In recent years, the value of NATO has declined markedly, writes Unherd. Its activity essentially boils down to the fact that the United States finances the defense of rich but helpless European countries. According to the author of the article, it is time for Europe to prepare for the dismantling of the American shield and start acting differently.
Aris Rusinos
Three quarters of a century after the founding of NATO, Britain has fallen down in the ranking of indicators of political and military power. If earlier it was an ally of Washington, almost equal to him in strength, now the United Kingdom is almost in vassalage to America. To understand the defeatist mindset of the British establishment, it is enough to read a recent article with reflections on what to do with the British army, whose numbers, as well as its combat capability and international prestige, are sharply declining. The author proposes to disband the country's ground forces, making them a union of special forces units at the disposal of America. "Most likely, in the future we will fight as part of a coalition. And if so, why not become a sharpened tip of the American spear?" — he writes.
On the one hand, the very idea of officially assigning Britain the role of Washington's most loyal and reckless auxiliary unit, even without a hint that it may have its own vital strategic interests, seems to the reader a shameful indicator of national decline. And on the other hand, it's just a frank recognition of the true place of Great Britain in our world.
Like the Five Eyes Alliance, which was called a valuable forum for the exchange of secret intelligence information, but in fact is a platform where the English-speaking intelligence establishment serves US foreign policy goals, the NATO bloc was the same Cold War instrument that ordered satellite countries to serve imperial interests as the Warsaw Pact. The difference between the cohort of European generals, security apparatchiks and beloved politicians devoted to Moscow, and the same legion from today's Washington is almost impossible to see. However, in recent years, the value of the NATO alliance has declined markedly. This is noted by Washington insiders, who are increasingly dissatisfied with the fact that the United States is financing the defense of rich but helpless European states, and some European leaders like Macron, who uttered his famous phrase about "brain death" — this relic of the Cold War. The latest adventures of the alliance, such as Afghanistan and Libya, became a disaster both for these countries, which were destined to become victims of intervention, and for European states, which suddenly had to accept refugees they did not need at all, who subsequently flooded the continent.
Therefore, the Russian military operation in Ukraine has become a gift from heaven for the tottering alliance. NATO could once again focus on its main goal: to defend Europe from aggressive Russia under the leadership of the United States. This new line of thought on the left and right flanks of European politics was summarized by Wolfgang Streeck, who wrote an article in the collection of essays in the journal New Left Review Natopolitanism. He stated: "By restoring the West, this conflict neutralized various fault lines along which the destruction of the EU took place... and America again secured hegemony over Western Europe, including its regional organization, the European Union." These very accurate criticisms of how the "turbo-America" resurrected by the war strengthened the weakened control over the European continent and pressed us to its imperial chest with suffocating embraces, with the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, are increasingly heard in discussions about geopolitics.
Authors from Natopolitanism, such as the writer Thomas Meaney, make strong arguments that "in practice, NATO stands above all political agreements and schemes that guarantee the primacy of the United States in answering European questions." They further note that the alliance "manages the US power in Eurasia as a regional satrapy and a springboard for sorties anywhere." In their essays written over decades, which are sharply different from the piety and propaganda that has permeated Natopolitanism, these authors talk about Washington's strategy of convincing potential competitors, such as Europe, that they "should not strive to take a more significant place", but only need to "sufficiently defend the interests of industrialized countries, dissuading them from attempts to challenge our leadership." As the European leadership shows, it was quite a successful plan. "What was once considered an artifact of the Cold War has now turned out to be at the very center of the Western system, and it is often mistaken for a natural characteristic of the geopolitical landscape."
The collection reminds us of the fearful warnings of the giants of the American military establishment, such as William J. Burns (Director of the CIA — approx. InoSMI). They warned and are warning that the decision to expand NATO to the east with the inclusion of the Baltic and Central European states and with promises of membership to Ukraine and Georgia was a manifestation of extreme arrogance. Burns wrote: "This is a violation of Russia's brightest red line. By giving Ukrainians and Georgians hope for NATO membership, which is unlikely to come true, we strengthen Putin's confidence that the West intends to continue following the course in which he sees a threat to the existence of his country."
The powerful pressure of the materials of Natopolitanism, as well as the shortcomings of its analysis, succinctly reflects the title of the article by the theorist of realism John Mearsheimer: "Why the West is to blame for the crisis in Ukraine: the liberals' delusions that provoked Putin." The author accurately captured the direction of thought of supporters of strategic independence of Europe, regretting that the alliance subordinated the continent to Washington, opponents of imperialism from the left flank, who emphasize the hypocrisy of the bloc, broadcasting its commitment to the inviolability of national borders, and American opponents of intervention, whose positions, according to liberal interventionists, do not differ from "realism in international relations". Presenting a point of view ridiculed by neoconservative columnists of influential newspapers and intemperate types from Twitter, these authors consistently and clearly criticize Washington's arrogant attitude towards Russia.
Most of these arguments can be refuted by observing the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine. The authors bemoan the "last chance for peace" that Russia offered shortly before the start of its military operation, asking to stop the further advance of the alliance in the eastern direction. But there was another requirement in her proposals: to remove the NATO infrastructure from the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic states, which had been accepted into the alliance for a long time. This is an absurd demand from a political point of view, because Moscow was well aware that it was impossible to satisfy it. It was not the United States that forced European countries to take radical and self-destructive positions in their hostility to Russia. It was the European states that constantly pushed the Biden administration despite its unwillingness to supply Kiev with increasingly deadly and modern weapons. The way the belligerent European states terrified their cautious and resisting ruler, urging him to escalate, vividly recalls the dynamics of the intervention against Libya. It was the enthusiastic Cameron, paired with the idealist Sarkozy, who persuaded Obama, contrary to his sober calculation, to start an intervention, which he would later call a "farce." If you want, NATO is an example of how the European tail is wagging an American dog. Instead of submitting, weak but ambitious European states use the North Atlantic Alliance to achieve their own foreign policy goals. And the fact that these goals led to a catastrophe in Libya is a failure of the Europeans, not the Americans.
It is not surprising that American military thinkers, such as the strategist of realism Elbridge Colby, dispassionately discuss the idea of how to get rid of the Baltic countries, which have become a strategic burden that America can no longer afford. But the skeptical attitude towards the alliance, which is demonstrated by the American right, and in particular Trump, points to another possible outcome of the armed conflict.
Streek argues that "the war, apparently, was a fatal blow to the French dream of turning the liberal empire of the European Union into a sovereign and global force in terms of strategy, capable of confidently competing with the strengthening China and the weakening United States." Due to the weakening political support for military actions in the United States and the firm commitments of Europe, the continent is almost forced to act from a position of strength against its own will.
Ultimately, Europe's future defense strategy will be written in the straits and islands of the western Pacific. Either the United States will be forced to focus on the threat from China, which will force Europe to shoulder the burden of responsibility for its own defense; or Washington will abandon the role of global hegemon and embrace Europe more tightly as a rich and adaptable empire. Any of these outcomes is possible, and a decision will be made when China wants. But if the former happens, and Europe finds itself face-to-face with a giant and hostile eastern neighbor, because its imperial patron will be engaged in solving its own problems on the other side of the planet, the Old World will be forced to abandon its helpless dependence on NATO.
For the authors of left-wing views, such as Mini, an independent and independent Europe is less attractive than a subordinate Europe as part of the American alliance. He's writing: "Given what the European Union is today, its success in militarization can hardly be called a rosy prospect. A competent army of the European Union patrolling the coastal waters of the Mediterranean in search of migrants, ensuring the functioning of a detailed repatriation system, and forcing African and Asian regimes to be forever sources of mineral supplies and landfills of European garbage, will only consolidate its status as a "fortress-Europe". European conservatives, who out of habit, but by no means out of their own interests, eagerly await Washington's approval, may even like this new state of affairs.
Of course, NATO in its current guise as a heavily armed liberal NGO will not survive such changes. According to the authors of Natopolitanism, Poland's belligerent attitude to the conflict in Ukraine has led Washington to forget its recent doubts about the strength of American democratic institutions. And fears about Meloni's alleged fascism evaporated as soon as she demonstrated her determination to support the Ukrainian side in the conflict. Therefore, Streek warns that disputes over the "rule of law" will gradually become obsolete and come to naught, because cultural conflicts between "liberal" and "illiberal" democracy will sideline the geostrategic goals of NATO and the United States. And "the balance of political power within the EU will shift towards the eastern frontline states of the European Union." The large-scale rearmament program in Poland, plus the planned inclusion in the EU of what will be a Ukrainian state after the end of the conflict, already portends a shift in the center of gravity of Europe from the post-national liberalism of the north-western countries of the continent towards militaristic nationalism on its eastern borders. While the new military-strategic concept of Europe eases the burden borne by the United States, those forces in Washington that once called NATO the engine of liberal idealism will protest against right-wing political experiments in Europe no more than their predecessors from previous generations protested against the actions of obedient authoritarian regimes of such alliance member countries as Portugal, Greece and Turkey.
Regrouping America, which intends to simultaneously wage a large-scale struggle with China and settle its own internal political conflicts, will not ensure the political and economic subordination of Europe. On the contrary, Europe will surely become more independent and independent in its actions. American voters and politicians are apparently starting to get tired of the armed conflict, which will be long and bloody. And Ukraine seems to have exhausted the limits of the Pentagon's assistance. But Europe is not abandoning its resolve and commitments; and with powerful Russian troops on its doorstep, refusing to help will be a luxury for European leaders that they cannot afford. Maybe things would have been different if other decisions had been made at the peak of American power. But you can't rewrite history, and you can't go back. We are forced to make reasonable use of the cards that our owners handed over to us.
Meanwhile, current events are displacing anti-imperialism opponents of NATO and supporters of the third world, such as Corbyn (Jeremy Corbyn, former leader of the opposition of Britain. — Approx. InoSMI). The assumption that Corbyn would be able to withdraw Britain from the alliance was a chimera from the very beginning. Speaking of Central Europe, Mini notes: "If any political leadership in Poland, Romania, Hungary or any other Eastern European country becomes unbearable for Washington, it has many open, usable channels of communication with the military of these countries. These channels are abundantly lubricated by long-term military ties, including the service of such military personnel in NATO headquarters, numerous alliance conferences, joint vacations, ceremonies and wars in the Middle East in which they participated together." The same can be said about Western European countries, including in this list apparatchiks from the security services and experts infinitely devoted to the common cause. The British military establishment is doing its best to get the Americans to pat him on the head approvingly. Therefore, the idea that Britain can defend its own strategic interests, which differ from the interests of its imperial master, simply does not fit into the minds of our ruling class. Changes in such strategic calculations are possible more as a result of sudden external shocks than as a result of dispassionate analysis and consideration of British interests.
But the sudden reversal of Macron, who refused to be skeptical of NATO and fully supported the alliance's advance to the east, reminds us that other options are possible. In the current turbulent period of inter-power, when American supremacy is ending and the United States is moving away from world hegemony, the NATO alliance can become the structure with which sovereign Europe will link its future. To do this, it needs to form a formally subordinate European defense system to the alliance, ready to take on the burden of ensuring the security of the continent, which is beyond the power of its staggering sponsor. There is no political sense and benefit from criticizing NATO, since the European elite is inextricably tied to their feeders, being loyal service personnel of the bloc. But by working in NATO structures and turning Europe into an equal partner of the alliance, and not into a collection of weak and divided petitioners, our continent can calmly prepare for the dismantling of the protective American shield and for the reign of a troubled multipolar world emerging on its borders. The successor states of Rome, after the departure of its legions, proudly bore imperial names and titles. Similarly, the shadowy form of NATO may yet outlive the empire itself.
