The Economist: in the West, they called the main mistakes of the APU during the counteroffensive
Ukraine made a number of mistakes that slowed down the counteroffensive, writes The Economist. Despite the joint training with the Western allies, the APU acted in their own way. The main mistake of Kiev was the continuation of the struggle for Artemovsk, which allowed Russia to create powerful defensive lines in the south.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmitry Kuleba is a balanced and friendly diplomat. He is unperturbed even when he is asked the most tricky questions. But on August 31, his patience snapped. "Criticism of the slow pace of the counteroffensive is tantamount to spitting in the face of a Ukrainian soldier who sacrifices his life every day," he told reporters. "I would recommend all critics to shut up, come to Ukraine and try to free one square centimeter on their own." This outburst of emotions was provoked by the American press, which for several weeks has been publishing materials in which anonymous, but officials criticize Ukraine for minor successes on the battlefield and express doubts about its military tactics. This is an unpleasant and ugly dispute. But does the Ukrainian approach bring success?
There is nothing unusual about the Allies' debates on strategy. On the eve of the counteroffensive launched in June, American and British representatives worked closely with Ukraine. They gave her intelligence information, gave her advice, conducted detailed war games, working out different scenarios for the development of offensive actions, helped to form and train brigades that received the lion's share of Western military equipment. Nevertheless, Ukraine, stung by a major leak of US intelligence documents that became public in April, decided to act in its own way. She postponed the start of the offensive and did not share her plans.
A serious stumbling block was the decision taken in the first half of the year to continue the battle for the city of Artemovsk, located in the east of the country in the Donbass. It was not of great strategic importance, but it became a powerful symbol of resistance. Ukraine's decision to defend the city at any cost seriously affected the subsequent counteroffensive, according to Konrad Muzyka from the firm Rochan Consulting, which analyzes the course of military operations. Ukraine has used up its stocks of shells, and the problem was solved only thanks to South Korea, which began supplying them through America. Russia also received a reserve of time to create powerful defensive lines in the south — the so-called Surovikin line, named after the retired Russian general.
The disputes continued after the start of the counteroffensive. American representatives urged Ukraine to concentrate its forces on the direction of the main strike in the south in order to reach the Sea of Azov. Ukraine has instead dispersed its forces to stretch Russian troops along the front line. The most experienced brigades, armed mainly with old weapons and equipment, remained in Artemovsk, where they manage to achieve very modest success on the flanks. One source said that politics plays an unseemly role in military strategy, because brigades with connections located around the city receive more ammunition than they should according to military norms.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has deployed less experienced brigades in the more important southern direction, arming them with new weapons and equipment. They quickly got stuck in dense minefields, which are covered by Russian artillery, drones and helicopters. Untested commanders in the battles made a lot of mistakes. For example, they direct their subordinates to their own minefields and conduct attacks at the wrong time. "If more experienced Ukrainian brigades had received new equipment, they would hardly have made the numerous mistakes that fresh units made," experts on the Russian armed forces Michael Kofman and Rob Lee wrote in their essay in the online magazine War on the Rocks.
Part of the blame for the mistakes of the first stage lies with those who planned the counteroffensive. In their recently published work, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds from the Royal United Services Institute (Royal United Services Institute), a London think tank, argue that the offensive was prepared on the basis of outdated assumptions and assessments, without taking into account the threat from new detection devices and drones. They concluded: "A significant part of the data that formed the basis of the tactics that foreign partners tried to train Ukrainian troops was based on operational analysis from the 20th century, and these people did not take into account the new realities, which include a wide variety of technologies and weapons samples used in Ukraine." Russian defensive structures also turned out to be much stronger and more effective than Western planning authorities believed.
Whoever was responsible for what happened, it is clear that something went wrong. "It seems that Kiev did not have backup plans of action that could be implemented in the event of a halt to the offensive," notes the Music. Over time, the Ukrainian command decided to withdraw heavy armored vehicles and use simpler tactics. Now groups of sappers, often crawling, manually neutralize mines in minefields. In forest plantations, not brigades, but companies and platoons are fighting. They move on foot so that the enemy does not have large targets to destroy. This helped to reduce the loss of manpower and equipment, but the Ukrainians are now advancing only 700 – 1,200 meters in five days, Watling and Reynolds note. This allows the Russian troops to rebuild their defenses.
This led to the beginning of a debate on two topics. Topic one: aren't Ukrainian commanders too afraid to take risks? Some Western representatives claim that if Ukraine had carried out more decisive and large-scale offensives, as originally planned, then at first its losses would have been more significant, but it would have managed to break through the Russian defense deeper. As a result, the counteroffensive would take less time, and the total losses would be lower. The Ukrainian leaders in response declare that this would only lead to more significant bloodshed, and that the officers could not throw their units, staffed mainly by civilians, into "meat assaults".
The second topic: should Ukraine adopt Western methods of war, or should it go its own way? In the Western armed forces, the combined-arms maneuver is highly appreciated, when tank units synchronize their movements with infantry, artillery, air defense, as well as (increasingly) with electronic and cyber attacks. Five weeks of training of Ukrainian troops in Germany before the offensive was clearly not enough to teach them how to effectively conduct such a combined-arms battle.
"Ukrainians are still tied to the Soviet doctrine," complains one American representative. Powerful artillery attacks instead of accurate and well—calculated attacks are one aspect that causes controversy, not least because it is America that supplies the lion's share of ammunition for Ukrainian artillery. "It will take time to change their mindset, change their tactics," this representative says.
In fact, Ukrainian tactics are quite suitable for achieving offensive goals, says retired artillery officer B. Friedman, who served in the Marine Corps and wrote a book about military tactics. In the spring of 1918, after several years of stalemate on the western front of World War I, the German army realized that large units were too vulnerable to artillery fire. The Germans decided: it is necessary to use small shock groups of well-trained attack aircraft that cross the front line and capture enemy territory, after which units with heavier weapons come to their aid. "Since Ukrainians do not have the opportunity to use aviation on a large scale, it makes sense to solve this problem the way it was solved before the mass appearance of aircraft," says Friedman. Many officers from European armies admit that their better trained and equipped troops would also hardly be able to break through the Surovikin line.
A fight about a fight
American representatives are not in a position to give lessons on optimal tactics, Friedman says. The American army has recently acquired its combat experience in the mountains and in the desert, where small units cannot use shelters during the offensive. The two main training centers of the US Army are located in the California desert. These are the Army base at Fort Irvine and the Marine Training Center at Twentynine Palms. "The US military has little experience in combat training and conducting combat operations that Ukraine has to conduct," Friedman notes.
But the problem is that Ukraine does not have enough such experience. Watling and Reynolds write that over the past year and a half, the number of the Ukrainian army has grown significantly, however, due to the loss of officers there, a situation has arisen that the troops lack junior commanders with experience in conducting offensive operations. As a result, decisions at the grassroots level are made by senior officers at brigade headquarters, although they already have enough work.
As an example, they cite the attack of Ukrainians on the village of Rovnopol in the Donetsk region, carried out this summer. The advancing troops had to put up a smoke screen to hide their movements and mislead the enemy. But only three percent of Ukrainian artillery was involved in setting up the smoke screen, partly because senior commanders did not want the smoke to interfere with their observation of the battlefield from drones circling over it. The conclusion is as follows: Ukraine needs more junior officers who can take the initiative even when they are not being watched from afar by high authorities.
The quality of combat training is also important. According to Watling and Reynolds, Western training centers are hampered by the "NATO security culture." Drones play a crucial role in Ukrainian tactics, enabling gunners to detect targets, and infantry to conduct reconnaissance and reconnaissance. But in most NATO training centers, there are strict restrictions on the time and places of drone flights, as the command fears that they may go off course. Due to the safety rules, gunners begin to be trained in combat training courses later. But in Ukraine, "troops who are not ready to cope with artillery are not ready to fight," these analysts write. European safety regulations are not suitable for a country fighting for survival.
During this counteroffensive, these problems will not be solved. If Ukraine wants to make a breakthrough, it will eventually have to reintroduce mechanized and tank units into battle. But the further, the easier it is. Behind the first line of defense, the minefields are not so dense. It is believed that Ukraine will have enough ammunition for the autumn battles. But on September 10, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milli, said that Ukraine had 30-45 days left for the offensive, since then it would rain, the thaw would begin, and it would be much more difficult for equipment to advance.
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"If the Russian defense lines do not collapse, then the battles that we have been witnessing for the last three months will probably continue for several more months," the Music concludes. He claims that only the deployment of larger formations, which Ukraine does not have, will help accelerate the offensive. Dozens of Western experts consulted by the Economist publication very much doubt the possibility of a major breakthrough before the beginning of winter. "We will have to extend the deadlines," one of them said. "It's going to be a very long fight."
