What tactics were used by the militants, and because of what the regular army could not resist it
The results of the attack by Hamas militants on Israel indicate the failures of the work of local special services and insufficient training of the army, experts interviewed by Izvestia believe. Despite the fact that a defense system with observation posts, patrols and bases of rapid reaction battalions was created along the entire border with the Gaza Strip, Palestinian detachments managed to capture key IDF strongholds in a matter of hours and seriously penetrate into the country. For two days, the Israeli army could not completely dislodge the militants from cities and settlements. Why the first Hamas strike was unexpected, what tactics the Palestinians adhere to, and how the fighting will develop — in our material.
To a depth of 30-35 kilometers
The attack on Israel began early in the morning on October 7. Initially, several thousand homemade rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip by Hamas detachments. Also, Arab militants used a limited number of attack drones. Their targets were military and civilian facilities on the border territory — in Sderot, Netivot, Beer Chef and other cities.
The Southern Air Defense Regiment is responsible for defending the territory of Israel from air attacks from the Gaza Strip. It includes several divisions of Iron Dome anti—missile systems. But the number of rockets launched by Hamas exceeded the capabilities of the air defense system. Therefore, many shells have achieved their goals.
Immediately after the missile launch was detected, the Israeli command announced the alarm. The civilian population was sent to bomb shelters, and the personnel of military units to special shelters. This has greatly facilitated the implementation of Hamas' plans.
After the rocket attack, Arab militants stormed Israeli defensive positions covering the border of the Gaza Strip. The 143rd territorial division "Shualei ha-Esh" (translated from Hebrew - "Fire Foxes") was responsible for the defense of this direction.
At the very border, the division command deployed observation posts, between which foot units patrolled daily, as well as personnel on armored vehicles, armored personnel carriers and tanks. Israeli infantry companies and police forces were also deployed at border checkpoints.
Deep in the defense of the 143rd Division were the bases of rapid reaction battalions. According to the plan of the command, their personnel had to move quickly to help in case of an aggravation of the situation.
To storm Israeli positions, Hamas units used tactics previously used by ISIS militants (a terrorist group banned in Russia) during the fighting in Syria. First, with the help of drones or jihad mobiles, key defense positions are attacked. After that, a large mass of infantry goes on the attack at maximum speed — on foot, in cars or motorcycles. Demoralized defenders find it difficult to resist the instantaneous attack of a large mass of manpower.
In the case of the 143rd Division, the fact that most of the personnel of the Israeli military left for the weekend played into the hands of Hamas militants. And the remaining fighters in the positions mostly hid in shelters during the missile attack.
From 6 to 14 o'clock, Hamas militants managed to destroy almost all observation posts, as well as storm several border checkpoints and even bases of rapid reaction battalions. Also, several foot patrols and tanks became victims of the attack. A large number of Israeli weapons and armored vehicles were seized at military bases.
During the decisive attack, Hamas militants landed several sea and air (on motorized helicopters) landings. Their task was to capture important areas of the terrain in order to prevent the approach of Israeli reserves to the place of fighting. Several boats were destroyed by Israeli forces. But in general, the landings fulfilled their task.
Also, small terrorist detachments operating in almost all cities of the southern part of Israel provided active support to the advancing forces. They seized several government buildings and police stations.
The Israeli command reacted to the attack with delay. Only from 2 p.m. on October 7, the Israel Defense Forces began to strike targets in the Gaza Strip. Only at around 15:00, the transfer of reserves by helicopters began to the area of the fighting.
On the night of Saturday to Sunday, the first armored and motorized infantry units began to approach. At the same time, several columns of armored vehicles were fired at by Hamas militants. Several Merkava tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed.
By the evening of October 8, the Palestinian militants had gone about 30-35 km deep into Israel. In an official summary, Hamas said that they carried out a coordinated attack on more than 50 settlements in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip and in the southern region.
In the night from Saturday to Sunday, Hamas launched a new massive rocket attack on the territory of Israel. This time the targets were almost all major cities, including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. At least three thousand rockets were fired. Once again, such a number of shells seriously overloaded the Israeli air defense. A significant part of the missiles were able to achieve their goals. All day on October 8, mutual blows continued.
On the afternoon of September 8, Hamas said that its fighters on five boats landed on the coast near Israeli Ashkelon and seized parts of the city.
The representative of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Jonathan Conricus, said on the same day that the situation in the country had not yet been brought under full control. The Israeli forces are clearing settlements of small terrorist groups and continuing to transfer reserves.
Several high-ranking army and police officers were killed during the day. Among them, the commander of the IDF brigade Jonathan Steinberg, Brigadier General of the border police Izhar Peled, many senior officers.
The total number of victims was 2,156 people, the Israeli Ministry of Health reported on the evening of October 8. Local media reported the deaths of more than 700 people.
On the evening of October 8, the Ministry of Health of Gaza said that 370 people were killed and 2.2 thousand were injured in various degrees due to retaliatory Israeli strikes.
At the request of Izvestia, military experts and veterans of the special services commented on the events.
"Hamas counterintelligence has well brainwashed the Israelis"
Military expert Viktor Murakhovsky:
— In this conflict, the Hamas counterintelligence showed itself best. I have well brainwashed the Israelis who overslept the beginning of hostilities. Hence the loss of the first hours, including equipment. Israel's air defense has shown that it can cope with the selected targets. But the Israelis did not have enough anti-aircraft missiles to repel the attack. Two missiles are usually needed for the target, but there were none. The air defense was simply oversaturated with the number of targets and broke through.
A new generation has grown up in Palestine, which has not seen a big war. Hamas has got young people who are ready to go into battle without hesitation. She showed what she can do today. But the methods remained the same. Attacking civilians, taking hostages — all this is not accepted in the conduct of a major war, these are terrorist methods.
Israel declared martial law and began conscription. I think in a couple of days he will sort out the problems and overcome the crisis.
"The great failure of the Israeli intelligence services and the army"
Military expert Yuri Lyamin:
— We saw a big failure of the Israeli special services and the army. They overslept the preparation of a large operation. Moreover, as you do not hide, there are signs that will alert the enemy, give out your training. This includes building up arsenals, ammunition and a number of other activities.
It seems to me that Israel simply did not believe that the Palestinians would decide to conduct a large-scale ground operation. Hence the defeat of the first hours. Soldiers and officers were caught by surprise, they were shot in the barracks, the equipment was sheathed. At the same time, the army did not show itself from the best side: the garrisons located on the border showed negligent carelessness.
The Palestinians, of course, do not have the same equipment that the IDF has, but they have used the achievements of recent years. Drones played an important role, it is clear that the experience of recent conflicts has been studied and tactics have been developed on its basis. And it was successfully applied at the first stage. The Palestinians also had their own findings — the same tactical paragliding landings, thanks to which they managed to get to the rear of the opposing side. They were a surprise.
With the planning and implementation at the first stage, Hamas was doing well. The Palestinians managed to break through the enemy's air defenses. The famous "Iron Dome" was simply overextended. More rockets flew than there were in Israeli anti-aircraft installations. Let's see what happens next. Israel has complete superiority in aviation, heavy armored vehicles, artillery.
"The militants planned everything very carefully"
Veteran officer of special purpose units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, participant in combat operations and special operations, call sign Scat:
— Even with the development of events favorable for Israel, when during the counterterrorist operation by the defense forces, the militants will be destroyed and squeezed out, and the military structure of these formations will be systematically destroyed by air and missile strikes - the world will not be the same.
The threat to Israel has grown significantly in just a couple of days. Now everyone knows that "Merkavs" can be burned with cheap drones, and tiktokersh in Israeli uniform can be dragged with impunity in the trunk of a jeep.
The attacks will continue in the near future and attempts are already being made to expand their scale. More and more militants from among ordinary residents of Palestine will be attracted. There is no need to agitate anyone there.
It immediately caught my eye that in the directions of a possible invasion there was complete laxity of personnel. The attacks simply overslept. The vast majority of those killed were in their underwear. And it's not even about the fact that there is a lack of proactive intelligence. We are talking about a banal violation of all possible standards of guard duty and internal service by the servicemen themselves.
It is also evident that there is no organization of measures to repel a possible armed invasion. Border units should conduct regular training in this direction, prepare fire cards, strong points, etc.
This "merit" is not only the leadership of these units — this is a trend that has been formed for a long time in the absence of control from the higher command. There is a lack of combat readiness checks or a formal approach to conducting control and verification activities.
A large number of prisoners and killed from among the command. The general was captured, the brigade commander was killed. There is a planning of such events. I don't believe in random luck. They worked in a targeted manner. Thorough work was carried out on additional intelligence of information about the Israeli military leadership on the ground.
Coordination of the actions of the militants: everything is very carefully planned. With large-scale rocket and artillery support, the use of almost the full range of available means of cheap, but effective weapons (UAVs, paragliders, motorcycles). Strikes by small trained and well-armed groups on key posts and facilities. And then massive work on organizing riots among the local population. And all the Israelis overslept. The question arises about the effectiveness of intelligence work by Israeli intelligence services.
Female Israeli military prisoners are the strongest blow to the moral and psychological state of the military and the civilian population themselves. In addition, it is a blow to the image of the Israeli army.
I watched several videos with the actions of the Israeli police special forces. Frankly speaking, it resembles a running competition. Taking into account the fact that more than half of what was viewed is work on single militants and small groups — just some kind of fussy running around devoid of any tactical plan. There are not even attempts to block the occupied building. There is no use of armor and special weapons. The movements are stupid — a full-length crowd in an open area. There is not even a distant resemblance to the construction of a combat order dictated by the situation and tasks.
Alexey Ramm
Dmitry Astrakhan
Bogdan Stepovoy