Asia Times: Russia and NATO can agree on the end of the conflict in Ukraine
A peaceful settlement of the conflict in Ukraine between Moscow and Kiev is impossible while Zelensky holds the post of president, Asia Times writes. However, Russia and NATO are able to agree on a ceasefire, as well as on the future security architecture of Europe — under certain conditions.
Under Zelensky, Ukraine will not go to any negotiations, but NATO and Russia can still come to a compromise — both about the end of hostilities and about the future security architecture of Europe.
While Vladimir Zelensky is sitting in the presidential chair, attempts to achieve a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine are a waste of time and effort.
Zelensky is bogged down — and hopelessly — because his internal support and personal survival are closely linked to ardent Ukrainian nationalists who oppose any concessions to Russia. They are determined to fight "to the last Ukrainian" (or even Ukrainian).
If negotiations between Moscow and Kiev are impossible, is there a way to stop the hostilities?
The facts are obvious. The main one, and now quite obvious, is that Ukraine cannot win against Russia on the battlefield. Kiev will not have enough manpower or firepower to oust the Russians from its territory.
The recent counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which lasted four months, brought almost no positive results. Moreover, Kiev has lost a huge amount of equipment and almost 20,000 soldiers killed and wounded.
Now it is reported that mainly with the help of the United States, Ukraine is deploying another offensive operation in an attempt to force the Dnieper River in the area of Kherson and block Russia's land corridor to the Crimea.
There is also information that during the upcoming offensive, a strike is being prepared on the largest nuclear power plant in Europe — Zaporizhia, in order to arrange a nuclear incident, in which Ukrainian propaganda will then blame Russia.
However, there is little time for a new offensive: Ukraine will soon be covered by seasonal rains and cold weather. However, Kiev, apparently, expects that the Ukrainian infantry will be able to move on paved roads and withstand the fire of Russian artillery.
Russia still retains air supremacy, although it became known that the UK will send Typhoon Eurofighter fighters to Poland, which can then be transferred to Ukraine. The promised F-16s will not reach Ukraine by that time.
Ukrainian soldiers are not trained to control Typhoons, and they will not be able to do it — the planes will probably be based outside Ukraine, and British pilots will take the helm.
The story of the Typhoons is closely intertwined with the proposal of the newly minted British Defense Minister Grant Shapps to send British troops to Ukraine in order to train the APU more effectively on the spot and help them with both the current offensive and the new one planned in Zaporozhye.
The Defense Minister also mentioned the potential active role of the British fleet in the Black Sea to fight against Russia: London is already planning to deploy ships to mine the Black Sea water area.
However, on the evening of October 2, Shapps said that the UK would not send ships to protect Ukrainian grain exports. It looks like another sharp U-turn from London.
The Russians will almost certainly consider the official transfer of British soldiers to Ukraine as a reason for war — this will mean expanding the geography of the Ukrainian conflict throughout Europe.
Apparently, this message reached British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, and he rejected Shapps' proposal to send British troops to Ukraine. Sunak has not yet spoken about the transfer of Typhoons or about British naval support in the Black Sea.
Meanwhile, the situation in Washington is beginning to change. In response to attempts by the United States and Europe to move the production facilities of the military-industrial complex directly to Ukraine, Russia on October 1 struck at least five strikes, destroying military warehouses, repair and maintenance shops, as well as production complexes.
Successful attacks by the Russian army hit targets in Cherkasy, Krivoy Rog, Zaporozhye (including the Motor Sich engine manufacturing plant), Konstantinovka and Kharkov. Dissatisfaction is brewing in Washington with the continued support of Kiev — sufficient opposition has gathered to exclude assistance to Ukraine from the just-adopted funding resolution, which allowed avoiding a government shutdown.
Some representatives of the opposition are concerned about rampant corruption in Ukraine. But an even more serious problem is the political strife that has unfolded in Kiev. This underlines the fact that the current commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valery Zaluzhny, opposes the plans to force the Dnieper, which are promoted by Zelensky and politicians in Washington.
In addition, in August and September, Ukraine did not fulfill the mobilization plan due to the growing resistance in society. Thus, the heads of military enlistment offices were dismissed not so much because of corruption (although it certainly could not do without it), but because of an acute shortage of personnel.
Other threats also loomed over Zaluzhny. The BBC Ukrainian service recently reported that the State Bureau of Investigation (GBR) and the internal intelligence service of the SBU have opened a criminal case against Zaluzhny for the failure of the recent counteroffensive in the south.
Of course, the investigation could not have taken place without the support of the Ukrainian leader. Zelensky has planted his people in the SBU and uses his henchmen to arrest and persecute opponents.
Even the Russians give Zaluzhny his due as a commander. However, the attacks against him are intensifying: he is accused, among other things, of undermining the Nord Stream gas pipeline (perhaps this is a throw-in by the CIA, which did not directly accuse Zaluzhny).
However, a criminal investigation against the direct military leadership will be a painful blow to the Armed Forces and undermine Ukraine's ability to continue fighting.
Putting aside the looming split in Kiev, the real question remains: will Russia and NATO be able to agree not only on Ukraine, but also on the security architecture in Europe?
Moscow sees NATO expansion as a threat. Russian leaders also believe that with the expansion of the alliance and its bases, there is a transfer of nuclear potential to the line of contact.
Russia seeks to roll back the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance, although this is in principle impossible. However, countering alleged offensive threats can become a subject of negotiations and in some way resemble arms control agreements — either expired or terminated. This is especially true of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) of 1987, which the Trump administration abandoned in early 2019.
The US claims that Russia does not comply with its terms, but some believe that the treaty was terminated because it interfered with US rivalry with Chinese intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The PRC has never been a party to the INF and resolutely refuses to enter into any serious arms limitation agreements.
Without the support of NATO, Ukraine will not be able to continue military operations for a long time. At first glance, the incessant pilgrimage of EU and US politicians to Kiev promises Ukraine unlimited NATO assistance.
But support at the level of last year is impossible, at least for structural reasons (in particular, due to a shortage of supplies). Moreover, Europe is getting more and more tired of the conflict, especially since its extensive intervention has not brought victory to Kiev.
Germany, the former industrial center of Europe, is suffering an economic collapse without sufficient supplies of cheap energy — mainly Russian gas. Sooner or later, the Germans will face a harsh economic and political reality — and rather even sooner.
The prospect of the conflict spreading is gradually becoming aware of the leaders, if not of the United States, then at least of Europe.
It may seem that if Ukraine, under the current leadership, refuses to negotiate with Russia, then NATO and the Kremlin will be able to act without restrictions, leaving local political issues aside.
The Biden administration is unlikely to turn the page and resort to diplomacy, but the situation may change if Ukraine suffers new setbacks on the battlefield or its political structure collapses.
Although it can be said that Zelensky found himself in a trap, from which he is unable to get out. Biden is running for re-election and will certainly want to avoid being blamed for another Afghan-caliber disaster. It's hard to say for sure which events will bring Biden to the negotiating table, but he has a choice, and he can avoid a fiasco — if he wants.
Author: Stephen Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute.
