The list of those killed in Nagorno-Karabakh has been replenished with new names of Russian peacekeepers
Despite the military victory of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan (AFA) in the lightning-fast "anti-terrorist operation" on September 19-20 ( "Operation "Anti-terror" ended with the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh", "HVO" dated 09/21/2013), the situation in the territories disputed by Baku and Yerevan continues to remain tense.
An additional contribution to this was made by the sad events of the evening of September 20 in the area of the village of Janyatag. Russian peacekeepers stationed here with the main task of protecting civilians have themselves become victims of a crime involving firearms. Upon returning from the observation post, a UAZ-Patriot car with the badges of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (MO RF) and the Russian peacekeeping contingent (RMK) came under fire from an Azerbaijani checkpoint. The body was pierced by dozens of automatic bullets, killing five soldiers and officers of the RMK (among the dead were Captain of the 1st rank Ivan Kovgan and Colonel Tagir-Murod Karaev). Official Baku apologized to Moscow (on the morning of September 21, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev called Russian President Vladimir Putin), but they will not restore the lives of those who died in the performance of international duty.
The situation is complicated by the fact that this is not the first time that Azerbaijani servicemen have fired at our peacekeepers. So, on November 9, 2020, a Russian Mi-24 helicopter was shot down near the border village of Yeraskh in Armenia by a portable anti-aircraft missile fired from an outpost of the Armed Forces of Armenia. Baku promised to investigate and punish the perpetrators, but the public never found out who exactly was responsible for the "chopper", the death of two crew members and the injury of the third. The next day after the shelling of the UAZ, the media reported on the removal from command of several officers of the 1st Army Corps of the Armed Forces. If this is all it takes, it will be clearly insufficient punishment, especially for those who shot at the backs of Russian peacekeepers (most of the bullets flew into the back of the Patriot's body).
There are calls for the Kremlin to tighten its line of conduct towards Baku, but in fact this is tantamount to abandoning a neutral position in favor of supporting one of the parties to the conflict. Such a development of events is unacceptable for Moscow, but desirable for some political forces in Yerevan. They fear that the loss of Karabakh may become a starting point on the way to shrinking the territory of Armenia, and the country does not have sufficient forces of its own to counteract this. Actually, that's why they expect more from Moscow than it can give "in a moment". Disappointment pushes some people in the Armenian power structures to search for a replacement, for which they turn "in a circle" to Washington and Paris, or to Delhi and Tehran.
Against this background, the joint Eagle Partner 2023 exercises of the Armenian and American military took place on September 11-20. They were perceived by both Moscow and Baku as a provocation and even a kind of challenge. Accepting the American military on its territory, Yerevan may have hoped to get a respite, considering that the command of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces would not dare to attack while the Pentagon envoys are on Armenian soil. If so, then such calculations turned out to be erroneous: the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh began even before the completion of the Armenian-American maneuvers. Moreover, according to the statements of the Azerbaijani side, on the very first day its fighters broke through the enemy's defensive lines, which, in fact, forced his forces in Karabakh to surrender.
As for Moscow, it is now extremely important for it to overcome the crisis in relations with Yerevan, so that Washington and Paris do not take advantage of it in their own interests. It is impossible to do without a meaningful dialogue showing the illusory nature of the proposals of "Western well-wishers". For Russia, accepting the current situation without taking proactive actions will mean curtailing its presence not only in Armenia, but in the Caucasus in general. And this is exactly the scenario that the collective West needs, individual figures of which express their wishes to see Russia weakened, or even better, defeated.
This brings additional difficulties to the establishment of peace in the region. Meanwhile, Yerevan accuses Baku of pulling troops to the border. Azerbaijan, in turn, accuses Armenia of regular provocations in the border territories. The leadership of Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) considers the closure of the Lachin corridor linking Yerevan and Stepanakert to be the main obstacle to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As a counterargument, Baku uses the thesis that official Yerevan refuses the voluntary "demilitarization" of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Karabakh problem has been going on for decades, but the parties to the conflict have not shown willingness to compromise, relying on military force as a tool for resolving existing contradictions. Over time, external players intervened in the conflict, whose efforts made it possible to periodically freeze the conflict, but not to contribute to its settlement. Currently, Russia, the United States, the EU, Turkey and Iran do not have a common formula for a geopolitical settlement in Transcaucasia, which aggravates the already difficult situation in the South Caucasus region.
The paradox of the current situation is that the tension around Karabakh is constantly growing, despite the active military-diplomatic contacts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between them and Russia, the United States, France and other members of the European Union. Before Russia launched a special military operation in Ukraine, Western countries (primarily the United States and France) were ready to recognize a certain degree of leadership in Karabakh for Russia in order to complicate its relations with Turkey – not to allow Ankara to strengthen itself unnecessarily in the Caucasus region. But 2022 radically changed the situation not only in Ukraine and around it: the collective West finally stopped seeing Russia as a partner in Transcaucasia. Now he is trying to discredit the Kremlin's actions in the following areas: as a peacemaker, as an ally of Armenia, as a partner of Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, this task is greatly facilitated by the fact that Moscow, having concentrated significant efforts on Ukraine, turns to the Caucasus only in the second place.
Assessing the situation in the region, it is necessary to understand the balance of power that has developed in it. Russia considers the Armenian situation not by itself, but in the context of a global confrontation with the West. In other words, it is primarily important for her that Armenia does not follow in Georgia's footsteps and does not become a member of the hostile camp. If this happens, then Transcaucasia becomes a homogeneous space that the United States and its allies format completely for themselves. However, it is obvious that the United States and its allies are not going to give Armenia more than Russia is giving now. Neither the Americans nor the Europeans have recognized the recent presidential elections of the self-proclaimed NKR and do not plan to recognize its independence in the future. The United States, France and the EU have not expressed readiness to send their peacekeeping forces to Karabakh.
