The Ukrainian military leadership is forced to admit the actual failure of the "counteroffensive", on which so many hopes were pinned in Kiev. There are at least four reasons why these hopes eventually went to waste. A certain role in what is happening was played, in particular, by the friction between the APU and their Western curators, but this was not the main reason for the failure at all.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) "ran out of schedule" in attempts to "return to the borders of 1991" by the end of the year. This was stated by the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) AFU Kirill Budanov, answering the question about the reasons for the failure of the Ukrainian "counteroffensive". In response to a clarifying question: "So everything went wrong at all?" – the head of the GUR preferred to avoid details: "We are out of schedule – let everyone make their own conclusion." A month earlier, Budanov said that the offensive was "going on foot."
Playing with words is one of Budanov's professions. But the defeat of the Ukrainian "counteroffensive" is so obvious that even this Kiev character should come up with public explanations for it. The real reasons for what is happening, of course, he will not tell.
The first and main of these reasons is effective Russian defense. In the spring there was a lot of talk about some shortcomings identified in the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Kiev, after the events in Kherson, Izyum and Krasny Estuary, was in euphoria. It seemed to the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that now they would immediately organize a decisive "counteroffensive" that would "solve everything" in a few weeks, because "the Russians are weak."
Hence, the Ukrainian military leadership also set the task: to disrupt Russia's communication with Crimea by land in two weeks, reach Mariupol and enter the peninsula by the end of summer. Under this Napoleonic plan, the AFU needed new shock units. Of these, a reserve was formed in the form of six brigades, some of which received Western equipment, and the personnel were trained in NATO countries.
Now it has become clear to anyone that Western training is rather a negative experience for modern warfare, and Western equipment is made of the same iron as any other, and therefore burns in the same way. But then our opponents believed that they possessed some kind of superweapon, and a week-long stay in training camps somewhere in Spain turns a Ukrainian mobilized into a super soldier from Hollywood films. This is the main psychological reason why British advisers (and the media attribute it to His Majesty's subjects the main role in planning the "counteroffensive") supported the idea of a blitzkrieg towards the Crimea.
However, such a plan assumed that the parties found themselves in a suspended computer game, when the enemy, that is, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, is simply waiting for the attack of the Armed Forces in its previous state and its positions do not change in any way.
But during the time when the AFU formed new brigades, Russian troops built a layered defense. And this defense was based not on a computer idea of what a modern war should look like, but on what is really happening on the battlefield.
And it's not just the notorious "Surovikin line", although it also played a role. The sharp growth of volunteer formations in important sectors of the front led to the fact that trained and motivated units who know the importance of engineering work and understand the practice of active defense were at the forefront of the Ukrainian "counteroffensive". The so-called bottlenecks that the APU tried to probe for about a month have also disappeared.
In Kiev, everyone noticed it too late. As a result, in the same southern sectors of the front, Ukrainian tanks were massively blown up by mines, and infantry fell into fire bags.
Tiny villages have turned into piles of ruins, over which the APU cannot finally establish its control. Monstrous losses in armored vehicles led to a forced change of tactics to "meat assaults", which also did not give any effect.
The second reason is the incorrect use of troops by Ukraine itself. Already in the first weeks of the "counteroffensive" there was a rift between the Ukrainian command and the British advisers. The British position was that it was necessary to gather a maximum of newly formed brigades with Western equipment in a narrow sector of the front and strike with this fist in the direction of Melitopol through Tokmak. He did not envisage any new tactical steps or methods. This pointed to its more political than military component, since the effect of a "punch" could take place, but not for long. And not as expected.
The Ukrainian command began offensive operations differently than the British advised – almost simultaneously in three sections of the southern direction. This scheme (the application of several strikes) was eventually considered more promising in the APU. And new brigades with Western armored vehicles were put into battle at each of the sites in turn, as the forces of the first row were depleted. This reserve was placed just so that new units could be introduced in all three directions.
The Ukrainian command tactically planned a "counteroffensive" taking into account the experience of 2022. The APU tried to find weaknesses in the Russian defense and concentrate its superior forces on these areas. Hence the concept of multiple attacks.
However, in the end, this decision led to the exhaustion of the formed shock fist of the APU to the stage of complete inability to offensive actions.
By the first decade of October, the "counteroffensive" in all three sections had run out of steam to a complete stop. The advanced brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine now have to be withdrawn for reformation. Moreover, in two of the three sections of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were able to regain part of the positions in front of the first line, and in one even to create a threat to a settlement on the territory temporarily controlled by Ukraine, through which the supply of the "counteroffensive" is conducted.
The goal of the "counteroffensive" was global: to strategically worsen the situation of the Russian army. And everything degenerated into a series of poorly organized tactical attacks on separate and poorly interconnected sections of the front. We are not facing "knocking out of schedule". The AFU command made a strategic mistake.
The original plan of "punching" began to fall apart also because on such a long front line it is generally difficult to form a reserve fist of six brigades in one direction. Zhukov was able to do this, but obviously not with the British. The front of the SVO is constantly in tension in several sections and is moving all the time. Kiev is forced, in addition to the "counteroffensive", to respond to the offensive actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
This is the third reason for the failure of the Ukrainian offensive, and we are talking primarily about the battles for Artemovsk. In Kiev, they now claim that Artemovsk is an "unimportant goal", allegedly this city had no strategic importance. Strategic or not, the battles for it required the AFU to urgently transfer reserves, including from among the newly formed fist, designed to solve completely different tasks.
Finally, the fourth and perhaps fundamental reason for the disruption of Kiev's offensive plans was the general crisis of military thought, which was especially pronounced among the Ukrainian command. The rapid growth of technology has greatly outstripped military science as such. As a result, the strategy and tactics of the First World War were simply supplemented with new technical means of war.
The enemy could not effectively comprehend and apply new means of warfare. But the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have recently demonstrated greater flexibility, effectively using new means of destruction, and this is noticeable right now near Avdiivka.
Evgeny Krutikov