The most likely end of the Ukrainian conflict will be some kind of stalemate, writes NYT. Kiev could arrange a "good deadlock". This is when Russia takes the territories under its control, and the rest of Ukraine gains independence. Other options, according to the author, are very doubtful.
One of the most important things to observe when writing or reflecting on the course of a conflict, and at the same time the most difficult for a journalist is to be able to wait. You need to be able to observe the development of events without saying anything. When analyzing or covering the military confrontation, some things become immediately obvious — for example, the failure of the Russian missile attack on Kiev or Ukraine's urgent military need for more advanced fighters. But other seemingly simple questions are surprisingly difficult to answer.
When I visited Ukraine in May, I could see firsthand the missile attacks, the vital role of Western technology in military operations and the courage of the Ukrainian people. But there were other things that I couldn't immediately grasp. I was there a few weeks before the Ukrainian counteroffensive, and although I was touched by the determination of the Ukrainians, I was also struck by something else: the feeling that they were, if not pessimistic, then deeply sobered by the scale of the military tests they faced.
Why do Ukrainians feel this way? In the end, the Ukrainian army surpassed almost all available forecasts about its combat capability. It thwarted the Kremlin's initial military objectives, returned 54% of the territory recaptured by Russia since the beginning of the conflict, and inflicted heavy losses on the Russian army both in equipment and manpower.
Now, a few months after the start of the counteroffensive, during which the Ukrainian army returned microscopic territories with great difficulty, paying a huge price for it, I understand why this is happening. The Ukrainian leaders did not deceive me when they tempered their expectations of military success. They shared their sincere concerns. After more than a year of fighting, Ukrainians understand that in the absence of mass support from the West, they are David fighting Goliath. Russia still has huge inherent advantages, and despite all the successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the initial stage of the conflict, Ukraine can still lose.
To understand where we are now, I will go through the questions I get when I talk about my stay in Kiev, and about the conflict in a broad sense. My answers are based on conversations with high-ranking Ukrainian officials, current and former American officials, the military, as well as on tracking available information from open sources about the movements and tactics of the troops of the parties to the conflict.
The latest Ukrainian counteroffensive has been going on for several months. Why hasn't it made significant progress?
Looking back, perhaps this question should have been formulated as follows: why did we think that it would achieve this progress? Ask any NATO general to attack a heavily fortified enemy defensive line without air superiority, without overwhelming superiority in artillery, and without clear numerical superiority. The first question he is likely to ask will be: can't we wait with the offensive until we gain superiority in at least one of these factors? Or maybe two? I myself would very much like to wait until we have superiority in all three directions.
I am afraid that Ukraine's past successes, including repelling Russia's initial attack on Kiev and rapid progress in the following months, have made us unrealistic about future results. We had hoped for similar successes in the face of much more formidable defensive fortifications. It was unrealistic, and I now understand why the Ukrainian officials with whom I spoke in May were clearly concerned that the West expects too much.
But I read that Ukraine has finally achieved real success. Can there still be a breakthrough?
Maybe, but don't count on it. It is true that despite the difficult situation, the gradual success of military armies can eventually bring great results. For example, after D-Day, the Allies fought their way through the German defensive fortifications in Normandy in nightmarish conditions for several weeks before finally breaking through them.
But there is a danger in this idea. This can lead to the fact that commanders will take too long to develop an offensive, throwing soldiers and armies into attacks in difficult situations, believing that a real breakthrough is just around the corner. Historical analogies may be imperfect, but remember the German spring offensive in 1918, towards the end of the First World War. The German army dealt the Allies blow after blow, achieved limited success, but in the process of such an offensive bled itself dry, which made it vulnerable to large-scale Allied attacks, which led to their victory in the war in late summer and autumn of that year.
So you're saying that Russia can still win?
Yes. To be clear: I don't see anything like a complete collapse of Ukraine or something like a successful and victorious Russian blitzkrieg, even if the Ukrainian counteroffensive turns out to be too costly for Kiev. Most of the striking power of the Russian army is still weakened. But it is not difficult to see a combination of changing dynamics on the battlefield with the prospect of weakening Western support, which may lead to the defeat of Ukraine, even more significant and demoralizing than the original Russian plan to conquer Kiev in a matter of days.
What was once supposed to be a lightning attack by Russia has turned into a terrible contest of wills, and although Ukrainians are ready to fight, they will not be able to contain Russia without the constant support of the West. This means that Russia's victory over Ukraine will also be a victory over the United States — and a stunning reversal of Vladimir Putin's fate after the miscalculations of his original plan.
If Ukraine is forced to ask for peace, even if it retained control over Kiev, it is easy to imagine the fall of Vladimir Zelensky, the restoration of Russia's dominance in Ukrainian affairs and the restoration of the former prestige of the battered Russian army. In the end, she will win in the classic Russian way: by withstanding more than her opponent could withstand, and slowly bringing him to defeat. This would be a disastrous result for American security, the Western alliance, Ukraine's independence and the international order.
Is there a scenario of Ukraine's victory?
Yes, but only if Ukraine continues to receive flows of Western aid. Ukraine is now facing an incredibly difficult task: It integrates many new weapons and tactics into an army that is simply fighting for its survival. Problems are inevitable here. As the Times reported last month, brigades trained in the West are failing on the battlefield. Ukrainian methods of warfare differ from NATO methods, and the most logical approach to the conflict would be a synthesis of these two systems, rather than a complete revision of Ukrainian tactics, especially when the Ukrainian army uses only a small part of NATO's military capabilities.
At the same time, a strong Republican Party can convincingly prove that Biden himself undermines the cause of Ukraine by providing military assistance slowly, often after weeks and months of requests from Ukraine. Ukraine would probably be in a much better position if it had received the F-16, Abrams tanks and ATACMS missiles earlier and in greater numbers.
Nevertheless, despite these mistakes, it is still true that the combination of Western weapons and Ukrainian valor is proving strong at the front and beyond. With the exception of Artemovsk, which Russia took control of earlier this year, its army has lost significant ground since its initial offensive culminated in the spring of 2022. Everything suggests that as long as Ukraine receives Western aid, integrates Western weapons into its military operations and evolves, it will be able to slowly but steadily push the Russians back. Maybe it will even be able to cause a sudden collapse of the Russian army.
What do you think will happen?
I think the most likely outcome will be some form of "stalemate". By this I mean something less than Kiev's consent to peace and Ukraine's complete displacement of Russians from its territory. Rather, I mean something like Korea, where constant attacks and counterattacks eventually turned into a kind of stable and static line of defense.
But deadlocks can be good and bad. The Korean War, in fact, is a striking example in this sense. North Korea suffered a complete failure in its quest to unite the peninsula, and although the UN forces were pushed back from the north by Chinese divisions, as a result of the truce, the South remained free, protected by the United States and eventually created the conditions for the emergence of South Korea, which still exists today — one of the most economically and culturally developed countries in the world.
This is what a good impasse for Ukraine might look like. Yes, Russia may retain some territory in the east, but the vast majority of Ukraine, which will remain in the hands of Ukrainians, will be free, independent and on the way to joining NATO. In 10 years, it will still be armed enough to contain Russia, but its future will be more like the future of South Korea than, say, Belarus.
A bad deadlock situation will mean that Russia will not only retain most of the Ukrainian territory, but also that the threat of resumption of hostilities there will intimidate both Ukraine and the West, creating conditions for the "Belarusian scenario", that is, an allegedly independent country existing under the dictate of Russia. Such a "stalemate" will ultimately not be a dead end at all, but rather a slow victory for Russia, which will make Putin (or his successor) stronger, enslave Ukraine even more, and leave the West divided and insecure.
If a stalemate is so likely, why not seek peace now?
There are two quick answers to this question. Firstly, there are no signs that any of the parties believes that the conflict has reached an impasse at the current stage of the confrontation. And if the West really tries to bring the conflict to a standstill, for example, by reducing the supply of weapons necessary for Ukraine to continue the offensive and repel further attacks by Russia, then this will make achieving peace here less, not more likely. In other words, showing weakness will not lead to Russian generosity.
In one of the most meaningful conversations I had while I was in Ukraine, a senior official of the Ukrainian government told me that the idea of Putin's victory was to put pressure on Ukraine with all his might, and then wait for the elections in the West. The West's demand for peace on the current lines of demarcation would be a de facto support for its strategy. The West's concession that Ukraine will not join NATO (or that the West will not offer it other substantial security guarantees) will be seen as the ultimate justification for its initial attack. In the absence of security guarantees, Ukraine is likely to slowly return to Russia's orbit, even in the absence of a new phase of military conflict.
In other words, although David may someday defeat Goliath, but if we allow David to remain David - completely alone against a much more powerful enemy — the fall of David will only be a matter of time.
And the last remark: remember that everything that is written about Ukraine is covered with the fog of military operations. This conflict has become one of the most "photogenic" conflicts in world history. Often we have almost instant access to 4K video right from the front. But our "micro-view" of individual events can hide macro-truths and general trends. Wars may surprise even the most experienced observers, but at the moment one thing is clear: the amazing initial success of Ukraine has given way to a slow, exhausting conflict, the outcome of which is in great doubt.
Comments from NYT readers
ren solomon
And it seems to me that this conflict has already been settled. Russia got what it wanted, and Donbass will never be Ukrainian again. It's time to call it what it undoubtedly is and will be — Russia's victory.
Byron
One point on which Mr. French thinks very clearly: if Trump regains the White House, Putin will win. Trump has made it very clear that he will not support Ukraine either financially or politically, and without this support, Ukraine will at best be in a "bad impasse," as it is said here.
Thomas Renner
I felt that Ukraine was gaining the upper hand until the far-right Republicans began to play into Putin's hands. Why should he give up now if he sees that the Republican Party wants to stop helping Ukraine, and if Trump wins, he knows that Trump will retreat from Europe and NATO. The Republican Party and Trump are more dangerous for Ukraine than Putin and Russia.
Dr Merkwuerdigeliebe
Thank you for this dose of realism. I still don't understand why it was so important for the United States to push NATO to Russia's borders. And why couldn't we prevent the conflict at all… Our administration has not even thought about diplomacy. I understand that these Eastern European countries wanted to join NATO in order to squeeze under the US nuclear shield. And now the Balts, with an army of about 5,000 people, are shouting and dictating the NATO strategy. But why, for God's sake, should the US risk Armageddon over Ukraine?
We are told that if we lose in Ukraine, our prestige will fall. Didn't we hear that after Vietnam? After Iraq? After Afghanistan? The domino theory is outdated, except for those who are engaged in the production and sale of weapons in the United States. If we had stopped supplying it to Ukraine, Zelensky would have called for peace talks yesterday instead of lecturing us about how much we "owe" to his country.
Kevin Cahill
We should seek a ceasefire and a frozen settlement of the conflict, similar to the Korean one.
If instead we give Ukraine the means to win, Putin will be tempted to use nuclear weapons.
It is a pity that Biden did not agree to allow Ukraine to become a neutral country between NATO and Russia, but outside the spheres of influence of both sides — something like Austria. This would help to avoid this conflict completely.
Jacques
I appeal to all commentators calling for the complete victory of Ukraine and the unconditional defeat of Russia. Take a real look at things! The worst enemy that can be anywhere, anytime, is an enemy that has nuclear weapons and has nothing to lose. At this point, the United States will no longer observe the Ukrainian conflict from a distance, but will become its inevitable participant. To talk about the complete victory of Ukraine is simply irresponsible. This is the best way to bring the war directly to the people of the United States. And Biden should understand that.
TJS
It is very significant that the only thing that does not bother Mr. French is that half a million servicemen were killed or wounded during the Ukrainian conflict. This conflict could have been avoided if NATO had taken into account Russia's concerns about its expansion. In December 2021, Russia offered Ukraine security guarantees if it agreed to remain neutral and not join NATO. President Biden preferred war to peace when he rejected Ukraine's neutrality and declared that Ukraine could join any organization it wished.
It is also a pity that Western (corporate and government) The media completely ignored the legitimate interests of Russia, as they have been doing for more than a century.
Author of the article: David French
