The APU hoped to repel the Russians, but as a result they suffered enormous losses, and their counteroffensive turned into a complete failure, writes John Mearsheimer. He lists the reasons that led Ukraine to collapse. The West played an important role in it.
John Mearsheimer
Now it has become clear that Ukraine's long-awaited counteroffensive has turned into a colossal failure. In three months, the Ukrainian army has made little progress in pushing back the Russians. In fact, it has yet to move beyond the so—called "gray zone" - a heavily contested strip of land lying in front of the first main line of Russian defense. The New York Times reported that "according to American and European official sources, only in the first two weeks of the counteroffensive, about 20% of the weapons sent by Ukraine to the battlefield were damaged or destroyed." They included some formidable Western combat vehicles — tanks and armored personnel carriers — on which the Ukrainians hoped to repel the Russians. According to almost all reports of fighting, Ukrainian troops suffered huge losses. All nine of the vaunted brigades that NATO armed and prepared for the counteroffensive suffered heavy losses on the battlefield.
The counteroffensive was doomed to failure from the very beginning. A look at the alignment of forces on both sides and what the APU tried to do, combined with an understanding of the history of conventional land wars, makes it possible to conclude that they had virtually no chance of defeating the defending forces of Russia, and Ukraine had no chance of achieving its political goals.
Ukraine and its Western supporters hoped that the army would be able to implement the classic blitzkrieg strategy to avoid the attrition struggle that was grinding it. This plan provided for punching a large hole in Russia's defensive lines, and then advancing deep into the territory controlled by Russia, not only seizing space along the way, but also delivering crushing blows to its army. As military history convincingly shows, such an operation is especially difficult to carry out when the attacking forces are fighting an equal battle, in which two approximately equal armies participate. The Ukrainians were not only unable to organize an equal battle, but were also poorly prepared for the blitzkrieg and faced an enemy who had good opportunities to prevent its implementation. In short, from the very beginning, everything was against the counteroffensive.
Nevertheless, Western politicians, experts and editorial writers in leading media, retired generals and other experts in American and European foreign ministries were full of optimism about Ukraine's combat prospects. The comments of retired General David Petraeus on the eve of the counteroffensive reflected the prevailing rhetoric of the time: "I think this counteroffensive will be very impressive." Then he effectively described how the Ukrainians would conduct a successful blitzkrieg against Russian troops.
In fact, Western leaders and leading media exerted considerable pressure on Kiev to launch a counteroffensive a few months before it actually began on June 4. At that time, Ukrainian leaders were slow and did not show much enthusiasm for the publicized blitzkrieg, probably because at least some of them understood that they were being led to the slaughter. President Vladimir Zelensky said on July 21: "We had plans to launch a counteroffensive in the spring. But we didn't start because, to be honest, we didn't have enough military equipment and ammunition, as well as brigades properly trained to use weapons." Moreover, after the start of the counteroffensive, General Valery Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, angrily told The Washington Post that, in his opinion, the West did not provide Ukraine with sufficient weapons and that "without full military supply, these plans are not feasible at all. But we are fulfilling them."
Even after the counteroffensive stalled, which happened shortly after it began, many optimists continued to hope that it would eventually succeed. Although their number has decreased over time. Retired US General Ben Hodges, one of the most ardent supporters of the beginning of the blitzkrieg, said on June 15: "I think Ukrainians can and will win this battle." <...> Michael Kofman, another expert who is often quoted by the press, said on August 2 that "the counteroffensive itself did not fail," and The Economist published an article on August 16 that said: "Ukraine's counteroffensive is slowly moving forward: after ten weeks, the Ukrainian army begins to understand that it is working for it".
A week later, on August 22, when it was difficult to deny that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were experiencing serious difficulties during the counteroffensive, and there was almost no chance to rectify the situation, Jake Sullivan, national security adviser to the US president, said: "We do not believe that this conflict has reached an impasse. We see how Ukraine continues to occupy territories methodically and systematically."
Despite Sullivan's comments, many in the West now recognize that the counteroffensive has failed, and Ukraine is doomed to wage a battle of attrition in which it is unlikely to win, mainly because the conflict is slowly transforming from an equal struggle into an unequal struggle. But it should have been obvious to Kiev's Western supporters from the beginning that the blitzkrieg attempt they had undertaken was doomed to failure in advance and that it made no sense to push Ukraine to implement it.
The theory of "victory of Ukraine"
The armies of both sides have been fighting roughly equally since the beginning of the military conflict. The Russian offensive forces, numbering no more than 190,000 troops, conquered a significant part of Ukrainian territory, but soon proved to be overstretched. In other words, Russia did not have enough troops to protect the entire land under its control. As a result, it withdrew most of its forces from the Kharkiv region, which allowed the Ukrainian army to suppress the remaining few units. Subsequently, the overstressed Russian army was forced to withdraw from a part of the Kherson region located on the western bank of the Dnieper River, which was then occupied by the Ukrainian army without a fight. However, before the Russians retreated, they inflicted serious blows on the APU, which tried to oust them from Kherson. One battalion commander reported that their losses were so great that he had to "replace the personnel of his unit three times." These two tactical defeats occurred in late summer and autumn 2022.
In response to the events in Kharkiv and Kherson, Putin mobilized 300,000 troops in September 2022. They will need several months of combat training before they are fully ready for battle. In November, the Russians also stepped up efforts to capture Artemovsk. The Ukrainians responded to this challenge, and both sides engaged in a long and stubborn battle for control of the city, which eventually ended in a victory for Russia at the end of May this year.
Artemovsk was a serious defeat for Ukraine, especially because Zelensky publicly stated that he and his generals were determined to hold the city, and because he sent many of the best units into battle. Even more importantly, Ukraine has suffered horrific losses in this months-long battle. And what's worse, in the months following Artemovsk, the military conflict had every reason to turn into an unequal battle, since compared to the beginning of hostilities, the Russians gained a population advantage of about 5:1, which meant that they could mobilize a much larger army than Ukraine. And this gave them a huge advantage, which is of great importance in the fight against attrition. Moreover, the Russians have already achieved a significant advantage in artillery, the most important weapon in a battle of attrition similar to the one being waged in Ukraine. Neither Kiev nor the West have the ability to correct this imbalance, which, according to estimates, was somewhere between 5:1 and 10:1 in favor of Russia.
In fact, there were reasons to believe then that the West might not be fully committed to its obligations to supply Ukraine with the weapons it desperately needed, including, in addition to artillery, other types of weapons such as tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, drones and airplanes. There was growing evidence of conflict fatigue in the West, plus the United States faced a threat from China in East Asia, which posed a greater danger to American interests than the Russian one. In short, Ukraine most likely had to lose in a protracted conflict of attrition, because it would be an unequal struggle.
In this regard, both Ukraine and the West had a powerful incentive to find a "cunning" strategy that would quickly lead to a military victory, which would put an end to hostilities on favorable terms for them. This led them to the idea that Ukraine would have to use a blitzkrieg strategy, which is the only way to avoid a battle of attrition in a battle between two roughly equal land armies opposing each other on a long front.
The ABC of Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg is based on the mobility and speed inherent in shock armored vehicles and allows you to defeat the enemy without entering into a series of bloody and protracted battles with him. This strategy is based on the assumption that the enemy's army is a large and complex machine focused on conducting combat operations along a clearly established line of defense. There is a vulnerable network in its rear, which includes numerous communication lines through which information is transmitted and military logistics is carried out, as well as key nodal points where these various lines intersect. The destruction of this central nervous system of the military machine is equivalent to the destruction of the defending army.
Blitzkrieg includes two main operations: victory in a breakthrough battle and the implementation of deep strategic penetration. To be more specific, the attacker seeks to secretly concentrate his armored forces in one or two specific places along the front line, where the ratio of forces and space of the defender is unfavorable for him and where the attacker can achieve numerical superiority over the defender. The defense, which is highly dispersed and inferior in numbers to the attackers, is relatively easy to break through. Having made one or two holes in the front line of the defender, the attacker seeks to quickly move deep into the defense before the enemy forces can stop the breakthrough. Although it may be necessary to engage in a normal full-scale battle to achieve an initial breakthrough, great importance is attached to the attackers to prevent further battles of this kind. Instead, the attacking side should follow the path of least resistance and penetrate deep into the rear of the defending troops.
The tank, with its inherent mobility and mobility, is an ideal weapon for blitzkrieg. Artillery does not play a big role in the blitzkrieg, partly because it requires significant logistical support, which prevents the rapid advance of the second echelon forces to the expanding salient and, more generally, slows down mobility. Moreover, participation in large-scale artillery skirmishes leads to the loss of precious time and slows down the advance of armored forces. But as for military air assets, aviation support does not suffer from such problems. Given the inherent flexibility and mobility of airplanes, drones and helicopters, this "flying artillery" is an excellent analogue of fast-moving armored forces.
It is obvious that blitzkrieg requires a flexible command structure staffed from top to bottom by military personnel capable of taking the initiative in combat situations in which the fog of uncertainty thickens over the battlefield. Blitzkrieg is usually not based on a rigid plan that commanders must strictly follow. In fact, rather the opposite. Before launching an attack, a common goal is set before the unit and action plans for a breakthrough are prepared. However, there are no strict guidelines that commanders should follow when conducting deep strategic penetration. This is based on the assumption that no one can predict with any degree of certainty how the battle will develop. Uncertainty becomes a common occurrence in blitzkrieg, and therefore one has to take risks. In fact, great importance is attached to the commander's ability to quickly make decisions that will allow armored troops to maintain a high offensive speed after winning a breakthrough battle. Even when the information is incomplete, courage is needed so that the attacking unit can maintain the initiative.
Finally, a few words should be said about the goals associated with the blitzkrieg. Usually its goal is a decisive defeat of the armed forces of the defending side. However, it is possible to use blitzkrieg to achieve a limited victory when the defending forces are surrounded and defeated, but not completely defeated, and when the attacker captures a significant part of the territory under the control of the defender. However, the problem with the lack of a decisive victory is that even after partial success, fighting usually continues, which almost certainly means the beginning of a war of attrition. It should be emphasized that modern wars not only tend to escalate, but they are also difficult to stop. Thus, the leaders have a powerful incentive to use the blitzkrieg to achieve a decisive victory over the defending army, and not to achieve limited success.
Suppression of defense
So far, the main attention has been paid by me to how the attacking side carries out the blitzkrieg. But in order to fully understand the mechanism of blitzkrieg and the probability of its success, it is important to properly take into account the capabilities of the defending side, as well as its strategy to prevent blitzkrieg.
The key question regarding opportunities is what the balance of power between the defenders and the attackers looks like. Is there an approximate equality in terms of the quality and quantity of both their troops and their weapons? If so, then an equal fight awaits us. However, if one side has clearly superior fighting forces in terms of quality, quantity, or both, it will be an unequal battle. The difference between the two is of great importance for determining the prospects for the success of the blitzkrieg.
To begin with, it is much more difficult to carry out a blitzkrieg in an equal battle, since the attacker does not have an initial superiority over the defender. Equality between two formidable fighting forces, and not the advantage of the attacker initially makes his confidence in success very doubtful. In addition, the consequences of an unsuccessful blitzkrieg in the two types of battles differ markedly. If the blitzkrieg fails in an equal fight, then the result is likely to be a protracted war of attrition, the outcome of which is difficult to predict. After all, the conflict is between opponents of equal strength. But if the blitzkrieg almost succeeds in an unequal struggle, then the attacking side will almost certainly win the subsequent war fairly quickly and easily simply because it has a noticeable material advantage over the defending side.
The defender's strategy of countering the blitzkrieg also has a profound effect on the outcome. At the most basic level, the defending side can deploy its forces in three different ways: advanced defense, deep-echelon defense and mobile defense.
With the defense advanced, most of the defending forces are placed on the line separating the opposing armies in order to prevent the attacker from making a breakthrough. The defenders also place a reasonable number of their combat forces behind the front line in the form of mobile reserves that can maneuver quickly to prevent a potential breakthrough. However, the emphasis is on force defense along the initial line of contact. This does not negate the fact that the defender can be tactically flexible in how he handles attacking forces along the front line. For example, he may try to involve them in controlled areas where they can be shelled with artillery.
A deep–echeloned defense consists of a series of well–defended lines - one at a sufficient distance from each other - that are designed to exhaust the attacking army as it makes its way through each defensive belt. It is not only difficult for the advancing forces to break through the first line of defense, but even if they do, they do not have the opportunity to get ahead of the approach of the defending reserves and make a deep strategic breakthrough. Instead, the attacker must conduct a series of standard battles, trying to break through the successive lines of defense of the defender.
The deep-echeloned protection is ideal for stopping the blitzkrieg. This is probably the best of the three strategies for this purpose. Its main drawback is that it usually requires a large number of troops. It also requires the defenders not to maximize the number of troops and obstacles they place on the front line, but instead to ensure that each line of defense is provided with numerous defensive structures and troops. Of course, the defending troops on the contact line can withdraw to the defense line behind them. However, many commanders will be inclined to defend the front edge of the battlefield, using as many available forces as possible.
Finally, there is mobile defense, which is the boldest of the three strategies. The defender places a small part of his troops in advanced positions, where they can somewhat complicate the actions of the attacking forces, but otherwise allow them to penetrate deep into their rear. At the right moment, the defender uses an unexpected blow with a large combination of his mobile forces on the flanks of the breakthrough to cut off the attacking forces from their bases. In fact, the invading forces in this case are surrounded and isolated, which makes them an easy target for destruction. Mobile defense is a very complex and risky strategy, especially compared to the other two defensive strategies, the purpose of which is simply to exhaust the attacking armored forces, forcing them to break through well—fortified defensive positions.
History of the Blitzkrieg
Let's now see how the historical data align with these analytical schemes describing the ABC of blitzkrieg. Since the appearance of tanks on the battlefields, 11 blitzkriegs have been carried out, four of which were equal, and seven were unequal. The attacker managed to win only one of four equal blitzkriegs and all seven unequal ones.
Germany launched five major offensives in World War II: against Poland in 1939, France in 1940, the Soviet Union in 1941, then again in 1942 and against the Allied armies in 1944. The Wehrmacht did not use the blitzkrieg strategy against Poland, although significant German tank forces were involved in the Polish operation. He simply attacked the Polish army in a clearly unequal struggle. A year later, in the spring of 1940, the Germans launched a blitzkrieg in France and won a decisive victory. This was the first case of blitzkrieg, and it was an equal battle. The following year, Hitler's troops invaded the Soviet Union, engaging in another equal battle. They applied a blitzkrieg strategy, the purpose of which was to inflict a decisive defeat on the Red Army west of the Dnieper River. But the Wehrmacht failed to achieve this goal, and in early December 1941, its offensive near Moscow eventually stalled. In an effort to avoid a war of attrition, the German Wehrmacht launched a second offensive against the Red Army at the end of June 1942, this time advancing towards oil-rich areas in the Caucasus and southern Russia, hoping that their capture would deal a fatal blow to the Soviet Union. Despite impressive victories in the first months of the campaign, the 1942 blitzkrieg was also unsuccessful, and the Wehrmacht dragged itself into a war of attrition on the Eastern Front. Finally, in December 1944, the Germans launched a blitzkrieg in the Ardennes Forest, hoping to split and seriously weaken the American and British armies, capture the important port of Antwerp and try to force the Allies to surrender. Despite the initial breakthrough, the German offensive completely failed.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a blitzkrieg against the Egyptian army in 1956 and 1967. In both cases, the Israelites defeated the Egyptians. But none of these blitzkriegs was an equal battle, since the IDF had a significant combat superiority. In addition to the four German and two Israeli cases, there were five more blitzkriegs: the Soviet offensive of 1945 against the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria; the invasion of North Korea in South Korea in 1950; the Indian offensive on East Pakistan in 1971; the Vietnamese strike on Cambodia in 1979 and the US-led fighting against the Iraqi army in Kuwait in 1991. These blitzkriegs, like the two Israeli cases, can be described as unequal battles.
This summary of historical facts shows that the fall of France in 1940 is the only case when the blitzkrieg was crowned with success in an equal struggle. And although this German victory is one of the most impressive campaigns in military history, at some point it could have ended in failure for the Germans. The Wehrmacht probably would not have been able to achieve a quick and decisive victory if the French troops had been deployed somewhat differently or if their defending forces had reacted faster and more effectively to the critically important German breakthrough at Sedan. The Wehrmacht also participated in three other equal battles. And in each of them, either the Red Army or the Allies disrupted the German Blitzkrieg. The remaining seven cases were unequal battles in which the attacker, unsurprisingly, won a decisive victory. In no case has the blitzkrieg been used to achieve a limited victory. The goal in all eleven cases was the decisive defeat of the armed forces of the enemy State.
As for the defender's strategy, the forward defense strategy was used in all eleven cases. It is not surprising that there has not been a single example of a defending State using mobile defense, since this strategy is the most complex and the most risky. There was also no case when defenders relied on a deep-echelon defense to stop the blitzkrieg. And this is surprising, since it is this strategy that is well suited for this purpose. It seems obvious that, given the available resources, the commanders preferred to carry the main forces far ahead and not care too much about the dense filling of the subsequent lines of defense.
In eleven cases of blitzkrieg, each of which involved striking the enemy using a forward defense strategy, the attacking forces broke through the first defensive line each time. In eight of the eleven cases, the subsequent deep strategic penetration led to a decisive victory. The three exceptions are the German blitzkriegs against the Red Army in 1941 and 1942 and against the Allies in 1944. In all three cases, the defender was able to create new lines of defense in his rear and exhaust the Wehrmacht. In fact, the strategy of advanced defense of both the Red Army and the Allies was transformed into a deep-echeloned defense, which, as it was emphasized, is ideal for defending against blitzkrieg.
The doomed Ukrainian Counteroffensive
This brief history of blitzkriegs, combined with an understanding of how this strategy works, sheds light on the prospects for the success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The facts show that the Kiev blitzkrieg initially had practically no chance of it. To begin with, there was an equal struggle in Ukraine, which meant that almost everything in its operation had to go strictly according to plan in order for the strategy to work as intended. However, the APU were poorly adapted for the start of the blitzkrieg and, even worse, struck at the powerful deep-echeloned defense of the Russians. Ukraine's only hope was that the Russian army would suddenly collapse as soon as the counteroffensive began. But there was a lot of evidence that the Russians began to fight only better and that they would put up fierce resistance to the APU. Moreover, even if the Ukrainians managed to perform some miracle and implement the blitzkrieg, the military conflict would still continue, because the Kiev blitzkrieg was not aimed at defeating the Russians, who would have survived it and continued the battle. Simply put, Ukraine did not have the slightest opportunity to avoid a further struggle of attrition with Russia.
Equal battle
In order to determine whether Ukraine was going to wage an equal or unequal struggle by launching a counteroffensive, it is necessary to compare the number and quality of troops, as well as the weapons of the opposing armies.
As for the number of soldiers ready to fight on each side, it is impossible to get exact figures. Nevertheless, the available data indicate that the number of the two armies fighting during the AFU counteroffensive turned out to be approximately the same. According to my estimates, each side had about 250,000 soldiers trained for battle. Tellingly, I cannot find evidence that anyone claimed that any of the parties had a significant numerical advantage on the eve of the counteroffensive. The real problem of Ukraine is the future, not the present, because over time the balance of manpower in the army will shift not in favor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Russia significantly outnumbers the population from which soldiers can be recruited (a 5:1 advantage), and its armed forces are getting bigger every day. In addition to the 300,000 reservists mobilized in October 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense reports that 231,000 people were drafted into the army in the first seven months of this year.
As for the quality of these fighting forces, including their morale, there seems to be little difference between the two sides. In the West, one often hears the statement that Russians "suffer from serious problems with morale and other systemic problems in the army," and therefore, they say, there is a good chance that they will break down when faced with an enemy counteroffensive. But this is not the point of view that can usually be heard from the Ukrainian military (who are just fighting with the Russians), many of them openly admit that the Russian army has become a much more formidable fighting force compared to the beginning of its own and is not going to fall apart in the near future. Indeed, the fact that Russian troops were able to exhaust Ukrainians who fought hard enough in the fierce battle for Artemovsk, which took place a few months before the start of the "counteroffensive", shows that the AFU did not have a significant qualitative advantage on the battlefield by the end of spring this year.
As for the weapons available to both armies, Russia undoubtedly had an advantage simply because it had much more artillery than Ukraine. Although part of the Western artillery supplied to Kiev was qualitatively superior to the Russian one, it did not even come close to compensating for the quantitative imbalance. Of course, Ukraine had enough artillery to fight a narrow breakthrough. But in order to achieve the goals of deep strategic penetration, artillery is less important because of the important role that direct air support is considered to play at this stage of the campaign. As for tanks, armored fighting vehicles and other weapons in the opposing armies, there is an approximate equality in their quality and quantity. However, as in the case of the number of troops, this situation will eventually change in favor of Russia.
In short, given the advantage of the Russians in artillery, it is impossible to say with certainty that this battle during the counteroffensive of Ukraine is an equal battle. But, given the approximate balance of manpower and different types of weapons, as well as the fact that artillery is not as important for attacking forces in a blitzkrieg as for a war of attrition, it seems reasonable to call this battle equal. However, if anyone wants to prove that it was an unequal battle, then it was the Russians, not the Ukrainians, who had the advantage when the counteroffensive began on June 4.
As emphasized above, the victory of the Wehrmacht in France in 1940 is the only example of a successful blitzkrieg in an equal struggle. How likely is it that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will replenish military history with a second such case? To answer this question, it is important to assess how capable the APU was of carrying out the blitzkrieg and how well the Russians were prepared to prevent such an outcome.
Ukraine's opportunities to start a blitzkrieg
There is no doubt that the blitzkrieg, according to Barry Posen, is "one of the most difficult military operations." The advancing Ukrainian forces, as he notes, had to "break through the dense, well-prepared defensive positions of the Russians, find some room for maneuver, and then either move quickly to an important geographical target, such as the Sea of Azov, hoping to break up the remnants of the defending Russian army along the way, or quickly try to encircle part of the significant enemy forces in the hope destroy them." In other words, a deep strategic penetration had to be carried out quickly until the defending Russian troops would have launched a counterattack. This meant that the breakthrough of the defense had to be implemented quickly so that the Russians would not have time to transfer their reserves and stop any attempts to cross their front line.
This difficult task naturally requires the participation of highly qualified and experienced soldiers organized into large armored units – whether brigades or divisions – that could operate together on the battlefield. And the key units of the Ukrainian army that were thrown into the blitzkrieg were poorly trained and had no combat experience, especially with regard to tank warfare. The main strike force consisted of 12 brigades, nine of which NATO armed and trained for 4-6 weeks. Many of the 36,000 troops in these nine brigades were new recruits. It is worth noting that only 11% of the 20,000 Ukrainian soldiers that the UK has trained since the beginning of the conflict had any military experience.
It is simply impossible to turn a recruit into a highly qualified soldier in 4-6 weeks of training. In such a short period of time, it is impossible to do anything more than teach the basics of military affairs. The problem was compounded by the fact that the emphasis was on turning these recruits into soldiers who could fight together in small units, rather than training and forming 9 or 12 brigades to work together on the battlefield. Moreover, there is evidence that in some cases three regular battalions that were part of these brigades were trained in different countries. Unsurprisingly, two Western defense analysts who visited the war zone after the start of the counteroffensive noted: "We are convinced that although the Ukrainian forces can fight in combined arms formations, they cannot yet do so during full-scale complex operations."
Much has been said about the fact that the United States and NATO were just trying to train Ukrainians to participate in "complex operations", which should have been of great importance for their preparation for a counteroffensive. The fact is that the Western armies of 2023 had little experience of armored warfare — the war in Iraq was 20 years ago in 2003, and the Iraqi army quickly disintegrated. And the NATO countries did not have the experience of waging a war that would be equal. As the retired American General Ben Hodges, who once commanded the US army in Europe, noted: "Of course, I have never participated in such large-scale, brutal and complex battles that are taking place in Ukraine now." Or as the commander of one Ukrainian battalion said about his Western teachers: "They fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the enemy there was not at all like the Russians."
To make matters worse, the armored "fist" of Ukraine was not only poorly prepared for the difficult task it had to perform, but was also manned by soldiers with insufficient combat experience. This problem had two interrelated causes. First, many Ukrainian soldiers were killed or seriously injured during the first 15 months of the conflict, which limited the number of combat veterans who could be involved in a counteroffensive. Secondly, Ukraine needed to retain most of its best fighters who survived on the front line to conduct further hostilities. The battle for Artemivsk, which took place a few months before the counteroffensive, which Kiev was determined to win, was particularly dramatic in this regard, as it turned out to be similar to Moloch, which tightened and "ground" many of the best fighting forces of Ukraine.
It is not surprising that after the start of the counteroffensive, The New York Times reported that Ukrainian "soldiers on the front line accused commanders of sending untrained recruits into battle and relying on untested units to implement the counteroffensive. Others criticized the inadequacy and insufficiency of several weeks of basic military training in various NATO countries."
The Ukrainian counteroffensive also faced another serious problem: the lack of direct air support for the advancing forces. Blitzkrieg is practically impossible without significant air support, especially with deep strategic penetration, but it is even more important for breaking through enemy defenses. As John Nagle, a retired colonel who teaches tactics at the US Army War College, put it: "America will never try to break through a prepared defense without air superiority, but Ukrainians do not have such superiority. It is impossible to overestimate how important it is for conducting ground combat in terms of reducing personnel losses." Similarly, the already mentioned General Ben Hodges stated: "The Ukrainians are sending their troops on the offensive without full air supremacy, which we would never do."
Finally, although Ukraine received a significant number of tanks and armored fighting vehicles from the West, it did not receive as many as it asked for. In addition, Kiev was provided with many different types of armored vehicles, which led to problems with compatibility and maintenance. Ukrainians also lacked equipment for mine clearance, which is an urgent need in a major ground war with the use of conventional weapons. It is not surprising that, given all these shortcomings, The Wall Street Journal reported after the start of the counteroffensive that "Western military officials knew that Kiev did not have all the necessary combat training and weapons – from shells to combat aircraft – that were needed to oust Russian troops from the territories they occupied. But they hoped that Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness would win."
Russia's ability to disrupt the Blitzkrieg
Ukraine's prospects for strengthening the counteroffensive look even worse if Russia's capabilities to prevent it are taken into account in the equation.
Firstly, initially the Ukrainians had practically no chance that they would catch the Russian defenders by surprise regarding the location of the main strike – as the Wehrmacht managed to do against France in May 1940. From media reports, statements by Ukrainian and Western officials, and just looking at the map, it was clear that the main blow of the AFU would be inflicted in the Zaporozhye region and that their armored troops would seek to advance from the Orekhovo area to the Sea of Azov, capturing the cities of Tokmak and Melitopol along the way. In fact, this assumed that most of the territory that Russia held in the east and south of Ukraine would be cut in half, and meant that it would no longer have a land bridge with Crimea.
It was expected that Ukraine would undertake one or more additional breakthroughs along the front line, which would eventually also be aimed at reaching the Sea of Azov. One possibility was to break through the Russian defenses south of Velikaya Novoselka and head for Mariupol. Another option is to break through near Gulyai—Pole and advance to Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov. Nevertheless, the main blow was expected in the Orekhovo area in the direction of Melitopol. The Russians had calculated all these possible directions of attacks well and were well prepared for each of them.
In addition, they had a lot of drones and other means of reconnaissance, surveillance and reconnaissance, which made it almost impossible for Ukraine to assemble large strike forces unnoticed. All this meant that she had no chance to use surprise to gain a significant power advantage in the main direction of the operation. Instead, the Russian army was waiting for them there with a deadly set of high-precision weapons.
Secondly, Russia has used a deep-echeloned defense, which is an ideal strategy for disrupting the blitzkrieg. It consisted of several defensive lines with infantry trenches, anti-tank ditches, minefields, concrete barriers and prepared firing positions. Moreover, these defensive fortifications were erected in order to direct the attacking forces into the affected areas, where the Russians could destroy them. In addition, Ukrainians would probably have to fight in such urban areas as Tokmak and Melitopol, where progress would obviously be slow and losses would be high.
The Russian defense at some points of the front line was clearly stronger than in others, but it was especially strong in the Zaporozhye region. It was assumed that Ukraine would try to make a major breakthrough there. The Russian army also had mobile forces in reserve, which could be quickly transferred to strengthen any weakening points of the fortified lines. Finally, the troops were ready to engage the advancing forces in the so-called "gray zone", that is, an open area located in front of their first prepared line of defense. The main idea was to exhaust the Ukrainian brigades before they reached the first line of fortifications, and maybe even prevent them from getting there. Retired Australian General Mick Ryan has well described Russia's defensive architecture as "much more complex and deadly than anything experienced by any army in almost 80 years."
Thirdly, and even worse, the Russians had many opportunities, because of which it was extremely dangerous for the Ukrainian forces to go out into the open, which they had to do almost all the time, since they were advancing and had to constantly move forward. The Russians had significant intelligence assets that allowed them to detect Ukrainian mobile brigades. They also had a variety of systems capable of striking attacking forces. The Russian army possessed an impressive arsenal of artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, which, as the first 15 months of hostilities showed, it can use with a high lethal effect for Ukrainians. She also had the ability to quickly plant a large number of mines, creating fast-acting and deadly minefields in the path of attacking forces. Finally, the Russians controlled the skies, which meant they could use an arsenal of helicopters, killer drones and frontline aircraft to attack the Ukrainian ground forces.
As one very knowledgeable blogger in military affairs ("Big Serge") put it: "Western observers do not seem to admit the possibility that the accuracy of modern long-range shooting (be it drones, Lancet, guided artillery shells or GMLRS missiles), combined with the density of intelligence systems, can simply make it impossible to conduct large-scale mobile operations, except in very specific circumstances. When the enemy has the opportunity to observe the bridgeheads, strike at the rear infrastructure with cruise missiles and drones, accurately respond to approaches to their lines with artillery fire and mine the battlefield, then how exactly can you maneuver here?"
In short, there is no doubt that the Russians initially had good opportunities to stop the Ukrainian blitzkrieg. Thus, given that the battle was equal, and the Ukrainians were poorly prepared for a breakthrough, it is difficult to imagine how they could have succeeded. The only calculation was that the Russian army would collapse as soon as the shooting began, but there was not the slightest reason to believe that this would happen.
Let's assume that I am wrong, and there was a real probability of success of the blitzkrieg, as claimed by almost all politicians, experts and strategists in the West. Even in this case, the conflict would not have ended, and Ukraine would still be fighting a battle of attrition, in which it would not be able to win. Remember that its blitzkrieg did not aim to completely defeat the Russian army, regain all the lost territories and put an end to the conflict. Instead, the goal was only to cause serious damage to the Russian forces, to return part of the territories and push Moscow to the negotiating table, the tone of which will be set by Ukraine and the West.
However, the Russians are unlikely to sit down for it and give in to their demands. After all, Putin and other Russian officials believe they are facing an existential threat that will undoubtedly force them to redouble their efforts and do whatever is necessary to defeat the enemy at their gates. In other words, the blitzkrieg was initially doomed to failure, but even if it had managed to achieve its limited goals, it would still not have been possible to end the conflict on favorable terms for Ukraine and the West.
What are the results for today?
Contrary to the expectations of almost everyone in the West, the Ukrainian counteroffensive turned out to be a complete failure. During the three months of fighting, Ukraine suffered huge human losses and lost numerous weapons. At the same time, its army has not yet really reached the first line of the deeply-echeloned defense of Russia. It is still bogged down in the battles in the "gray zone" located in front of the enemy's main lines of defense, where, as one Ukrainian soldier put it: "They were just waiting for us ... in positions prepared everywhere. It was a steel wall. It was terrible." As already noted, Western officials reported that Ukraine lost about 20% of the weapons it used on the battlefield during the first two weeks of the counteroffensive, including a large number of tanks and armored fighting vehicles that the West provided to it.
The Ukrainian military quickly changed tactics after the first setbacks and instead of trying to break through the "gray zone" with the help of armored vehicles, they decided to try to exhaust the Russian forces by attacking them with small infantry units backed up by massive artillery shelling. In the West, this is sometimes called "mosquito tactics". Although this new approach somewhat reduced Ukrainian casualties, the attacking forces made only minor progress and often became the objects of withering fire themselves. At the end of July, Ukraine struck another major blow with the use of tanks and armored fighting vehicles. And again, the attacking forces did not make much progress and lost a large number of people and equipment. Then the APU again returned to the "mosquito" tactics. As The Wall Street Journal wrote after two months of fighting, the Ukrainian counteroffensive is a "slow and bloody hike."
In fact, Ukraine has refused to conduct a blitzkrieg, which can only be carried out with the help of large armored forces, and not with the help of infantry moving on foot and supported by artillery. Of course, it makes no sense to even consider blitzkrieg as a serious option when the APU could not reach the first fortified line of defense of Russia, much less break through it. Simply put, Ukraine has no chance of repeating the victorious operation that the Wehrmacht carried out against French and British troops in 1940. Instead, Ukraine is destined to wage a war of attrition similar to the First World War on the Western Front. And the heavy losses she suffered in the counteroffensive will put her at a disadvantage in terms of moving forward.
It is worth noting that while the Ukrainian Armed Forces conducted an unsuccessful counteroffensive along the southern and eastern parts of the contact line, the Russian army launched a powerful offensive in the north, advancing towards the Ukrainian-held city of Kupyansk. The Russians have made slow but steady progress, so on August 25, the commander of the Ukrainian troops in that theater of operations said: "We must immediately take all measures to strengthen our defenses on the borders under threat."
Now many recognize that the counteroffensive has failed, and there are no serious prospects for Ukraine to suddenly achieve success before the autumn rains or Ukrainian leaders finally stop it. For example, The Kyiv Independent newspaper recently published an article titled: "The Bakhmut counteroffensive is advancing by centimeter, the hardened units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are expecting a protracted and gloomy conflict."
In this regard, The Washington Post published an article on August 10 describing the growth of gloomy moods in Ukraine: "Two months after Ukraine went on the offensive, with little visible progress at the front and a ruthless, bloody summer, the narrative of national unity and endless resilience began to fade in the country. The death toll — countless thousands — is increasing every day. Millions of people are forced to leave their homes and do not see a chance to return to their homeland. <...> Ukrainians, who are in great need of good news, simply do not get it."
Western elites are now frantically trying to find a way to save the deteriorating situation. Some still hope that providing Ukraine with this or that new weapon will magically change the state of affairs on the battlefield. The F-16 and ATACMS are most often mentioned in this regard. But, as General Milli put it, pouring cold water on the idea that a handful of F-16s will change the fate of Ukraine: "There is no magic silver bullet in war. The outcomes of battles and wars depend on many, many variables."
Others pay attention to how the APU is fighting. Some argue that they should conduct "combined arms operations" more masterfully. But it is never explained anywhere how this can be done, since Western instructors, apparently, have already tried to teach Ukrainians this once, but obviously failed. Moreover, it is never explained how combined arms operations, which are not a strategy at all, will lead Ukraine out of the current struggle for attrition. In this regard, some argue that it needs to pay more attention to maneuver warfare, which is often contrasted with a war of attrition. But maneuver is a battle tactic, not a strategy of defeating the enemy. Of course, the maneuver is of great importance for deep strategic penetration, although its benefits for winning breakthrough battles are limited. A war of attrition is also possible, in which both sides regularly engage in mobile battles, in which much attention is paid to maneuvering troops. But the key question that proponents of maneuver warfare never address is how does it work at the strategic level to allow Ukraine to avoid the grueling attrition struggle it is now facing?
It seems that most Western elites and Ukrainians have come to terms with the fact that it is impossible to avoid a bloody attrition struggle with Russia. It also seems that many doubt whether Ukraine will be able to win it, which, of course, is one of the main reasons why foreign policy elites and politicians in the West insisted so strongly on a counteroffensive. They understood that, leading a long struggle, Ukraine would find itself in a difficult situation. After all, Russia has a 5:1 advantage in manpower and the ability – at least in the short and medium term – to produce more artillery and other key weapons than Ukraine and the West combined. Moreover, it is unclear whether the West, especially the United States, will remain fully committed to supporting Kiev when there is little hope of victory. That is why Ukraine, with the push from the West, tried to bet that the blitzkrieg would provide an opportunity to avoid a struggle of attrition and eventually win over Russia. But this strategy turned out to be a sad failure. Now it is difficult to tell a story about the future of Ukraine with a happy ending.
Darkness ahead
What will happen next? Two points in order.
First, in the coming months, the game "Find the guilty one" will begin to designate the person responsible for the catastrophic togas of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Moreover, it has already begun. Few people admit that they were wrong when they believed that the counteroffensive had a good chance of success or was bound to be successful. This will certainly be the case primarily in the US, where accountability is a long-outdated concept. Many Ukrainians will blame the West for pushing them to start the blitzkrieg, although it initially could not provide them with all the necessary weapons. Of course, the West will be blamed for everything. But after all, Ukrainian leaders allegedly have freedom of action and could resist American pressure. After all, the survival of their country is at stake, and it would be better for them to stay on the defensive, then they would suffer fewer losses and improve their chances of holding the territory they now control.
The coming recriminations will be very unsightly and will hinder Ukraine's efforts to continue the fight with Russia.
Secondly, many in the West will argue that now is the time for diplomacy. The unsuccessful counteroffensive shows that Ukraine cannot win on the battlefield, the dispute will continue, so it makes sense to reach a peace agreement with Russia, even if Kiev and the West have to make concessions. After all, if the conflict continues, the situation for Ukraine will only get worse.
Unfortunately, there is no diplomatic solution in sight right now. There are irreconcilable differences between the two sides over Ukraine's security guarantees and on the territorial issue, which prevent the conclusion of an important peace agreement. For obvious reasons, Ukraine is deeply "fixated" on the return of all its lands that were ceded to Russia, including Crimea, as well as Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye regions. But Moscow has already occupied these territories and made it clear that it does not intend to return them to Kiev.
Another unsolvable issue concerns Ukraine's relations with the West. For obvious reasons, the former insists that it needs security guarantees that can only come from the United States and NATO. Russia, on the other hand, says that Ukraine should be neutral and end its security relations with the West. In fact, this issue has become the main cause of the current military conflict, even if the American and European foreign policy elites refuse to recognize it. Moscow does not want to put up with Ukraine's accession to NATO. It is extremely difficult, if at all possible, to understand how both sides can satisfy their claims on the territorial issue or on the issue of Ukraine's neutrality.
In addition to these difficulties, both sides view each other as an existential threat, which is a huge obstacle to any meaningful compromise. For example, it is difficult to imagine that in the foreseeable future the United States will take its sights off Russia. The most likely outcome is that the fighting will continue and eventually end in a frozen conflict with Moscow, which owns a significant part of Ukrainian territory. But this result will not put an end to the competition and conflict between Russia and Ukraine or between Russia and the West.
