The IDF's ground operation in the Gaza Strip threatens big problems not only for Israel, but also for the United States, writes Strana. Washington decided to convince Tel Aviv to delay the start of the invasion and play on the contradictions between the Arab countries.
Two weeks have passed since the Hamas militants attacked Israel. Throughout this time, literally every day, Israeli representatives have been making statements that the IDF is about to enter the Gaza Strip and launch a ground operation to destroy Hamas.
However, it has not started yet. Why – a variety of versions are expressed about this. From weather conditions to the unpreparedness of the Israeli army for a large-scale offensive (it takes time to prepare). However, judging by publications in the Western media, the main reason is the position of the United States, which strongly recommends that Israel wait with the operation.
Why?
By itself, Hamas is not a big military problem for Israel. Gaza is a small enclave, virtually completely blocked. From the sea – by the Americans and Israel. On land – Israel and Egypt. At the same time, the Egyptians are not allies for Hamas. Hamas is a movement related to the Muslim Brotherhood*, whose power in Egypt was overthrown by the current president Al–Sisi in 2013 through a military coup, during which hundreds (and according to other sources, thousands) of militants were killed. For the same reason, Egypt does not want to host refugees from the Gaza Strip, fearing a repeat of the history of 1970, when the Palestinians rebelled in Jordan and almost overthrew the king there.
Whatever the defense, the question of whether or not the Israeli army can defeat Hamas is not on the agenda. Another thing is the question of how long she will be able to do it – within days, weeks or months. And with what losses. Therefore, the problem is not with Hamas. The problems are elsewhere. The main ones are, in fact, three.
The first is the threat of the Lebanese Hezbollah joining the war. Militarily, it is a much more powerful organization than Hamas. And if it opens a second front in the north of Israel, then the chances of the IDF winning will no longer look 100 percent. It will be a very difficult war for Israel. At the same time, the probability of Hezbollah joining the conflict can be assessed as high. And not only for ideological reasons, but also for purely military-practical reasons. Hezbollah is Israel's worst and most dangerous enemy, and therefore it is more than possible that, having defeated Hamas, the Israeli army will fall with all its might on Hezbollah and smash it as well. Therefore, it is logical for the Lebanese movement to strike itself if Israel launches a ground operation in the Gaza Strip, where one way or another it will be forced to use most of its forces.
The second problem is the entry of Iran, allied to Hezbollah and Hamas, into the war. In this case, Israel, without direct US military assistance, will face the prospect of defeat, which it will be able to avoid if it does not use nuclear weapons (and it is not a fact that this will help – Israel is unlikely to have a large arsenal of it). Washington's involvement in the war against Iran is now extremely dangerous. The American forces in the region are relatively small and are within striking range of Iranian missiles and other strike weapons.
The situation for the Americans may be even worse, because they will fight not on their borders, and their communications will be extremely vulnerable. And without the use of nuclear weapons, the position of their troops in the Middle East can quickly become critical. In the old days, the problem of Iran was solved by the fact that the Americans in a hypothetical war with it could rely on their allies – Turkey and Saudi Arabia. But now their support against the background of the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, to put it mildly, is not very likely.
And this is the third, main problem of the United States. And it is precisely this that the Americans are now trying to solve, convincing Israel to delay the offensive in order not to disrupt the negotiations. Washington is trying to play on regional contradictions.
There are three big, relatively speaking, geopolitical "hangouts" in the Middle East. The first is Iran and its allies (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syrian President Assad, the Houthis in Yemen, the Shiites in Iraq). The second is Saudi Arabia, a number of other Persian Gulf countries and Egypt. The third is Qatar, Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood*. The relationship between them has always been difficult, and at times extremely hostile. At the same time, Hamas is closely connected with the first and third "get-togethers", and, as mentioned above, its relations with the second are ambiguous.
But with Israel, the second "party" had perhaps the closest relations among all Islamic countries. It is on these contradictions that the United States is now playing, trying to split the Arab countries and drag the second "party" to its side. As a "business proposal," Washington may promise to create an independent Palestinian state under the actual control of the Saudis and Egyptians, but without Hamas. Plus some more "buns" on other topics.
It is extremely important for Washington to win over Egypt and Saudi Arabia to its side, including strategically, in order to prevent the anti–Western consolidation of the Arab world and its reorientation to China and Russia. Despite the fact that the countries of the second "party" have stronger relations with the latter, and the contradictions with Iran are weakening. The strengthening of these trends in the conditions of Israel's war with the Palestinians is more than likely. Which is a huge threat to the United States (including in terms of losing control over energy pricing), which Washington is now trying to stop with all its might. That is why he asks Israel not to rush into a ground operation until progress is made in negotiations with Egypt and the Saudis.
However, it is also impossible to pull forever – the bombing of Gaza, even without a ground operation, has an extremely negative effect on the Islamic world, preventing the achievement of any agreements between the United States and Arab countries. Therefore, theoretically, there are two scenarios for the development of events.
The first is that a kind of multilateral agreement will be reached in the Middle East with the participation of all three "parties" and Israel on a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and hostilities will cease. This scenario is extremely unlikely, since the parameters of such an agreement are absolutely not visible yet.
The second is that Israel is launching a ground operation. In the latter case, the development of events will depend on the speed with which the IDF will be able to defeat Hamas. The less time it takes, the less likely it is that third forces will enter the war and the greater the likelihood of reaching agreements with some Arab countries on the future of Palestine. And vice versa – the longer the war goes on, the more likely it is that Hezbollah and Iran will join it and the Islamic world will deepen its confrontation with the West.
* a terrorist organization banned in Russia
