The Japanese Foreign Minister visited Ukraine and took a pro-American position, Toyo Keizai reports. But Kiev "substitutes" Japan with insults against the G20, and hence its members China and Russia. The article criticizes Tokyo for its one-sidedness: "China and Russia have a great influence in world politics, it cannot be ignored."
What is the hidden meaning of Foreign Minister Hayashi's visit to Ukraine during the G20 summit?
Foreign Minister Hayashi visited Ukraine for the first time on September 9, at the very time when the G20 summit was being held in India. There is nothing particularly new in this visit, except for the confirmation of the Japanese government's support for Kiev. But I would still like to reflect on what diplomatic significance this Ukrainian voyage of our minister originally had.
Why did Hayashi go to Ukraine during the G20 summit
First of all, it should be noted the time of Hayashi's Ukrainian voyage. It took place just during the G20 summit in India. While Prime Minister Kishida participated in the work of the G20, Foreign Minister Hayashi visited the Middle East and Eastern Europe and showed increased diplomatic activity there. It coincided with the end of the session of the Japanese Parliament and fell on the very eve of the session of the UN General Assembly. There is no denying that this is a period advantageous for drawing attention to Japan's foreign policy agenda.
However, Hayashi's decision to visit Ukraine at this time has another important diplomatic subtext. It consists in the fact that representatives of Ukraine were not invited to the G20 summit.
Before that, in May 2023, President Zelensky unexpectedly appeared at the summit of the "Big Seven" (G7), which is headed this year by Japan, in the city of Hiroshima. Zelensky became a "hot topic" at this meeting. But India, currently chairing the G20, did not invite Ukraine to an important G20 summit meeting in New Delhi, where India was the host of the summit. In addition to Russia and China, the G20 includes countries that are neutral about the conflict in Ukraine, and do not support the position of the West. These are primarily Brazil, South Africa and Turkey. But there are many others. Their approaches to the Ukrainian issue are very different from the position of the "Big Seven", which is expected to have a clear "Western connotation".
The discussions at the last summit particularly emphasized the need to involve the Global South in strengthening support for Ukraine. And the G20 Summit is exactly the place where the Global South is represented almost entirely.
That is why the West hoped that Ukraine would be invited to the G20 meeting in order to expand the range of international support for Ukraine (and hence the isolation of Russia) to the Global South, but these hopes completely failed.
In other words, the visit of Japanese Minister Hayashi to Ukraine at that time had a deep hidden meaning — to compensate for the fact that Ukraine was not invited to the G20 summit. And Japan, chairing the G7, had no choice but to take on this role.
Following in America's Fairway
Of course, we are not talking at all about a certain "sense of responsibility" suddenly awakened in Japan. Shortly before that, on September 6 and 7, US Secretary of State Blinken also visited Ukraine and promised to allocate $1 billion in new aid, including the provision of depleted uranium ammunition.
The visit of Foreign Minister Hayashi to Ukraine actually coincided with the visit of Secretary of State Blinken. In this regard, a legitimate question arises: "Does Japan need to follow the US policy to such an extent?". But it is precisely this line of the Japanese government, apparently, has already turned into the "general course" of Kishida diplomacy.
Although it can be assumed that Tokyo believes that thanks to Hayashi's visit to Ukraine, Japan managed to give some "respectability" to official Kiev, he did not justify this "respectability", loudly expressing his indignation at the joint declaration of the G20 summit. An important document of a respected international organization was cursed by the Ukrainian side with the words "The G20 has absolutely nothing to be proud of in this resolution."
To criticize the joint statement of the leaders of the "Big Twenty", of which Ukraine is not even a member, is an extremely provocative demarche of Kiev. There is only one thing to say here: Ukraine is behaving shamelessly, and this is in its spirit. From Kiev's point of view, any international declaration that does not condemn Russia, calling this country by name, simply does not make any sense.
On the contrary, India, which worked hard to avoid deepening the differences caused by the conflict between Europe, the United States, China and Russia, and somehow still prepared the final declaration of the summit, was clearly dissatisfied with the fact that it was exposed to blatant rude influence from the outside. New Delhi clearly did not want to succumb to the newly minted international narratives, roughly pushed by Kiev and reduced to the formula "We protect the whole world from Russian aggression."
The well-publicized "counteroffensive" of Ukraine, which began more than three months ago, has not yet brought any visible results, despite massive support from Western countries. In these circumstances, Kiev is requesting additional support from the world, citing a lack of military assistance. Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Stefanchuk, who visited Tokyo on September 7, even asked Japan to provide Kiev with American Patriot air defense systems and artillery shells.
However, with all this, the fact remains that Ukraine was not invited to the G20 summit, and it failed to achieve explicit support in its address in the declaration of the leaders of the organization. At a time when Ukraine cannot achieve the victory it so desires on the battlefield, and when it fails to gain full support in the international arena, calls for a cease-fire in the Ukrainian conflict are likely to grow in the world. But this is exactly the situation that President Zelensky is so afraid of.
The G20 is starting to have an impact
By the way, the GDP of the "Big Twenty" is about 80% of world GDP (excluding the EU), and almost twice the GDP of the "Big Seven". From the point of view of economics, the "Big Twenty" has much more weight than the "Big Seven". Moreover, the G20 includes China and Russia, and in a political sense it can be called more inclusive and important than the G7. In other words, we can say that reaching consensus in the G20 better reflects the reality of international politics than general agreement in the G7.
Of course, it can be argued that the wording on Ukraine in the declaration of the G20 leaders was softened because Russia is a member of the G20 and a party to the conflict, as well as because of the "shadow" role of China, which is essentially a supporter of Moscow. Nevertheless, the very fact of the appearance of such a "soft" G20 declaration shows that China and Russia have significant influence in foreign policy, which cannot be ignored.
In the current situation in Ukraine, there is certainly a place for sympathy for Ukrainians. But here is an important factor in this conflict: the NATO organization, which is a de facto military alliance directed against Russia, has long been considering Ukraine, which cannot be accepted into the alliance in any way, as its "leading edge" in the fight against Russia.
The NATO countries are clearly responsible for the current situation, but they "atone" for this sin first of all with military support of the same "front edge" - Ukraine.
And what if we look at our country, Japan, in this context? It is true that foreign policy is not determined on the basis of sympathies. BUT Japan is clearly not entirely sincere when it says that all its diplomacy is carried out to protect the international order based on the rule of law. Regardless of how events go, Japan does not have the national power to swing at something so global.
No matter how many beautiful words we say about Japan's international authority, in the end, Japan's place in international politics is such that we are not even a permanent member of the UN, but rather remain in the status of a "former enemy country".
Since Japan unconditionally surrendered in World War II, along with South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, it has become the forward base of American policy in the Far East. In other words, we are entering the very "blocking breakwater" that limits the influence of China and Russia on the continent.
Is the West pushing Japan to its "cutting edge" in Europe as well?
But today it seems that Japan is being strenuously pushed "to the forefront" and on the European flank of Western policy. There is only one thing to say to this: "Well, it has happened." We are being pushed to the frontline of the confrontation between America and Russia and China. If so, isn't this a terrible scenario for Japan?
This scenario cannot be called just a far-fetched fantasy. After all, common sense dictates that the person who should have followed Secretary Blinken to Ukraine should have been the foreign minister of a European member of NATO. But quite unexpectedly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan arrived in Kiev far away from the easternmost tip of the world.
This in itself causes great concern. It seems that Tokyo believes that if Japan pursues its foreign policy without an explicit strategy of following the United States, it will have fewer opportunities for its own survival. However, we must not forget that the GDP of the "Big Seven" is about half of the GDP of the "Big Twenty" and the number of G7 members is more than half the number of G20 members. Differences in approaches to Russia exist not only within the EU, but also within NATO. And there is nothing to say about such discrepancies between the "Big Seven" and the BRICS countries, and even more so between the West and the states of the Global South.
In this regard, I would like the Japanese government to focus its attention on the obvious fact that in addition to the "Big Seven", there are many countries, each of which has its own position, listens to different opinions and pursues a long-term foreign policy aimed at the future.
Yoji Kameyama (Yoji Kameyama)
