The policy pursued after the Cold War did not take into account Russian aspirations and aspirations, writes The Economist. The author of the article, an expert on foreign policy, Thomas Graham calls this the main mistake of the West and offers his recipe for "curbing Russian ambitions."
Thomas Graham
The collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to great hopes for a strong partnership between the West and Russia. Nevertheless, after a little over thirty years, Russia has become an irreconcilable enemy for him. Why? There is a lot of truth in the most common interpretation of the West, which puts all the blame on Russian President Vladimir Putin. He revived the traditional authoritarian regime in Russia, and then even more unceremoniously challenged the liberal world order, which is led by America. In an effort to restore the empire in Russia, he attacked Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014 (unreliable information widely accepted in the propaganda rhetoric of the West. — Approx. InoSMI), and in February 2022 began a special military operation in this country.
But this picture is incomplete. It removes from the West, and above all from America, any responsibility for the current situation. This is an untenable position. Putin did not act in a vacuum, and often he simply responded to what he considered a threat from the West. In the current circumstances, this will be very unpleasant, but the Western political leadership should take a critical look at the American policy pursued after the end of the cold war. This is the only way it will be able to effectively cope with the challenges from Russia — both today and in the future.
At the end of the Cold War, America set two goals. It sought to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community as a free-market democracy. To exclude the possibility of Russia's return to an authoritarian imperial past, America also supported geopolitical pluralism in the former Soviet bloc. By supporting economic and political reforms in Russia and advocating for its membership in Western organizations, such as the "Big Seven" (which for a while became the "Eight"), the United States simultaneously expanded NATO to the east and promoted the independence of the former Soviet republics, which were most eager to join Europe - first of all, Georgia and Ukraine. But this approach failed.
The integration project was doomed from the very beginning, because it contradicted Russia's national aspirations and its most important strategic goals. Some Russian leaders have indeed declared their commitment to market democracy and partnership with the West. However, representatives of the elite as a whole remained faithful to the idea of a traditional and autocratic Russian state with strategic independence, that is, unlimited opportunity to form temporary coalitions with various states in order to promote and protect their own interests. They were interested not so much in reforming Russia as in restoring its power and influence. They were not going to turn into an ordinary European country under the leadership of the United States.
Russia saw America's active opposition as an attempt to prevent its return to the position of a great power. When its economy began to recover in the early 2000s, it began to actively resist. This was most noticeably manifested in her campaign to neutralize America's diplomatic advances in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, Putin has tried to suppress foreign influence inside Russia, including by tightening the screws on Western-funded civil society organizations. He did this for the full restoration of sovereignty, which any great power should have.
Nevertheless, hostile relations were not inevitable. The Kremlin could be appeased and reassured by a more gradual advance of NATO to the east and the expansion of American influence in the post-Soviet space, combined with less intrusive interference in Russia's internal affairs. The Russian leadership would have had time to assess the benefits of cooperation while the country was adapting to the new geopolitical realities. But America was impatient and in a hurry to consolidate the success of Russia's strategic weakening in Europe and in the former Soviet bloc. Therefore, Putin eventually concluded that it is possible to restore the status of a great power for Russia only through confrontation.
As a result, the West today faces two challenges. Firstly, he needs to thwart Russia's strategic plans, and secondly, prepare the ground for less hostile long-term relations with Moscow in a world that is becoming increasingly multipolar. How can America make a more constructive rival out of a sworn enemy?
Western support for Ukraine is very important. Here the task is not limited to the battlefield. It will be possible to thwart Russian plans only if Ukraine eventually becomes a strong, democratic and prosperous country, firmly tied to the West. This task is for many years to come, and it is extremely important to fulfill it in order for Russia to come to terms with its current borders. This has been the case throughout history: Russia's expansion ends when it meets strong and organized states.
However, no matter what happens in Ukraine, Russia will not disappear anywhere and will remain America's rival. Predictions about its collapse and the democratic revolution are a fantasy. On the contrary, Russia will certainly retain some version of its historical self. It will be an authoritarian country in the sphere of domestic politics, impulsively inclined to expansion, economically and technically backward, but determined to play the role of a great power. And its interests will continue to contradict the American ones, as it has been since the end of the XIX century, when the United States turned into a world power.
But such a Russia will still retain its importance, mainly because of its large nuclear arsenal, huge reserves of natural resources, geographical location in the center of Eurasia and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council with the right of veto. In such an environment, America's task is not to restrain Russia, but to curb its ambitions and put them at the service of American national interests. This is especially important in conditions when Chinese power must be directed so that it causes minimal damage to America. For example, China should be offered, together with Russia and America, to create conditions for strategic stability. At the same time, it must be done so that it does not dominate the resource-rich Central Asia and the Northern Sea Route connecting East Asia and Europe and passing through Russian waters. It is also extremely important to overcome global challenges such as climate change, pandemics and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
To succeed, you need skillful and subtle diplomacy. It is necessary to carefully balance Russia's resistance and concessions to its interests. Patience is extremely important here. Success can be achieved not by spectacular breakthroughs, but by gradually accumulating advantages. This is how America survived the Cold War. So she has to move forward today.
