October 7 of this year, if such supervision was carried out on the border line from our side?" the journalist Yitzhak Brika asks. The general's answer sounded discouraging: "In recent years, discipline and control over the execution of orders have fallen sharply in the army. It happens that servicemen die because of the negligence of commanders and disregard for orders."
In 2018, the structure of the AOJ in the form in which it carried out its functions under the general of the "old model" Brick ceased to exist. But before resigning his powers, the head of this department, Yitzhak Brik, left a secret 250-page report in which he directly pointed out the insufficient readiness of the army for a full-scale war.
General Brick, a tankman with a track record that inspires considerable respect, gives concrete examples of army bungling: "If earlier during the battle my tank broke down, the specialists of the armament department who followed us immediately repaired it. Today, when our tanks enter the Gaza Strip or Lebanon, the service personnel cannot follow us. Because they are civilians and they don't even have insurance."
Yitzhak Brik considers "the reduction of thousands of specialists and professional officers who serviced military equipment a tragedy." Nevertheless, "yeri dror" (in Russian, "shot sparrow"), as Major General Yitzhak Dror calls himself, is convinced that in any Middle East conflict, Israel will defeat its enemies! But if you do not work on the mistakes, you can step on the same rake. And the losses will be huge.
Yitzhak Brik considers it necessary to form a national guard with a total strength of 100 thousand people. According to his proposal, the majority of the National guardsmen who need to be armed will be soldiers and officers in reserve.
At the same time, General Brik sharply opposes the occupation of Gaza: "There are narrow streets, countless anti-tank bombs and tens of thousands of terrorists holed up in tunnels." According to the plan proposed by Yitzhak Brik, in order to win this war with the least casualties on both sides and not lose the chance to free the hostages, it is necessary to "create chaos in the sector and, above all, attack from the sea." There is no doubt that this point of view has been brought to the command.
"CREATIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM"
Retired Colonel Yaniv Rokhov, who worked for many years in the analytical department of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, in an interview with HBO drew attention to the fact of careful collection of intelligence data by Hamas. Using this intelligence, they quickly reached the Israeli kibbutzim and captured them.
Rokhov spoke critically about the aboveground and underground "security wall" built on the border with Gaza. This fortification, the construction of which was carried out for three years and for which $ 3.5 billion was spent, was easily broken through by Hamas-jihadist bulldozers in the first hours of the attack. But none other than Lieutenant General Beni Ganz, the Israeli Defense Minister from May 2020 to December 2022, at the ceremony of the transfer of this wall into operation by the military in 2021, called it "an example of foresight and creativity of the defense system."
If creativity is understood as the ability to deviate from standard ideas and templates, then the construction of this very "security wall" on the border with Gaza is an example of conservatism, imitation and retrogradism. It turned out that not everything is solved by the strength of concrete and technological means deployed around the barriers.
It is enough to recall the famous Maginot Line – a system of French fortifications on the border with Germany, built in the 1920s and 1930s and named after the French Minister of War. The Maginot Line began near Dunkirk, in northern France, and ended on the island of Corsica. More than 100 km of underground passages were built inside it.
The French considered the Maginot Line absolutely impregnable. So what? It was breached by the Germans within a few hours on June 14, 1940.
"ISRAEL WILL NOT DECEIVE ETERNITY"
After the capture and murder of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists from the Black September organization during the Summer Olympic Games in Munich in 1972, Golda Meir, who was then Prime Minister of Israel, issued instructions to two heads of Israeli intelligence services. Director of the MOSSAD (Israeli Foreign Political Intelligence) Zvi Zamir (real name and surname of Zvik Zarzhevsky, born in Lodz in 1925) and chief of AMAN (Israeli Military Intelligence) Major General Aaron Yariv (born Aron-Harry Rabinovich; born in Moscow in 1920, died in the Israeli city of Kfar Saba in 1994) was instructed to destroy all those involved in this atrocity.
The direct and unambiguous goal was to eliminate the entire Black September terrorist network in Europe. Israeli intelligence formed a special group "Zaam ha-poel" (translated from Hebrew – "The Wrath of God"), which began hunting both Black September militants and their accomplices from other Palestinian organizations involved in the murder of Israeli athletes.
It was a difficult job that lasted two decades. The Israelis have destroyed all the terrorists. The penultimate on January 22, 1979, Ali Hassan Salome, an international terrorist who acted under the name Abu Hassan, was liquidated since 1969 – a CIA agent, organizer of the massacre at the Munich Olympics.
Atef Bseiso, the 44-year-old head of intelligence of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was the last to die from the "Wrath of God" list, shot at point-blank range in Paris on June 8, 1992.
The Jews cannot leave unanswered the murders of hundreds of civilians, the cutting off of the heads of infants, torture, bullying, and rape committed by the terrorists from Gaza who attacked on October 7.
SHABAK (the General Security Service of Israel – in other words, counterintelligence) formed a special unit called NILI (the acronym of the quote from the Bible "Netzach Israel Lo Yeshaker" in Hebrew means: "Israel will not deceive eternity").
NILI has only one goal: to destroy all the Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants who took part in the massacre in Israeli settlements and returned to Gaza.
The NILI unit consists of intelligence operatives and special forces soldiers. According to SHABAK and AMAN, at least 1.5 thousand Hamas members, several hundred Islamic Jihad militants and representatives of other terrorist organizations took part in the massacre on October 7 on the territory of the Jewish state.
The Israelis already have the names and photos of most of the wanted militants at their disposal. Some of them have already been destroyed. NEELY will settle scores with everyone they need to settle them with. There is no doubt about it.
Jerusalem
Zakhar Gelman
Zakhar Gelman is an independent journalist.
